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Chapter 6 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23,1939: 
When Did Stalin Decide to Align with 
Hitler, and Was Poland the Culprit? 
Anna M. Cienciala 
The official reason given by the Soviet government for the failure of Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations for a military and political alliance in late August 
1939, was the refusal of Poland and Romania to allow the passage of Soviet 
troops through their territories in the event of a German attack on those 
countries. Soviet historians upheld that view, especially blaming Poland, but 
also accusing the Western powers of planning to set Germany against the 
USSR, and claiming that this situation gave Stalin no choice but to conclude a 
pact with Hitler.1 Although microfilm copies of the secret protocol to the 
Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939, were found in western 
Germany at war's end, and were published in the West, Soviet authorities and 
historians consistently denied the protocol's existence, as did the commissar 
for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who signed it.2 It is clear, how-
ever, that high Soviet officials knew the German and Russian originals were 
1. For an early version of some of these charges, see Vyacheslav M. Molotov's 
speech to the Supreme Soviet of August 31, 1939: God Krizisa, 1938-1939 (Mos-
cow, 1990), vol. 2, [henceforth: GK 2] no. 620; Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents 
on Foreign Policy, vol. Ill [henceforth: Degras SDFP III] (Oxford, 1953), 363-371. 
For the old party line on 1939, see Boris Ponomaryov et al., eds., History of Soviet 
Foreign Policy, 1917-1945 (Moscow, 1969), ch. 11: and Vilnis Sipols, Diplomatic 
Battles Before World War II (Moscow, 1982), ch. IV. On standard Soviet treat-
ments of interwar Polish foreign policy, see Anna M. Cienciala, "Marxism and His-
tory: Recent Polish and Soviet Interpretations of Polish Foreign Policy in the Era of 
Appeasement. An Evaluation," East European Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1967): 92-117. 
2. Molotov, who signed the secret protocol along with Ribbentrop, told a Russian 
journalist: "There could not have been any such secret agreement I can assure you 
that this is unquestionably a fabrication." See Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers. 
Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Cbuev (Chicago 1993), 13. 
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kept in sealed envelopes in the Presidential Archives in the Kremlin w h e r e 
they were officially "discovered" in October 1992. Earlier, copies were f o u n d 
and verified in the archives, as admitted publicly in late December 1 9 8 9 . 3 
The lively debate that took place on the pact among Russian h i s t o r i a n s 
in 1989, and carried on in Russian works published in the next few y e a r s , 
showed two schools of thought: one close to the former official i n t e r p r e t a -
tion, defending Stalin's policy, while the second condemned it a long w i t h 
other aspects of Stalinism. The 1989 debate began before the off ic ial a c -
knowledgment of the existence of the copies and subsequently the o r i g i n a l s 
3. The first information on the negotiations for the secret protocol was given a t 
the Nuremberg Trials by the lawyer defending Rudolf Hess, citing a deposition by 
the German Foreign Ministry legal expert, Friedrich Gauss, who was present at the 
negotiations, see Alfred Seidl, Der Fall Rudolf Hess 1941-1987. Dokumentation 
des Verteidigers, 3rd, expanded printing (Munich, 1988), 93-95. However, the Al-
lied prosecutors agreed to the Soviet request that this evidence was inadmissible a t 
the Nuremberg Trials. 
On the history of the microfilm containing the secret protocol, see: Ingeborg 
Fleischhauer, Der Pakt. Hitler; Stalin unter die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatic 
1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990), note 139, 533-534. The Secret 
protocol of August 23,1939, was first published in the British press by the Manchester 
Guardian, 30 May 1946. It was then published in Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939— 
1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington, 
1948, 78, and republished in Documents on German Foreign Policy (henceforth: 
DGFP) ser. D, vol. VII (London, Washington, 1956), no. 229; for the Russian texts 
see GK 2 (Moscow, 1990) nos. 602, 603 and Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki. Vol, 
XXII, 1939 god. Kniga I, [henceforth: DVP 1939 J] (Moscow, 1992), no, 4 8 5 . 
On finding verified copies of the secret protocol, see Alexander N. Yakovlev's 
speech to the Second Congress of People's Deputies, December 24, 1989, Russian 
text, Izvestiia, December 25, 1989, reprinted in: O.A. Rzheshevskii, ed., 1939 God. 
Urokii Istorii [henceforth: 1939 God] (Moscow, 1990), appendix, 4 9 2 - 4 9 3 . F o r 
the Congress's condemnation of the secret protocols announced on December 2 5 , 
see: Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Pravda, December 28,1989, reprint in 1939 God., 4 9 6 -
497; brief excerpt in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1990, no. 42, #09, 1 1 . 1 ; for 
the full text of the reports, see On the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-
German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939 (Moscow, 1990). 
On the first discovery of original German and Russian copies of the secret proto-
col in the Russian Presidential Archives, when Gorbachev handed over power t o 
Boris N. Yeltsin, see interview given by Yakovlev—who was present—to M i c h a e l 
Dobbs, in his: Down with Big Brother. The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New Y o r k , 
1996), 447-448. On the discovery of the Secret protocol by Russian archivists and 
historians in October 1992, see Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire. The 
Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime, trans, and ed. Harold Shukman ( N e w 
York and London), 1998, 528, cf. Lev Bezymensky, "The Secret Protocols o f 1 9 3 9 
as a Problem of Soviet Historiography," in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign 
Policy 1917-1991. A Retrospective (London, 1994), 83-84. 
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of the secret protocol, though a selection of German and Soviet documents 
published that year clearly impelled this acknowledgment. Nevertheless, 
many Russian historians still believe that Western appeasement of Ger-
many, and the Soviet need for time, left Stalin no other option than the pact 
with Hitler to ensure the country's security.4 
The policy of the Polish government, touted by Soviet historiography as 
the decisive factor in the failure of Soviet-Western military negotiations in 
August 1939, was viewed in the same way by some Western participants. 
Thus, in the memoirs of Sir Robert Strang (then assistant secretary for 
foreign affairs and head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, 
who assisted the British ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, from 
mid-June to early August 1939), Warsaw's refusal of the Soviet demand for 
the passage of the Red Army through Poland was presented as the decisive 
factor in the breakdown of the negotiations.5 This was also the view of 
French captain (later general) Andre Beaufre, a member of the French con-
tingent in the Anglo-French military mission in Moscow.6 He was sent to 
Warsaw to help persuade the Polish government to accept the Soviet de-
mand; years later, he still believed the Polish refusal led to the breakdown 
of negotiations. However, two key British participants who were in Mos-
cow at the time, thought otherwise. General T. G. Heywood, head of the 
army section of the British military delegation, thought France and Britain 
never had a chance because the Russians had been playing both sides to get 
the highest price, and the British ambassador, Sir William Seeds, was happy 
4. For a brief survey of the debate among Russian historians, see: M.I. 
MePmiukhov, "Predyistoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny v sovremennykh 
diskusiiakh," in G.A. Bordiagov, ed., Istoricheskie Issledovaniia v Rossii. Tendentsii 
poslednikh let (Moscow, 1996), 278-307; on 1939, ibid., 278-283. For a condem-
nation of Stalin for signing the pact, see: V.L. Doroshenko, "Stalinskaia provokatsiia 
vtoroi mirovoi voiny," in: Drugaia Voina 1939-1945 (Moscow), 1996, 60-72; Lev 
I. Ginzburg, "Sovetsko-Germanskii pakt: Zamyseli egorealizatsiia," Otechestvennai 
Istoriia, no 3 (1996), 29-40; and M. I. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatsii, 
1939-1941 (Moscow, 1992), an earlier version of which appeared as "Sovetsko-
Germanskiie dogovorennosti v 1939—iunie 1941: Vzgliad istorika," Sovetskiie 
Gosudarstvo i Pravo, no.9 (1989), 92-104. 
5. Lord Strang, At Home and Abroad (London, 1956), 189-190. Strang had 
been the British charge d'affaires in Moscow in the early 1930s. For a brief bio-
graphical sketch, see Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Ori-
gins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (London, 1989), 361-362. 
6. For Beaufre's account of his mission to Warsaw, see General [Andre] Beaufre, 
Memoires 1920—1940—1945 (Paris, 1965), 144-151. 
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to accuse Molotov of bad faith to his face.7 Nevertheless, Western histori-
ans generally sided with Strang and Beaufre. A quarter of a century after 
the Moscow negotiations, the British historian, A. J . P. Taylor, a defender 
of British appeasement, condemned Polish foreign policy for being unrea-
sonable and for pretending to great power status, while he credited the 
USSR with the intention of attacking Germany in case of war. He blamed 
the Western powers and Poland for the failure of negotiations with Mos-
cow, and contended that the Nazi-Soviet pact was neither an alliance nor a 
partition of Poland.8 Although Taylor's views were more extreme than most, 
Western historians generally agreed that the Poles were either partly or 
largely to blame for the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations 
and, thus, for the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. 
As mentioned earlier, in 1989, on the fiftieth anniversary of the out-
break of World War II, much was written about the pact in Russia, but 
positive interpretations of Stalin's policy held a significant edge. There was 
no such debate in the West; indeed, the vast majority of Western historical 
periodicals did not even discuss it. British historians and writers who did 
so, generally agreed that Stalin had no other option but to align with Hitler, 
and castigated Poland for her refusal to accept Soviet troops into its terri-
tory. Thus, two journalist-historians, Anthony Reed and David Fisher, ap-
provingly cited journalist-historian William Shirer to the effect that Polish 
"self-destructiveness" had been responsible for the partitions of Poland in 
the late eighteenth century, and that the Poles were guilty of "willful blind-
ness" in refusing to consider Soviet demands for Red Army passage in 
August 1939. To this, the two authors added their own disparaging com-
ment: "Like the three little pigs, the Poles still frolicked inside their straw 
house while the big bad wolf was already drawing breath on the outside."9 
7. For general T. G. Heywood's opinion, see point 8 in his letter of August 23 to 
the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy [henceforth: DBF?], 3rd series, vol. VII (London, 1954), app. II, no. 6, 607. 
For Seeds to Molotov on bad faith, see Seeds to Halifax, August 29, 1939, in D.C. 
Watt, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the For-
eign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series A. The Soviet Union 1917-1939, vol. 
15 (Lanham, MD., 1986), 144. 
8. For examples of Taylor's disparaging opinion of Foreign Minister Jozef Beck 
and Polish foreign policy, see The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), 
80-81, 251; on the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 262. For a penetrating critique of Taylor's 
views on Poland, see Piotr S.Wandycz, "Poland between East and West," ch. 8 in 
Gordon Martel, ed., The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered. The A.J.P. 
Taylor Debate After Twenty-Five Years (Boston, London, Sydney, 1986), 187-209. 
9. Anthony Reed and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace. Hitler, Stalin, and the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941 (New York and London, 1988), 214-215. William L. 
Shirer (1904-93) was the Universal News Service correspondent in Berlin, 1934-
37, also Columbia Broadcasting Service correspondent in Vienna, 1935-37, Prague 
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On a scholarly level, the leading German historian of Soviet-German rela-
tions in 1938-39, Ingeborg Fleischhauer, contended that the Polish refusal 
to allow the passage of Soviet troops eliminated Moscow's option of an 
alliance with the Western powers. However, some German historians dis-
agreed. They perceived Stalin's goal as either expanding communism after 
an exhausting European war in which the USSR would be neutral, or as 
Soviet territorial expansion, or a combination of both.10 
After the publication in 1990-1992 of Soviet diplomatic documents for 
1939,11 most Western historians still hewed to their previous views. Thus, 
British historian Geoffrey Roberts concluded that, while an agreement with 
Nazi Germany was always an option for Stalin, "not until the final break-
down of the military negotiations with Britain and France were the Ger-
mans invited to cross the threshold." He claimed that this was an act of 
desperation on Stalin's part, and also endorsed Taylor's view of the Nazi-
Soviet pact.12 Another British historian, Jonathan Haslam, had concluded 
earlier (1984) that: 
Confronted with the evident unwillingness of the Entente to provide immediate, 
concrete, and water-tight guarantees for Soviet security in Europe, let alone in 
Asia . . . the Russians were left with little alternative but an agreement with 
Germany creating a condominium in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the Nazi-
Soviet pact was unquestionably the second best solution.13 
Haslam thought that Stalin kept his options open until it was clear that the 
Anglo-French military delegation was not ready to grant Soviet demands. 
and Berlin, 1937-40, then war correspondent 1941-45; see his Berlin Diary, 1934-
1941 (New York, 1941), and The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 
1961). He was very critical of Polish foreign policy, particularly with regard to the 
USSR. 
10. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Hitler-
Stalin Pact," in Bernd Wegner, ed., From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and 
the World, 1939-1941 (Oxford, 1997), 31, 43. For the view that Stalin aimed to 
expand communism after a European war, see Gottfried Schramm, "Basic Features 
of German Ostpolitik, 1918-1939," Wegner, ibid., 24; for a similar view, see Rolf 
Ahmann, "Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt: Nichtangriffs- und Angriffsvertrag?" in: Erwin 
Oberlander, ed., Hitler-Stalin Pakt 1939: Das Ende Mitteleuropas? (Frankfurt-am-
Main, 1989), 26-42; and Jorg K. Hoensch, ibid., 50. 
11. See note 3 above. D VP 1939 I contains more new Russian documents than 
God Krizisa, published in 1990. 
12. Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World 
War. Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941 (New York, 1995), 
86, 92. For an earlier work by this author, with similar conclusions, see The Unholy 
Alliance. Stalin's Pact with Hitler (Bloomington, IN., 1989). 
13. Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security 
in Europe, 1933-1939 (New York, 1984), 231. 
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However, in 1994, he concluded that Stalin had opted for Hitler as early as 
the dismissal of Maxim M. Litvinov from the post of commissar of foreign 
affairs in early May 1939. This view is shared by some Russian historians, 
for example, Lev I. Ginzberg.14 Fleischhauer contends, however, that Stalin 
finally made up his mind on August 21, when it was clear that the British 
and French delegations had no answer to give on the passage of Soviet 
troops through Poland and Romania. An American historian, Teddy 
Uldricks, rejects all existing theories in favor of the simple explanation that 
Stalin was a realist and sought security wherever he could find it, a view 
shared by Gabriel Gorodetsky.15 According to Canadian historian Michael 
Jabara Carlay, [Foreign Minister Jozef] "Beck was the bete noire of just 
about everyone in Europe" and " . . . Litvinov regarded him as a Nazi 
pimp." [sic]. Finally, Carlay writes: "Polish opposition to collective secu-
rity and Polish collusion with Nazi Germany immensely irritated Soviet 
and French diplomats and led ultimately to Poland's disappearance."16 As 
for the Poles, most have always believed—as did the Polish government in 
August 1939—that Stalin wanted to stay out of the war, preferred a deal 
with Hitler, and deliberately double-crossed France and Britain. This was 
also the view of exiled Polish historians, shared later by their colleagues in 
Poland when they could write freely on the subject after the collapse of 
communism in 1989.17 However, with the exception of some German schol-
ars, Gerhard L. Weinberg, the leading American historian of Nazi foreign 
policy, and Donald Cameron Watt, the premier British diplomatic histo-
rian of this period, most Western historians still see the Nazi-Soviet pact as 
14. Haslam: "Litvinov, Stalin and the Road not Taken," in Gorodetsky, ed., 
Soviet Foreign Policy, 58; also Ginzburg, "Sovetsko-germanskii pakt," 30. How-
ever, the majority view is expressed by Vladimir Sokolov: "The question of Litvinov's 
resignation was ripe for decision if the Soviet government did not intend to pursue 
a policy oriented to Britain and France, but an independent policy meeting the 
country's national rather than ideological needs." Sokolov, "People's Commissar 
Maxim Litvinov," International Affairs, no. 5, (Moscow, 1991): 93-107. 
15. Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 339; Teddy J. Uldricks, "Soviet Security in the 1930s," 
in Gorodetsky, Soviet Foreign Policy, 73; see also Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Illu-
sion. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven and London, 1999), 
8-9. 
16. Michael Jabara Carlay, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was And The Com-
ing Of World War II (Chicago, 1999), p. 68. 
17. Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864-
1945, vol. II, 1864-1939 (London, 1956, reprint Warsaw, 1981), ch. 22; Stanislaw 
Gregorowicz, MichalJ. Zacharias, Polska—Zwiqzek Sowiecki. Stosunki polityczne 
1925-1939 (Warsaw, 1995), ch. XV; Wojciech Materski, Tarcza Europy. Stosunki 
polsko-sowieckie 1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1994), ch. VI, section 5. 
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either the only, or at least the logical, choice for Stalin.18 Most historians 
also view the demand for Red Army passage though Poland as natural, and 
see the Polish refusal as either key to the breakdown of Franco-British 
military negotiations with the USSR, or at least a significant contributing 
factor. In contrast to the above, the goal of this paper is to demonstrate 
that most of the available evidence indicates Stalin always preferred a pact 
with Germany, and that he used negotiations with the Western powers to 
pressure Hitler into an agreement with the USSR. Finally, it will also show 
that Poland did not play any significant role in Stalin's decision to sign the 
nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. 
It is, of course, true that the Poles distrusted the Soviet Union. This was not 
surprising, given Russia's role in the partitions of Poland, and then her 
oppressive rule over her share of Polish lands.19 After World War I, Lenin's 
attempt to destroy the reborn Polish state was foiled by Marshal Jozef 
Pilsudski in the Battle of the Vistula in mid-August 1920. This defeat rankled 
deep with the Russians, together with great resentment at the loss of west-
ern Ukraine and western Belorussia to Poland in the Treaty of Riga (March 
18, 1921).2 0 As for the Poles, they distrusted both of their great neighbors 
18. On these German historians, see note 10 above. According to Gerhard L. 
Weinberg, "A war between Germany and the Western Powers looked to the Soviet 
leader like the best prospect for both the safety and the future expansion of Soviet 
power," Germany, Hitler and World War 11. Essays in Modern German History 
(Cambridge, England, 1995), 176. D. C. Watt distributes blame for the failure of 
the Moscow negotiations equally between the British and the French on the one 
side and the Soviets on the other. However, he adds the proviso that having a paid 
Soviet spy in the foreign office communications center (Francis Herbert King), and 
a master spy in Japan (Richard Sorge), the director of Soviet negotiations with 
Britain and Germany was "like a poker player with marked cards." Watt suspects 
the conviction that Hitler's main targets were Britain and France was central to 
Soviet policy, How War Came, 231, 369. 
19. For Poland under Russian rule and national uprisings, see Piotr S.Wandycz, 
The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle, WA, and London, 1974); 
and Norman Davies, God's Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. II. 1795 to the 
Present (New York, 1982), ch. 2. 
20. For the diplomatic history of the Soviet-Polish War, see Wandycz, Soviet-
Polish Relations 1917-1921 (Cambridge, MA., 1969); on the military side, see 
Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London, 
1972). For Lenin's statements at a closed session of the Ninth Party Conference on 
September 22, 1920 (first published in Russia in 1992), on the reasons for the 
Soviet rejection of the Curzon Line and the decision to advance into Poland, see 
Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York, 1993), 181-183. 
For the Treaty of Riga, see Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, vol. 
1. 1939-1943 [henceforth: DPSR] (London, 1961), no. 3. 
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and conducted their foreign policy accordingly. In view of German claims 
to Polish western territories and the well known, if muted, Soviet claims to 
eastern Poland, the cardinal principle of interwar Polish foreign policy was 
"equilibrium" or nonalignment with either neighboring power, but main-
taining equilibrium between them. This policy was bolstered by an alliance 
with France to secure the latter's aid in case of war with Germany, and a 
defensive alliance with Romania in case of war with the USSR. The equilib-
rium policy was characterized by the Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty 
(1932) and the Declaration of Nonaggression with Germany (1934, for 
ten years), after which the Polish-Soviet treaty was extended for ten years.21 
However, due to Hitler's policy of courting Warsaw, Polish relations were 
more amicable with Berlin than with Moscow from 1934 until March 1939. 
The agreement with Berlin recognized Poland's existing alliances, that is, 
with France and Romania. Thus, equilibrium was a well known Polish 
policy, which was reiterated to Moscow several times in the course of the 
fateful spring and summer of 1939.22 
Poland's distrust of the USSR was shared by the European peoples who 
had been subject to Russia in the past; that is: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and also by Romania whose possession of Bessarabia was never 
recognized by the USSR. The Soviet Union was also distrusted by most 
West European statesmen, who saw their views confirmed by Soviet decla-
rations and official statements, especially Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth 
Party Congress on March 10. He then declared Soviet readiness to help 
victims of aggression—but also accused France and Britain of setting Ger-
many against the USSR and said the Soviet Union would not pull chestnuts 
out of the fire for other powers.23 
Two days after Hitler's destruction of the Czechoslovak state (March 
15, 1939), and with rumors flying of a German threat to Romania, the 
British inquired whether Moscow would declare its readiness to aid Roma-
nia in case of aggression. The Soviet government, in turn, proposed a con-
ference in Bucharest for joint consultation.24 This was turned down by the 
21. For the texts of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact of July 25,1932 and its 
ten-year extension on May 5, 1934, see DPSR, nos. 6, 10; for the Polish-German 
Declaration of Nonaggression of January 26, 1934, see DGFPy C, vol. II (London 
and Washington, 1959), no.291. 
22. For a brief study of interwar Polish foreign policy, see Anna M. Cienciala, 
"Polish Foreign Policy, 1926-1939; 'Equilibrium,' Stereotype and Reality," Polish 
Review, vol. XX, no. 1 (1975): 42-58. 
23. For extracts from Stalin's speech of March 10, 1939 to the Eighteenth Con-
gress of the Soviet Communist Party, see Degras, SDFP III, 315-322. 
24. For the British inquiry, see Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax to Ambassa-
dor Seeds, March 17, DEPP, 3rd sen, vol. IV (London, 1951). no. 389; for Seeds' 
conversation with Litvinov on March 18, and his report on Litvinov's proposals of 
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British government, which proposed, on March 21, a declaration on con-
sultation in case of a threat of further aggression to France, the USSR, 
Poland, and Romania. The Polish government refused to sign because, as 
the Polish foreign minister claimed, Poland's signature alongside the USSR 
would provoke a German attack on her. The real motives, however, were 
both distrust of Moscow and the goal of keeping the door open to a com-
promise settlement of the Danzig-Corridor question with Germany, which 
would be compatible with Poland's security and independence. Instead of 
signing the declaration, Beck proposed a secret Anglo-Polish agreement on 
consultation, which the British accepted. This led to the conclusion of a 
provisional agreement on mutual assistance, signed on April 6, during Beck's 
visit to Britain. Beck explained the Polish position to Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain saying that the Poles had no confidence in Soviet Russia. On the 
basis of their experience, they saw no difference between Soviet and Tsarist 
imperialism, but in the face of the German threat they thought it advisable 
that, at a minimum, Russia's neutrality should be secured. They did not 
believe that Russia would honestly join Poland's allies, but they would not 
oppose British and French efforts to reach an understanding with Moscow. 
Beck added that, as in the case of the negotiations for the Franco-Soviet 
alliance (1935), the Polish government would insist that no treaty con-
cluded by its Western allies without their participation could impose any 
obligations on Poland. But he also declared the Poles would welcome any 
Allied agreement with the Soviets, which would allow the transit of mili-
tary supplies and the delivery of Soviet raw materials to Poland.25 
The Polish attitude toward the USSR was based, not only on memories 
of the past and hopes of a peaceful resolution of disputes with Germany, 
March 19, ibid., nos. 403, 421; for the Russian text of the Soviet proposal of March 
18, see Litvinov to Stalin, DVP 1939 I, no. 150, also Litvinov to Soviet ambassa-
dors in London and Paris, March 18, 1939, Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of 
World War II [henceforth: SPE] (Moscow, 2nd printing, 1976), no. 109. For British 
documents on the Declaration on Consultation, see DBFP, ibid., chapter V. 
25. See annotated edition of Jozef Beck's memoirs: Polska polityka zagraniczna 
w latach 192-1939. Na podstawie tekstow min. Jozefa Becka opracowala Anna M. 
Cienciala Paris, (1990), 245-246; cf. the French edition of Beck's memoirs, Colonel 
Jozef Beck, Dernier Rapport. Politique polonaise 1926-1939 (Neuchatel and Paris, 
1951), 93-194; English edition, Final Report (New York, 1957). For British records 
of Beck's London talks, see DBFP, 3rd Sen, vol. V (London, 1952), nos. 1,2,10, 16, 
also Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939. A Study in the Interde-
pendence of Eastern and Western Europe (London, Toronto, 1968), 216-217. This 
work was based on Polish archival documents in the Polish Institute and Sikorski 
Museum, London (henceforth PISM), also on published British, French, German, 
and Italian documents available at that time. For a later study of the topic in 1939, 
based on Polish and other archival documents, see Cienciala article cited in note 41 
below. 
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but also on certain key assumptions, some of which were shared by non-
Polish observers. Thus, from Warsaw's point of view, a German-Soviet al-
liance was seen as most unlikely for ideological reasons, which was, inci-
dentally, also the view prevalent in the West. Furthermore, from the mili-
tary point of view, the Poles did not expect the USSR to participate in any 
offensive action against Germany because the Soviet officer corps had been 
decapitated by the purge of 1937—a view shared by both the French and 
British General Staffs. Finally, the Poles thought a German-Soviet partition 
of Poland would be unacceptable to the Soviets because it would bring the 
formidable German army and air force that much nearer to Moscow, thus 
posing a mortal threat to Soviet security—a view shared by many Western 
observers, though some entertained such a possibility. Therefore, the Poles 
expected a German attack on their country to bring them automatic Soviet 
aid.26 They were confirmed in their views by Soviet statements that the 
USSR would supply Poland with raw materials—at least, within the frame-
work of the trade agreement signed in February 1939, ratified on May 
16—and probably with military supplies and air support in case of a Ger-
man-Polish war.27 
However, friendly public declarations aside, the Soviet attitude toward 
Poland was characterized by profound hostility and suspicion. Moscow's 
attempts to pin down the Polish government on the declaration of consul-
tation seem to have been designed less to elicit Polish agreement than to 
document an expected Polish refusal. Thus, Litvinov told Seeds on March 
21 that he was sure Poland would not accept the commitments under the 
declaration on consultation in case of further German aggression, as pro-
posed by London. He also confided to French Charge d'Affaires Jean Payart, 
on March 29, that he felt Beck's "line" was unlikely to change until Poland 
received a direct blow. Despite these views, the Soviet government made 
26. The opinion of the Polish ambassador to the USSR, Wadaw Grzybowski, 
was typical. He told Undersecretary of State, Jan Szembek, on June 26, 1939, that 
he did not believe the rumors of German-Soviet talks because Moscow could not 
permit a German victory over Poland, and thus have Germany as a neighbor, see 
Jan Zaranski, ed., Diariusz i Teki ]ana Szembeka, 1935-1939, vol. IV (London, 
1972), 641. This was also the policy evaluation given by the Polish General Staff to 
Col. Stefan Brzeszczynski, Polish military attache in Moscow, when he visited War-
saw in early June, see Brzeszczynski report to the War Minister, Paris, December 31, 
1939, Kol. 79, PISM. On June 29, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow reported a 
similar statement by a member of the Polish embassy; see Foreign Relations of the 
United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1939. Vol. I. General, [henceforth FRUS 1939 I] 
(Washington, D.C., 1956), 196. 
27. For the Polish-Soviet trade agreement of February 19, ratified on May 16, 
1939, see Dokumenty i materiafy do historii stosunkow polsko-radzieckich, vol. 
VII, January 1939—December 1943, [henceforth: DiM VII] (Warsaw, 1973), nos. 
12-17, 63-64. 
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Poland's signature—along with that of France—the condition for its own 
adherence to the declaration.28 One may well ask why Moscow insisted 
that Poland sign the declaration on consultation, if she was expected not to 
do so? Perhaps Stalin saw this as a test of whether Britain and France 
would force Poland to sign? Whatever the case may be, Soviet Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir P. Potemkin did not, as is some-
times claimed, offer a mutual assistance pact to the Polish foreign minister 
when they met in Warsaw on May 1 0 , 1 9 3 9 . This was five days after Beck's 
speech to the Polish Parliament, in which he answered Hitler's statements 
of April 28. Beck declared Poland's determination to not be cut off from 
the Baltic Sea, but at the same time, Polish desire for peace—though not at 
any price, and especially not at the price of honor. Molotov instructed 
Potemkin to stop in the Polish capital on his way home from a tour of the 
Balkans and Turkey because Beck had expressed a desire to see him. 
Potemkin's main task was to learn what was going on between Poland and 
Germany, but Molotov also authorized him to "hint" at possible Soviet aid to 
Poland. According to Potemkin's brief, published telegram, that is all he did, 
saying the USSR would not refuse assistance to Poland if she desired it.29 
28. See Seeds to Halifax, March 21,1939, DBFP, 3rd ser. vol. IV (London, 1951), 
no. 461; Litvinov's report does not include his remark on Poland, GK, 1, no. 209. 
In his telegram of March 21 to Soviet ambassadors in Britain and France, Litvinov 
stated the Soviet government would sign the declaration as soon as France and 
Poland promised their signatures, SPE no. 122, GK 1, no. 215 and SVP 1939 I, 
no. 162. For Litvinov's remark to Payart, see extract in: SPE, no. 132, 226, not 
included in published Russian and French documents. For Litvinov's and Potemkin's 
conversations with Polish Ambassador Grzybowski regarding Poland's signature of 
the declaration, see DiM VII, nos. 32 ,37 ,42 ,43 ,46 ; also GK. 1, nos. 226,251, and 
DVP 1939, I, nos. 183, 189. 
29. For Beck's speech of May 5,1939, see The Polish White Book. Official Docu-
ments concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939 [henceforth 
PWB] (London and New York, 1940), no.77. By saying Poland wanted peace but 
"not at the price of honor;" Beck meant giving up Polish independence without a fight. 
His speech, prepared in consultation with the British government, answered Hitler's 
speech of April 28, in which the latter denounced the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 
1935, and the Polish-German Declaration of Nonaggression, and listed the proposals 
Poland had rejected, i.e., the return of Danzig and part of the Polish Corridor to the 
Reich in exchange for German recognition of the Polish-German frontier, saying he 
would never offer them again. For Molotov's instruction to Potemkin, May 10, 1939, 
see DVP, 1939,1, no.293; for Potemkin's brief telegram on his conversation with Beck 
that day, see SPE, no. 210; for the same text in Russian, see DiM, VII, no. 60, GK 1, 
no. 330. Fleischhauer interprets Potemkin's remarks as a proposal for a Polish-Soviet 
assistance pact, which was rejected, see her article in Wegner, ed., From Peace to War, 
34. Elsewhere she writes that Beck's declarations to Potemkin were "a bitter pill" for 
the Russians, who had hoped for an assistance pact with Poland, Der Pakt, 188. 
There is no documented evidence of a Moscow proposal for a Soviet-Polish assistance 
pact, or of Russian hopes for same. 
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Whatever else Potemkin may have said, he managed to give Beck the 
impression that Moscow understood Poland's nonalignment policy, and 
that the Poles would never attack the USSR in tandem with Germany. Beck 
also noted Potemkin's statement that Moscow would adopt a policy of 
benevolent neutrality in case of a Polish-German war.30 By this time, of 
course, Litvinov had been replaced as commissar for foreign affairs by 
Molotov (May 3), and Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were proceeding 
toward a treaty guaranteeing the USSR's western neighbors against Ger-
man aggression. In order to avoid any misunderstandings of Beck's state-
ments to Potemkin, Ambassador Grzybowski clarified the Polish position 
to Molotov the following day. He read to him the instruction just received 
from Warsaw: (1) Poland did not agree with, nor authorize, the French 
initiative regarding guarantees to Poland; (2) she could not accept a one-
sided Soviet guarantee, nor a mutual guarantee because, if she were totally 
engaged in a conflict with Germany, she could not aid the Soviet Union; (3) 
the Polish attitude toward collective negotiations would depend on the 
results of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, but Poland rejected all dis-
cussion of matters affecting her other than by bilateral methods; (4) the 
Polish-Romanian alliance was purely defensive, so it could not be regarded 
as in any way directed against the USSR.31 
It is not known what Potemkin actually reported to Molotov when he 
returned to Moscow because this document is not accessible as yet. It is 
known, however, that when the new Soviet ambassador to Warsaw, Nikolai 
I. Sharonov, took up his post in late May, he also professed Soviet friend-
30. On May 13, Beck wrote Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador in Paris, 
that conversations with Potemkin on May 10 made it clear the Soviet government 
understood the Polish point of view on relations with the USSR, and realized the 
Polish government did not intend to reach agreement with either great neighbor 
against the other. Beck wrote: "Mr. Potemkin also stated that in the event of an 
armed conflict between Poland and Germany, the Soviets will adopt 'une attitude 
bienveillante' towards us.," PWB no. 163, DPSR no. 19. Beck confirmed this state-
ment in his memoirs. He also noted that the new Soviet ambassador [Nikolai 
Sharonov] told him a few days later that Molotov had studied Potemkin's report 
several times and judged the conversation to be very positive, saying: "I quite un-
derstand Colonel Beck"—to which the latter answered he still understood Molotov 
quite well, see: Beck (Cienciala, ed.), Polska polityka zagraniczna, 253. 
31. For Grzybowski's statement to Molotov, May 11, see SPE, no.212, Russian 
text: DiM, VII, no. 62, GK 1, no. 336, DVP, 1939,1, no. 298; see also Grzybowski's 
"Final Report," Paris, November 6, 1939, PWB, no. 184, reprinted with some ab-
breviations in DPSR, no. 69. "French initiatives" meant French efforts aimed at the 
conclusion of a triple alliance between France, Britain, and the USSR involving 
Poland, but not necessarily with the latter's agreement. 
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ship for Poland and hinted at Moscow's readiness to help Poland.32 This 
and similar declarations may have been designed to support Polish deter-
mination to resist German demands by force, but it is clear Sharonov did 
not believe the Poles would really do so. His report to Molotov of August 
23 probably reflected not only his opinion but also the views of the Soviet 
leadership throughout the spring and summer of 1939. Sharonov wrote 
that Poland was preparing to bow to England's peace policy, if she had not 
already done so; therefore a German-Polish war over Danzig was unlikely.33 
It should be borne in mind that Stalin's decision to sign the nonaggression 
pact with Nazi Germany, however astounding to most contemporaries, 
had solid historical precedents. Russia and Prussia, later Germany, had 
enjoyed friendly relations for most of the period 1772-1914, and this rela-
tionship—in which the Austrian Empire was the third partner—was founded 
on the partitions of Poland. After the Bolshevik seizure of power in No-
vember 1917, came the peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers in 
March 1918, in which Lenin gave up the western provinces of the former 
Russian Empire rather than continue the war and thus risk losing power. 
The peace allowed Germany to launch powerful offensives on the western 
front, but her ultimate defeat nullified the peace of Brest-Litovsk. In April 
1922, the Rapallo Treaty normalized German-Soviet relations and can-
celed mutual claims, while the Treaty of Berlin, signed four years later, was 
in essence a nonaggression agreement between the two countries. Until the 
advent of Hitler, relations were very good and military cooperation flour-
ished. Even after Hitler terminated the latter in fall 1933, trade relations 
continued. Indeed, Stalin, in his report to the Seventeenth Congress of the 
CPSU on January 26, 1934 (the day the Polish-German Declaration of 
Nonaggression was signed), said that fascism was not the issue, for it did 
not prevent good Soviet relations with Italy. This policy line led to the 
32. Ambassador Sharonov reported on May 25, that he told Beck the Soviet 
Union would be willing to help Poland if the latter was attacked by Germany, but 
that earlier talks were necessary to make such help possible, DiM VII, no. 66, GK I, 
no. 373, DVP 1939, I, no.334. On presenting his credentials to Polish President 
Ignacy Moscicki on June 2, Sharonov said his mission was to support and develop 
friendly Polish-Soviet relations based on a series of mutual political and economic 
agreements. Close and fruitful cooperation between the two countries was, he said, 
a factor in the consolidation of universal peace and it was in keeping with Soviet 
policy to have peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, especially with its 
neighbors, see PWB, no. 165, DiM VII, no.70. This was two days after Molotov's 
speech to the Supreme Soviet, in which he used the same phrases on Soviet relations 
with Poland, see: Degras, SDFPy III, 337. 
33. Sharonov's report of August 23, 1939, DVP 2939, 1, no. 489; on Poland and 
Germany, ibid., p. 640. 
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conclusion of a German-Soviet trade-credit agreement in early April 1935, 
whereby Germany gave the Soviet Union a credit of two hundred million 
RM to purchase German manufactured goods in return for Soviet raw 
materials.34 While trade continued, German-Soviet relations deteriorated 
but Litvinov (perceived then as now as the champion of collective security) 
declared publicly in December 1937 that collective security was dead and 
that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Germany was per-
fectly possible.35 
Whether or not the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 was mainly the result of 
efforts by those German Foreign Ministry officials who wanted a return to 
Rapallo, as Fleischhauer contends,36 it is clear that such a return was de-
sired by some members of the German diplomatic and military establish-
ment. All available evidence points to the fact that this was also the Soviet 
goal. However, the question of when Stalin decided to pursue it is still a 
matter of debate because authoritative Russian documentation is lacking. 
The most important source for his policy decisions might well be the records 
of discussions in Stalin's "Kremlin Cabinet." This body consisted, in order 
of importance, of Stalin; Molotov, Politburo member, head of the Sovnarkom 
(Council of National Commissars), and from early May, commissar for 
foreign affairs; Andrei A. Zhdanov, head of the Leningrad party organiza-
tion and Politburo member in charge of ideology; Anastas I. Mikoyan, 
Politburo member and deputy premier in charge of foreign and domestic 
trade; Lazar M. Kaganovich, Politburo member in charge of agriculture; 
34. For documents on German-Soviet military cooperation, see Yuri Dyakov & 
Tatyana Bushuyeva, The Red Army and the Wehrmacht. How the Soviets Milita-
rized Germany, 1922-1933, and Paved the Way for Fascism (New York, 1995). 
For Stalin on Germany, January 26, 1934, Degras, SDFP, III, 70. For the German-
Soviet trade agreement signed April 9, 1935, see: DGFP C IV (London and Wash-
ington, 1962), nos. 20, 21. 
35. For Litvinov on collective security as dead, see his interview with the Mos-
cow correspondent of Le Monde, late December 1937, cit. Hugh D. Phillips, Be-
tween the Revolution and the West. A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov 
(Boulder, CO., 1992), 163; French text, Ambassador Robert Coulondre to Premier 
Yvon Delbos, December 27,1937, Documents Diplomatiques Frangais [henceforth: 
DDF], 2nd ser. vol. VII (Paris, 1972), no. 30, enclosure, "Note de M. Luciani." 
36. Fleischhauer claims that Stalin's remark on not pulling chestnuts out of the 
fire for others in his speech of March 10, 1939, was taken up by the "old" 
Wilhelmstrasse officials, who built on this phrase to pursue the German national 
interest as they saw it, and worked to get Ribbentrop's support for a deal with 
Soviet Russia-see Fleischhauer in Wegner, ed. From Peace to War, 33. This is also 
the theme of her major work, Der Pakt. 
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Lavrenty P. Beria, candidate member of the Politburo, commissar of the 
NKVD (National Commissariat of Internal Security); Marshal Kliment Y. 
Voroshilov, member of the Politburo and commissar for military and naval 
affairs, also others as needed. Selected officials, including Molotov, who 
was nearly always present, met almost every night with the "Vozhd" (leader) 
in his Kremlin office to discuss current problems and policy. However, only 
the dates and lists of visitors for each day are available. Aside from the lack 
of these records, Politburo, Central Committee, Foreign Affairs Commis-
sariat documents, also NKVD and GRU (Military Intelligence) documents 
illustrating Soviet foreign policy decision-making are missing from the 
Russian sources published thus far, and are still inaccessible in Russian 
archives.37 
In the absence of authoritative documents on Soviet foreign policy deci-
sion-making, it is worth mentioning that a handful of Soviet defectors re-
ported Stalin had wanted a deal with Hitler for some time before August 
1939. Among them was the Soviet charge d'affaires in Rome, Leon B. 
Helphand, who defected to the West in summer 1940. However, the first 
published claim that Stalin preferred a deal with Hitler to one with the 
Western powers was made by Walter Krivitsky, the head of Soviet military 
intelligence in Western Europe, then Spain, until his defection in 1937, 
when he feared the Stalinist purges would engulf him as well. Krivitsky 
published a series of articles in the Saturday Evening Post in April 1939 
asserting that Stalin had sought an agreement with Nazi Germany since 
1934. Later, he publicized the theory—shared by Polish statesmen and some 
Western observers—that Soviet negotiations for an alliance with France 
and Britain were a fraud. In support of this claim, Krivitsky adduced Stalin's 
refusal to believe in a German threat to the USSR. According to Krivitsky, 
when the German-Soviet trade-credit agreement was concluded in April 
1935, Stalin said that Hitler could not make war on the USSR—because 
German business circles were too powerful to allow it. Krivitsky also claimed 
that the head of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin, David Kandelaki, 
brought with him the draft of a German-Soviet agreement when he re-
37. For names of visitors in Stalin's appointment book for 1938-1939, see 
"Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalina. Zhurnaly (Tetradi) Zapisy lits 
priniiatykh pervym gensekom, 1924-1953;" Istoricheskii Arkbiv, no. 5-6 (Mos-
cow, 1995): 5-63, [henceforth: IA 1995, no. 5-6]. On declassified documents and 
general comments on Russian archives, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Some Observa-
tions on Using the Soviet Archives," Diplomatic History, no. 5 (1997): 243-258; 
also Michael David Fox and David Hoffmann, "The Politburo Protocols, 1919-
49," The Russian Review, vol. 55 (1996): 99-103. 
162 Ideology., Politics and Diplomacy in East Central Europe 
turned to Moscow in April 1937.38 If there was such a draft, it did not 
survive in German archives, though German documents record Soviet sound-
ings of Germany in 1935-36. Thus, on May 8, 1935, Litvinov told the 
German ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich Werner von der 
Schulenburg, that since the Soviet Union had signed an alliance with France, 
he hoped it would soon be followed by a general nonaggression agreement, 
"of the kind suggested by Germany." This would, said Molotov, lessen the 
significance of the Franco-Soviet pact and lead to the improvement of Ger-
man-Soviet relations, "which the Soviet Government desired above all things 
and which they now considered possible."39 This proposal was made just 
six days after the signature of the Franco-Soviet alliance in Paris and eight 
days before the signature of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance in Prague. 
German documents also show that in late 1936, Kandelaki told Hjalmar 
Schacht, head of the Reichsbank, that the Soviet government had never 
refused political negotiations with Germany and had even made concrete 
proposals to improve them at the time of the negotiations for the Franco-
Soviet pact—a passage that German Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin 
von Neurath underlined, adding a question mark. Kandelaki declared that 
38. Uldricks dismisses this testimony because it was given by lower-level Soviet 
functionaries, whose information was speculative and because, as defectors, they 
had rejected the Stalinist system, see Uldricks in Gorodetsky, Soviet Foreign Policy, 
69,-and 74, note 14. For Krivitsky's account, see Walter Krivitsky, / Was Stalin's 
Agent (New York, 1940). For Stalin's reaction to the German-Soviet trade agree-
ment, and Kandelaki bringing a draft agreement, ibid., 31, 38. The book was first 
published in London, in 1939, titled, In Stalin's Secret Service (reprint, New York, 
2000). The Russian translation of this edition has an extensive supplement with 
materials on and by Krivitsky, also documents selected and annotated by Aleksandr 
Kolpakidi, with photographs and short biographies of people figuring in the book, 
see Val'ter Krivitsky, la byl agentom Stalina. Zapiski sovetskogo razvednika (Mos-
cow, 1996). Walter Krivitsky (Samuel Ginsberg, 1889-1941), gave testimony to a 
congressional committee. He was found dead in room 532, Bellevue Hotel, Wash-
ington, D.C. on February 10,1941, see Flora Lewis, "Who Killed Krivitsky?" Wash-
ington Post, 13 February 1966), reprint, Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service (New 
York, 2000). Despite an alleged suicide note to Krivitsky's lawyer, it is very likely 
that the KGB murdered him. 
39. Ambassador Schulenburg's report on his conversation with Litvinov, May 8, 
1935, DGFP, ser. C, vol. IV, no. 78. Litvinov's mention of a German suggestion of 
a nonaggression pact referred to a vague German proposal made to the British 
government as a counter to their proposal that Germany join the proposed Eastern 
Security Pact, see "Communique of the Official German News Agency," 18 April 
1935, ibid., no. 29. 
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his government was ready to enter into open or secret German-Soviet ne-
gotiations to improve mutual relations, and on "general peace." However, 
Hitler rejected the idea, whose time, he said, had not yet come. But he also 
said that once Stalin showed himself the absolute master of Russia, and 
especially of the military, Germany would not pass up the opportunity.40 
German-Soviet negotiations for a new trade-credit agreement began in 
December 1938, with the signature of an agreement on methods of pay-
ment. At the turn of 1938-39, the German press toned down its attacks on 
the USSR and the Soviet press reciprocated. Trade negotiations proceeded 
in January 1939, but were suspended by the Germans later that month. 
They were to resume once more in July 1939, and this time they would 
pave the way to the nonaggression pact. 
How can a convincing answer be found to the question of just when Stalin 
decided on an agreement with Hitler? Krivitsky dated Stalin's decision as 
far back as the summer of 1934. However that may be, it is clear there 
were Soviet soundings in 1935-36, but the purpose of this paper is to ex-
amine developments during the spring and summer of 1939. The best way 
to proceed is to survey the available evidence, though this does not require 
a detailed examination of all known documents. The course of Soviet-Brit-
ish-French negotiations on the one hand, and of Soviet-German talks on 
the other, has been well known for several decades from published German 
and British diplomatic documents, and later from French documents. These 
are now supplemented by selected Russian diplomatic documents. How-
ever, a brief outline will help follow what is, after all, a very complex story. 
After the Soviet proposal of a conference of interested parties in Bucharest 
to discuss measures of preventing further German aggression, which was 
rejected by Britain, and after the failed British proposal of a declaration on 
consultation, Britain gave Poland a guarantee of the latter's independence 
40. See Schacht letter to Von Neurath, February 6, 1936, reporting his late De-
cember 1936 conversation with Kandelaki, also Neurath to Schacht, February 11, 
1937, reporting Hitler's answer, DGFP, C, VI (London, Washington, 1983), nos. 
183,185. Whether or not these Soviet overtures were aimed at Hitler, or at German 
officials interested in renewing the former Rapallo/Berlin Treaty relationship, it is 
now clear that Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes had nothing to do with pro-
voking Stalin's purges of the Soviet officer corps, including Marshal Mikhail N. 
Tukhachevsky, by passing on a Gestapo-provided message on the marshal's alleged 
secret dealings with the Wehrmacht, see Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin 
and Hitler. The Diplomacy of Edvard BeneS in the 1930s (Oxford, 1996), 99-107. 
It is likely that Stalin himself ordered his intelligence service in Germany to "leak" 
this message to the Gestapo, so he could use it to eliminate the popular Tukhachevsky, 
whom he may have seen as a rival for power. 
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on March 31, 1939, which was endorsed by Poland's ally France.41 The 
unintended result was increased Soviet suspicion of both the Western pow-
ers and Poland. In the communist ideological framework, "bourgeois" states 
were always assumed as hostile to the world's only "socialist" state. There-
fore, even before Hitler's seizure of the Czech lands in mid-March 1939, 
Stalin suspected the French and British of encouraging the Fiihrer to attack 
the USSR. Indeed, Litvinov wrote the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan 
M. Maisky, that Poland would give in to Hitler's demands, perhaps in re-
turn for Lithuania, and that Chamberlain wanted a German-Soviet war to 
break out over the Baltic States. Litvinov also wrote Iakov E. Suritz, the 
Soviet ambassador in Paris: "England has in fact concluded a treaty with 
Poland against us."42 It is clear that since Stalin controlled Soviet foreign 
policy, Litvinov's communications to the ambassadors reflected the Soviet 
leader's views. Thus, the British guarantee and then the provisional Anglo-
Polish mutual assistance agreement of April 6 fueled Stalin's suspicions of a 
Western plot to provoke a German attack on the USSR. 
Soviet negotiations with the British and French governments began in ear-
nest in mid-April, but after the Western powers finally agreed to guarantee 
Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, (though not Lithuania, which did not border 
on the USSR and for which the latter did not demand a guarantee), nego-
tiations bogged down over the issue of "indirect aggression." This meant 
the Soviet right to military intervention in these states if Moscow perceived 
a threat to Soviet security, and this even if the above states were not overtly 
threatened but changed their policy of their own volition. Stalin's fears 
were strengthened when Germany signed nonaggression pacts with Esto-
nia and Latvia in June 1939. The French and British governments, for their 
part, opposed the Soviet definition of indirect aggression because they wished 
to keep the door open to a peaceful solution of the German demands on 
41. The guarantee was not Chamberlain's "spontaneous" reaction to his per-
sonal humiliation by Hitler, when the latter seized the Czech lands in mid-March 
1939, nor did the prime minister fail to consult his advisers and the Foreign Office, 
as one historian contends, e.g. Gorodetsky, Grand Illusion, p. 4 and note 7. On the 
British road to the guarantee and its meaning, see Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in 
British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight or Avoid War?" Polish 
Review, vol. 34, no.3 (1989): 199-226; slightly abbreviated reprint in Patrick Finney, 
ed., The Origins of the Second World War (London, New York, Sidney and Auckland, 
1997), 413-432. 
42. Litvinov's letter of April 4, 1939 to Maisky on suspicions of Chamberlain's 
motives, and his letter of April 11 to Suritz on an Anglo-Polish treaty directed 
against the USSR, SPE, nos. 145, and 157. See also Litvinov to Stalin, 9 April 1939, 
in which the former denigrated French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet's proposal 
for Franco-Soviet talks to clarify measures to be taken in case of a German attack 
on Poland, DVP 1939 I, no. 206. 
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Poland. Furthermore, Chamberlain did not want to lose the support of 
neutral countries, especially the United States, by sacrificing the Baltic States 
to the USSR. French Foreign Minister G. Bonnet, though strongly in favor 
of a triple alliance between London, Paris, and Moscow as a deterrent to 
Hitler, also opposed the Soviet demand. Nevertheless, in late July, the Brit-
ish and French proposed a secret protocol specifying Soviet intervention if 
any of these states were threatened, as Czechoslovakia had been in March 
1939, but with consultation in other cases. Later, they agreed to the inclu-
sion of this provision in the alliance treaty, and lastly to the Soviet demand 
for a military alliance. They decided to send a joint French-British military 
mission to Moscow to negotiate the alliance, assuming the political agree-
ment would be negotiated at the same time. These negotiations began on 
August 12 but were suspended on August 17, allegedly over the Polish 
refusal to allow the passage of Soviet troops in case of war with Germany. 
They were finally broken off by the Soviet side on August 25, two days 
after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact. It is worth noting that France, 
an ally of the USSR since 1935, always showed more interest than Britain 
in a concrete military agreement with Moscow, as well as willingness to 
override Polish objections to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland. 
Indeed, the French premier and war minister, Edouard Daladier, gave the 
French government's consent to this Soviet demand on August 21, without 
Polish agreement. However, French offers were routinely ignored by Stalin.43 
Meanwhile, German-Soviet talks began on April 17 and, as early as May 
20, Molotov indicated interest in a political agreement with Germany. The 
Germans, while showing much interest, were put off by Molotov's rough 
insistence that Berlin first fulfill all Soviet economic demands as stipulated 
by the commissar for foreign trade, Mikoyan. Above all, they feared that 
Stalin might trick them, so they suspended political talks in late June. How-
ever, they proposed conditions for a trade-credit agreement in early July, 
which were favorably received in Moscow. Preliminary talks began in Ber-
lin in late July, at the same time outlining the basis for a political treaty, 
after which matters progressed rapidly. A trade-credit agreement was signed 
43. For a succinct presentation of French efforts to secure a separate agreement 
on military cooperation with the USSR, and French pressure for the conclusion of 
the triple alliance, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La Decadence 1932-1939 (Paris, 
1979), ch. XIII, 405-440. For French-Polish relations in the period March-end 
August 1939, see Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939. Papers 
and Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz Ambassador of Poland (New York and Lon-
don, 1970), 173-271; Polish text in revised and expanded edition, Wadaw 
Jedrzejewicz and Henryk Buthak, eds., Dyplomata w Paryzu 1936-1939. 
Wspomnienia i dokumenty Juliusza lukasiewicza Ambasadora Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej (London, 1989), pt. II, 213-322. On Daladier and Poland in late August 
1939, see discussion of Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, Moscow, later in this 
paper. 
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in Berlin on August 19, followed four days later by the signature of the 
nonaggression pact and secret protocol in Moscow. 
While the parallel course of Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations and Ger-
man-Soviet talks is fairly well known, this is not true of a sideline that most 
historians have virtually ignored. This was a series of "leaks" of Anglo-
French proposals to the Soviet government, which regularly reached Berlin 
through the German embassy in London. They are to be found in pub-
lished German documents which, in any case, are more helpful in tracing 
the Soviet path to the nonaggression pact than the British, French, and to 
some extent, the Russian documents. British historian D. C. Watt has ar-
gued persuasively that the leaks stemmed from Francis Herbert King, a 
paid Soviet agent in the foreign office communications department (code 
room). King was, indeed, in a prime position to pass summaries, or even 
copies, of secret British documents to the Soviet embassy in London. Whether 
or not he was the only person directly involved, it is clear the documents 
were suitably edited—most likely by an NKVD officer in the Soviet em-
bassy—and then passed on to the German embassy, which in turn tele-
graphed them post haste to Berlin.44 Alongside these leaks, there were also 
Soviet "hints" of Moscow's interest in a deal with Germany; these were 
made by Soviet diplomats to their foreign colleagues, and sometimes to 
foreign journalists. 
But most important of all were the talks between the Soviet representa-
tives and German Foreign Ministry officials in Berlin, which took place 
from mid-April to mid-August 1939. However, there are striking discrep-
ancies between some of the German and Russian accounts of these conver-
sations, and their interpretation is part of the debate on Stalin's policy in 
1939. Thus, some Russian and German historians, such as Lev Bezymensky 
44. D.C. Watt, "Francis Herbert King: A Soviet Source in the Foreign Office," 
Intelligence and National Security, vol. Ill, no. 4 (1988), 62-82. Watt later wrote of 
John Herbert King, as do some other authors, but this is clearly the same person. 
According to another British writer: " . . . this monumental breach of British secu-
rity actually began ten years earlier when King's fellow code clerk Andrew Oldham 
walked into the Soviet embassy in Paris.," John Costello, Mask of Treachery (New 
York, 1988), 347. King, a retired army captain, was an Irishman, who hated the 
British and needed money to support his lifestyle, see Nigel West & Oleg Tsarev, 
The Crown Jewels. The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (New 
Haven and London, 1999), 286. On Ernest Holloway [not Andrew] Oldham, see 
ibid., 286-287. 
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and Fleischhauer, claim that German officials who favored a return to the 
Rapallo/Berlin Treaty policy put statements in the mouths of Russian dip-
lomats in Berlin so as to nudge Hitler and Ribbentrop in this direction. 
Indeed, Fleischhauer, who has written the most detailed account of these 
conversations—based mostly on German but also a few Russian archival 
documents—claims that the initiative for the rapprochement between Ber-
lin and Moscow stemmed from those German Foreign Ministry officials, 
who wished to rein in Hitler by persuading him to sign a German-Soviet 
nonaggression pact, while also obtaining a Western commitment to main-
tain the East European status quo.45 However, Russian historian S. A. Gorlov 
argues that a coordinated pro-Rapallo orientation among German Foreign 
Ministry officials—some of whom were Nazis—was unlikely, though some 
clearly supported a return to good German-Soviet relations. He also points 
out that Hitler and Stalin must be taken into account. Gorlov admits that 
the ground for the nonaggression pact was laid in the period between mid-
April and mid-August 1939 in the talks conducted between German offi-
cials in Berlin and the Russian charge d'affaires, Georgii A. Astakhov. What 
is most important, however, is Gorlov's claim that the absence of Molotov's 
instructions and directives to Astakhov during this crucial period proves 
the latter was acting on his own initiative. In support of this claim, Gorlov 
cites the recollection of Hans Herwarth [von BittenfeldJ. Herwarth was 
then first secretary in the German embassy, Moscow, and thus personal 
assistant to the German ambassador in Moscow, von der Schulenburg. He 
wrote that Astakhov was viewed both in the embassy and in the German 
Foreign Ministry as a bright, untypical, Soviet diplomat who had his own 
views and worked to restore good German-Soviet relations. Gorlov adds 
that Astakhov was arrested at the end of 1939 and shot in February 1940, 
45. Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 404-405. Evidently she meant the new status quo as 
of late fall 1938, plus some further territorial cessions to Germany. The latter, while 
proposed by members of the German "opposition," were also envisaged by most 
German officials who wanted a rapprochement with the USSR. The proposals of 
the German "opposition," as put to the British government in December 1938 by 
its leader Dr. Karl Goerdeler, specified that in return for their overthrowing Hitler, 
Germany was to regain Danzig and the Corridor, also a block of colonial territory 
and obtain an interest-free loan from Britain. The Under-Secretary of State for for-
eign affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, found these terms unacceptable because they 
were too much like Hitler's Mein Kampf, and Britain would receive only I.O.Us, see 
his diary entry for December 10,1938, David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan,, O.M. 1938-1945 (London, 1971),128-129. 
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but does not give the reasons.46 Of course, if Astakhov really conducted his 
own independent diplomacy in Berlin between mid-April and mid-August, 
this would clear the Soviet government of the charge of double dealing by 
conducting secret talks in Berlin on the one hand, while officially negotiat-
ing with France and Britain on the other. However, aside from the well-
known fact that Soviet diplomats worked under tight control from Mos-
cow, a directive from Molotov to Astakhov in late July has been published. 
Also, an examination of the recorded conversations indicates that Astakhov 
must have been instructed to behave as if he were acting on his own in 
order to allow Moscow to sound out German intentions, also perhaps to 
provide it with an alibi should the secret conversations be discovered, or 
fail. Indeed, the practice of diplomats allegedly expressing their own opin-
ions to sound out the other side is well known. Thus, in the early stages of 
these talks, German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsacker also pretended 
to be expressing his "personal" views, although he was speaking according 
to instructions. Furthermore, the fact that no instructions or directives from 
Molotov before late July are included in the Russian documents published 
in 1990-1992, and are not accessible in Russian archives, does not prove 
that none was sent before late July 1939. Finally, the German officials with 
whom Astakhov conducted these conversations, including Foreign Minis-
ter Joachim von Ribbentrop, clearly regarded him as a reliable conduit for 
transmitting their statements to Molotov or they would not have talked to 
him as they did. Of course, there were also other indicators of Soviet inter-
est in an agreement with Germany, which could not have been made with-
out Stalin's knowledge and consent. These were the above mentioned "leaks" 
to the Germans of Franco-British proposals to Moscow, as well as "hints" 
given the Germans by Soviet diplomats. No such hints of a possible Ger-
man-Soviet agreement were made to Britain by the Soviet side in order to 
propel London toward an agreement with the USSR. However, some leaks 
were made by the Germans to the French, presumably because, since France 
was an ally of Poland, French armies were expected to fight the Wehrmacht 
46. See S. A. Gorlov, "Sovetsko-germanskii dialog na kanune pakta Molotova-
Ribbentropa 1939," Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, no. 4 (1993), 13-34. For an 
English rendering of Herwarth's comment on Astakhov in Berlin, 1939, see Hans 
von Herwarth with S. Frederck Starr, Against Two Evils (New York, 1981),. 144. 
According to the Soviet diplomatic dictionary, Astakhov died in 1942; see "Georgii 
Timofeevich Astakhov," in Andrei A. Gromyko et al., eds., Diplomaticheskii Slovar, 
vol. I., Moscow, 1984,100. Hearsay has it that he was shot. Whatever the date and 
way of his death, it is clear he knew too much about German-Soviet talks in Berlin 
in summer 1939. 
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in the West, and also because Paris always showed more interest in a mili-
tary treaty with Moscow than the British.47 
As far as Anglo-Soviet negotiations are concerned, it should be noted 
that on April 11, Ambassador Maisky asked Foreign Secretary Viscount 
Halifax why, if the British and French intended to help Poland and Roma-
nia, they could not make their aid conditional on these countries' adopting 
a "reasonable attitude" toward accepting Russian help? Halifax replied 
that while such a possibility could not be excluded, this could force Poland 
and Romania to issue formal protests and disassociate themselves from the 
Western powers, with damaging effects to the common cause. He thought 
it was up to the Soviet government to remove Polish and Romanian suspi-
cions. Maisky insisted that "collective security" was superior to bilateral 
agreements—but was reprimanded for this remark by Litvinov. Perhaps to 
sound out or even encourage London, on April 14, when the new British 
note to Moscow was ready, Maisky suddenly told Halifax that the USSR 
wished to play a part in aiding Romania, but first wanted to know how 
Britain envisaged helping that country. As for the French, they were un-
happy with the British stance and took action on their own. On April 14, 
Foreign Minister Bonnet proposed to Soviet Ambassador Iakov Suritz a 
Franco-Soviet military agreement covering aid to Poland and Romania. At 
the same time, however, the French government supported a very different 
British proposal. This was communicated by Ambassador Seeds to Litvinov 
on April 15 in the form of an inquiry. Seeds asked whether the Soviet gov-
ernment could declare that it would aid any neighboring state if it was the 
victim of aggression, providing such a state resisted and that such aid was 
desired. This question came after the signing of the provisional Anglo-Pol-
ish mutual assistance agreement on April 6, Mussolini's invasion of Alba-
nia the next day, and Anglo-French guarantees of Romanian and Greek 
independence on April 13. Nevertheless, Litvinov reacted to the inquiry by 
telling Seeds that the British proposal would bind the Soviet government 
47. The French ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre (formerly ambassador 
in Moscow), commented as early as May 7, 1939—four days after Litvinov's res-
ignation—on the basis of information from General Karl Bodenschatz, who was 
close to Goering, that a fourth partition of Poland was to be expected. On May 24, 
the Quai d'Orsay noted reports that Berlin-Moscow contacts could change every-
thing. These reports reinforced the French government in its belief that negotiations 
with Moscow must be concluded as soon as possible, Duroselle, La Decadence, 
430-431. On May 30, the French ambassador in London communicated to the 
British a long dispatch from Coulondre reporting that Ribbentrop was pressing for 
an understanding with Russia, DBFP, 3rd ser., vol. VI (London, 1953), no . l l , cf. 
DDF, 2nd ser., vol. XVI (Paris, 1983), no. 251. Coulondre continued to pass on 
warnings of this kind to Paris through the summer. 
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without committing anyone else.48 As will be seen from the foreign 
commissar's dismissal in early May, his statement to Seeds in mid-April 
reflected Stalin's view rather than his own. Stalin also ignored a French 
proposal for a bilateral Franco-Soviet military agreement. 
On April 17 Litvinov gave Seeds a detailed counterproposal which, as 
published Russian documents show, had been worked out with Stalin. It 
stipulated a military assistance agreement between France, Britain and the 
USSR, as well as their commitment to aid the latter's western neighbors 
between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. 
Furthermore, the British government was to state that the assistance it had 
recently promised to Poland concerned exclusively aggression by Germany, 
and that the Polish-Romanian alliance was to be made operative either 
regarding aggression by any country—or revoked as being directed against 
the USSR. Furthermore, a political agreement was to be signed by the inter-
ested parties at the same time as the military agreement, and a special agree-
ment was to be signed with Turkey. Finally, both sides would commit them-
selves not to sign a separate peace. The Soviet proposal seemed reasonable 
and comprehensive, but showed great distrust of both Britain and Poland. 
Indeed, the Poles were worried. British Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard 
reported from Warsaw that the Soviet proposals could jeopardize the pos-
sibility of Polish-Soviet cooperation, and showed Moscow's inclination to 
treat Poland as a pawn. He thought that since she would be in the forefront 
of the battle, her susceptibilities had to be borne in mind.49 As for Stalin, 
48. For Maisky conversation with Halifax, April 11, see DBFP, 3rd ser., vol. V, 
no.42, cf. GK 1, no.264; for Litvinov's reprimand to Maisky for speaking without 
instructions about collective security, thus giving the impression that bilateral agree-
ments were not envisaged, DVP I, no.217. For Maisky-Halifax conversation, April 
14, SPE, nos. 162, 163, DVP, ibid., nos. 217, 221, also Halifax to Seeds, April 14, 
1939, DBFP, ibid., no. 166. For Bonnet's proposal of a Franco-Soviet military agree-
ment to Suritz, April 14, DDF, 2nd ser. XV (Paris, 1981), no. 387; this was presented 
to the British as an "annex" to the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935, see DBFP, ibid., 
no. 183, see also Payart conversation with Potemkin on same, April 17, Potemkin to 
Suritz,. DVP, ibid., no. 231, and Payart to Bonnet, April 16, DDF ibid., no. 419. 
For the British proposals of April 15, see DBFP, ibid., no. 170; for Litvinov reac-
tion, ibid., no. 182, and cf. GK 1, no. 271. 
49. On the working out of the Soviet proposal, see Litvinov to Stalin, April 15, 
17, 1939, DVP 1939 I, nos. 223, 224, 228, and proposals handed to ambassador 
Seeds, April 17, ibid., no.229, also SPE no. 171, DiM VII no.50, GK I, nos. 275, 
276, DBFP 3rd ser. V, no.193. See also Litvinov to Suritz April 17, that the British 
guarantee to Poland could be interpreted formally as aid to the latter against the 
USSR, DVP ibid., no. 230. For Kennard's comments from Warsaw, April 18, 19, 
see DBFP ibid., nos. 204, 222. The Polish-Romanian alliance and secret military 
convention of March 3 1921, were purely defensive agreements in case of attack on 
their eastern frontiers, that is, by the USSR; for Polish texts see Tadeusz J^druszczak 
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Russian documents do not indicate whether he expected the British gov-
ernment to accept his terms, or regarded them merely as a way of sounding 
out British intentions. It is also possible they were designed with an eye to 
frightening the Germans, who were to learn of the Soviet proposal when it 
was reported by Seeds to the Foreign Office, where John Herbert King was 
working in the code room. 
On April 17, the same day that Litvinov handed Soviet counter-propos-
als to Seeds in Moscow, von Weizsacker recorded an interesting conversa-
tion with the Soviet envoy in Berlin, Alexei F. Merekalov. The latter re-
quested the unblocking of former Soviet orders to the Czech Skoda Works, 
now under German control. He also asked for the state secretary's view of 
Soviet-German relations. After Weizsacker's rather general answer, in which 
he mentioned the improved tone of the German press toward the USSR, 
the Soviet envoy declared that ideological differences did not hamper So-
viet-Italian relations, so he did not see any obstacles to normal Soviet-Ger-
man relations. This was not the first such Soviet hint. Stalin, in his report 
to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 
10 March 1939, had condemned Western appeasement of Germany and 
claimed the Western powers wanted to provoke a German-Soviet war, and 
said the USSR would not pull other people's chestnuts out of the fire. Fur-
thermore, according to a secret German report of April 1, the Soviet Com-
missar for Defense, Voroshilov, told the German ambassador's wife at a 
Moscow reception that, in view of Western policy, he thought German-
Soviet relations might be based on a different foundation. The Voroshilov 
and Merekalov statements look very much like a Soviet attempt to interest 
the Germans in a political agreement. It is worth noting that according to 
Astakhov's record of the Merekalov-Weizsacker conversation, Merekalov 
merely asked Weizsacker for his opinion on German-Soviet relations, to 
and Maria Nowak-Kielbikowa, eds., Dokumenty z dziejdw polskiej polityki 
zagranicznej 1918-1939. Tom 1, 1918-1932 (Warsaw, 1989), nos. 32, 33. These 
treaties were revised on March 26, 1925, and later supplemented by new guaran-
tees and technical agreements on January 15 and June 30 1931, respectively; for the 
texts of the first two, see nos. 75, 102, ibid; on the third, see second Bulhak article 
cited below. The revised military convention signed at this time had a clause com-
mitting both sides to mutual aid through supplies and transit in case of attack by a 
third country, not the USSR. However, both governments rejected British and So-
viet proposals to make the treaty overtly anti-German in 1939, for fear of provok-
ing a German attack against Poland and a Hungarian attack, supported by Ger-
many, against Romania. (The latter declared her neutrality on September 6, 1939). 
On Polish-Romanian relations in the interwar period, see Henryk Bulhak, "Polska 
a Rumunia 1918-1939,"in Janusz Zarnowski, ed., Przyjaznie i antagonizmy. 
Stosunki Polski z pafistwami scfsiednimi w latach 1918-1939 (Wroclaw, Warsaw, 
1977), 305-344; for documents, see: Bulhak, "Materialy do dziejow sojuszu polsko-
rumunskiego w latach 1921-1931," Studia Historyczne, no. 3 (1973), 421 ff. 
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which the latter jokingly replied he thought there were ideological differ-
ences, but that Germany wanted to develop economic ties with the USSR.50 
What is one to make of the divergence between these two reports? Did 
Weizsacker, who wished for a return to the good German-Soviet relations 
of the Rapallo era, put words in Merekalov's mouth to nudge Hitler and 
Ribbentrop toward a German-Soviet agreement? Or did Astakhov omit 
Merekalov's statement in order to conceal a Soviet initiative? The answer 
to this question may lie in some document still inaccessible in the Russian 
archives. 
Whatever the case may be, two days later, on April 19, the German 
embassy in London reported "from a reliable source" the contents of the 
Anglo-French proposals to the Soviet government as presented by Seeds to 
Litvinov on April 15. The "reliable source" stated that the Baltic States 
were also envisaged in these proposals, and reported the Soviet question 
whether the proposed Anglo-French guarantee was to cover only Poland 
and Romania, or the Baltic States as well. The "reliable source" also men-
tioned that the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Suritz, had said the Soviet Union 
was ready to guarantee Romanian possession of Bessarabia, while Deputy 
Foreign Commissar Vladimir P. Potemkin told the French ambassador in 
Moscow [fimile Naggiar] that the Soviet government had not yet made up 
its mind on the matter.51 The alleged Soviet statement on Bessarabia may 
have been inserted due to some French rumors, for it is not confirmed by 
any known French or Soviet document. On the contrary, Potemkin told 
Payart on April 16 that the Soviet government had not promised any aid to 
Romania if the latter was the object of aggression, and that such a view 
could only be a misunderstanding. He added that the Romanian attitude 
toward the USSR was evasive.52 It is also possible that the misinformation 
on Bessarabia was meant to frighten the Germans with the possibility of an 
imminent Soviet-Western agreement, while the alleged express Soviet ques-
tion on the Baltic States looks like a Soviet hint to Berlin of Moscow's 
50. See Weizsacker report on conversation with Merekalov, April 17,1939, DGFP 
D VI, no. 215; for Astakhov's version of the Merekalov-Weizsacker conversation, 
see DVP 1939,1, no. 236. For excerpts from Stalin's report of 10 Marchl939, see 
Degras, DSFP, III, 315-322. For Voroshilov's remarks to Mrs. von der Schulenburg, 
see Secret Report, Berlin, April 1,1939, Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, 
Berlin, Dienstelle Ribbentrop, Vertrauliche Berichte, Bd. 2, 1939, 293. The docu-
ment was found in the German archives by Dr. Stanislaw Zerko of the Instytut 
Zachodni, Poznan. The author wishes to thank Dr. Richard Raack, professor emeritus 
of the University of California at Davis, for making the document available to her. 
51. Charge d'Affaires [Theo Kordt] London, to Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 
19, 1939, DGFP, D, VI, no. 233. 
52. See Potemkin to Suritz, April 17, 1939, DVP 1939, no.231, and Payart on 
same, DDF 2nd ser. vol. XVI, no. 418. 
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interest in the region. In any case, the German embassy in London used the 
"reliable source" to inform the German Foreign Ministry about Western 
proposals at every stage of the negotiations, except for three weeks after 
July 22. It is likely that the good progress in direct German-Soviet talks in 
Berlin at that time made such reports unnecessary. 
In early May came the astonishing news of the resignation of Litvinov as 
commissar for foreign affairs—an event closely connected with the dating 
of Stalin's decision to throw in his hand with Hitler. If the " Vozhd" had not 
done this much earlier in 1934-36—as per Krivitsky—he could, as men-
tioned earlier, have made up his mind when he sacked Litvinov. The latter 
was forced to resign on May 3, allegedly because of his "disloyalty" to 
Molotov, then head of the Sovnarkom. There is no documented explana-
tion of what this "disloyalty" meant, but it is known that Litvinov never 
got on with Molotov, and that the latter shouted at him in Stalin's Kremlin 
office on the day of his dismissal. It is likely that Litvinov's persistence in 
advocating a compromise between Soviet and British proposals, and espe-
cially his suggestion that Moscow give up its demand for British agreement 
to Soviet guarantees of aid to Poland and Romania—i.e., that France and 
Britain would force them to accept such aid—was held against him. In-
deed, many years later, in 1987, former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. 
Gromyko claimed that Litvinov had been relieved of his post because he 
had gone against the party line. As Gromyko then said : " . . . he was 
against shifting our focus from England and France to Germany, and so he 
was fired." Furthermore, on May 5, 1939, Astakhov told a French journal-
ist in Berlin that Litvinov's dismissal did not mean a change of Soviet policy, 
but signaled the Soviet government's reaction to the ambivalent policy of 
the Western powers, which downplayed the political and military value of 
the aid that the USSR was ready to give them. It is also known that the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was thoroughly purged, though Litvinov 
was spared to await a better day. (He was the Soviet ambassador to the 
United States in 1941-43). As mentioned earlier, some historians believe 
Litvinov's dismissal marks the moment that Stalin decided to work for an 
agreement with Hitler—a view also expressed by some contemporary ob-
servers of international affairs and by some diplomats, including the French 
ambassador in Rome, Francois Poncet.53 Gromyko's 1987 statement con-
53. In one of Litvinov's last notes to Stalin, dated May 3, 1939, he criticized 
British delays in answering the Soviet proposals of April 17; suggested insisting on 
the inclusion of the eastern Baltic States [Finland, Latvia, Estonia], but said that 
Poland and Romania were already sufficiently protected by British and French com-
mitments. Thus, it seems Litvinov thought the USSR should not insist on giving its 
own guarantee to these states. He also proposed agreement to the British demand 
for the inclusion of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland in the guarantees; see DVP 
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firms the view that Litvinov's dismissal in early May 1939, if not earlier, 
indicates Stalin had made up his mind at this time to strike a deal with 
Hitler rather than with France and Britain. 
Indeed, German-Soviet relations began to warm up immediately. On 
May 5, Julius Schnurre, head of Department W I V (Economic Department, 
Eastern Europe) in the German Foreign Ministry, recorded a conversation 
with Astakhov. On learning that Soviet orders to the Skoda Works in Ger-
man-occupied Bohemia would be filled, Astakhov asked Schnurre whether 
German-Soviet economic negotiations could be renewed, to which Schnurre 
said he would soon give him an answer. Astakhov then asked whether the 
Germans thought that Litvinov's replacement by Molotov meant a shift in 
Soviet policy toward Germany. He went on to say that though Molotov 
had no experience in foreign policy, he would have a significant impact on 
it.54 It is curious that the only Russian record of this conversation is a tele-
gram from Merekalov to Molotov of May 5, reporting that Schnurre had 
invited him to call, told him that the Soviet order to the Skoda Works 
would be filled, and that no obstacles were expected. It is also worth not-
ing in connection with Astakhov's question on the renewal of economic 
negotiations, that in early January 1939, Merekalov had insisted to Schnurre 
(note S3 continued) 1939, I, no. 267. For Gromyko's statement, made at a Polit-
buro meeting in 1987, see Anatoly Chernaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans-
lated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA, 2000), 
126, emphasis added A.M.C.). Maisky wrote that Litvinov's resignation was pre-
ceded by "a war of words" between Molotov and Litvinov in Stalin's Kremlin of-
fice. Furthermore, a former Soviet diplomat, Evgeny Gnedin, claimed that long 
before this time, the NKVD had been preparing a "case" against Litvinov. See 
Sokolov, "People's Commissar Maxim Litvinov," 103 (For Sokolov, see note 14 
above). See also Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 
1933-1941 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1992), 129, and Haslam, note 14 above. An enlarged 
"Stalin Cabinet" met on May 3; the record shows that Molotov was there from 3 to 
7.50 p.m., while Litvinov came in at 5.15 and left at 5.50 p.m.; see IA 1995 no. 5 -
6, 36. Stalin's terse telegram to Soviet envoys on Litvinov's resignation and his 
replacement by Molotov mentioned a serious conflict between Molotov and Litvinov 
stemming from the latter's "disloyal attitude" toward the Sovnarkom, see DVP, 
ibid., no. 269. On Astakhov's remarks to a French journalist in Berlin, see Coulondre 
to Bonnet, May 5, 1939, DDF, 2nd ser., vol. XVI, no. 71. Astakhov must have been 
acting on instructions, since Merekalov had asked on May 4 for directives on what 
to say about Litvinov's dismissal, see DVP ibid., no. 276. The French ambassador 
in Rome, Francois Poncet, told his British colleague, Sir Percy Lorraine, that he 
believed Stalin sacked Litvinov "to make an arrangement with Germany, which 
would enable the latter to attack Poland and retake the Corridor with relative im-
punity." Lorraine to Halifax, Rome, May 5, 1939, DBFP 3rd ser. V, no.372. 
54. For Schnurre's record of the conversation with Astakhov, May 5, 1939, see 
DGFP, D, VI, no. 332. 
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on their renewal. In December 1938, the Germans had offered Moscow a 
credit line of two hundred million reichsmarks (RM) in return for Russian 
raw materials, and Schnurre was to go to Moscow as the German negotia-
tor. However, the Germans canceled the negotiations, allegedly because of 
French press reports.55 As will be seen later, Stalin and Molotov resented 
this cancellation. 
The international background to the next Astakhov-Schnurre meeting 
(May 17) was a new version of the previous British proposal (April 17). 
Presented by Ambassador Seeds to Molotov on May 8, it requested a pub-
lic Soviet declaration that the USSR would aid certain East European coun-
tries in case of aggression—but only after Britain and France had become 
involved. This was reminiscent of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance of May 
1935, which stipulated Soviet aid only after France acted to aid Czechoslo-
vakia. (The stipulation was inserted by President Edward Benes). The re-
vised Anglo-French proposal—consulted on with the Poles—was more forth-
coming than the first version, but Stalin and Molotov saw it as a request 
for one-sided Soviet aid to be given Poland and Romania for free, that is, 
without any compensation to the USSR. Still, Molotov asked Ambassa-
dors Suritz and Maisky for their views on what answer should be given, 
and both advised that negotiations be continued. Whether or not Molotov 
was influenced by this advice, on May 14 he handed Seeds the Soviet reply 
listing three basic Soviet conditions for constructing a barrier against fur-
ther aggression in Europe: (1) an effective mutual assistance pact between 
England, France, and the USSR; (2) their guarantee of Central and East 
European states threatened by aggression, including Latvia, Estonia, and 
Finland; (3) agreement by the three powers on the extent of material assis-
tance to be rendered to each other and to the guaranteed states.56 This 
55. Merekalov to Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1939, DVP 1939 I, 
no. 280. On the German offer of December 1938 and postponement of Schnurre 
trip, see DGFP D IV (London and Washington, 1951), nos. 484, 487. The German 
credit offer of December 1938 was for the same sum as in the German-Soviet trade 
agreement of April 1935; see note 34 above. 
56. For the Anglo-French proposal of May 8, see DBFP 3rd ser. V, p.487; SPE, 
no.205, GK 1, no.327. On Anglo-Polish consultations on same, see Ambassador 
Edward Raczynski's cipher telegrams to Polish Foreign Ministry of April 20, May 
3, 1939, Polish Embassy London, A.12 , Ciphers, PISM, also Raczynski report to 
Beck, April 26, DiM VII, no. 55; for Halifax to Kennard, April 28, and Kennard to 
Halifax, DBFP, ibid., nos. 304, 319. For Molotov's telegram to Suritz, May 8, see 
DVP 1939 I, no. 284; extract, SPE no. 206; see also TASS communique of May 10, 
1939, criticizing the English proposal as allegedly reported by Reuters, ibid., no. 
208. Maisky thought the English proposal was unacceptable, but that London had 
not said its last word, DVP 1939 I, no. 290. Suritz wrote Molotov on May 10 
advising acceptance of the English proposal, because this would show the Soviet 
Union was not playing a double game with Germany, would gain the support of 
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project did not include Lithuania, which did not border on the USSR, and 
which Moscow perhaps expected to be defended by Poland. Whatever the 
case may be, in mid-April 1939, Major Korotkikh, the Soviet military attache 
in Kaunas, told his Polish counterpart that the Soviet government consid-
ered the Baltic to lie in the sphere of Polish interests and that if Lithuania or 
any other Baltic state declared for Germany, the neighboring states would 
have to enter their territory in order to prevent German domination there. 
This seems to have been a low-level sounding of the Polish position on 
Lithuania, and, of course, Polish reaction to a possible Soviet entry into the 
other Baltic States. The Polish minister to Lithuania, Franciszek Charwat, 
did not mention Korotkikh's demarche when speaking to the Polish 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Jan Szembek, on 25 April 1939. But he 
did emphasize German economic pressure on Lithuania, and said he thought 
Poland should conduct an anti-German policy there.57 
Three days later, on May 17, Astakhov saw Schnurre again. According 
to the German record, Astakhov requested that the Soviet Trade Office in 
Prague remain there as a branch of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin. 
He then remarked on the improvement of the German press tone toward 
the USSR, and went on to say that since there were no outstanding differ-
ences between German and Soviet policies, there was no basis for hostility 
between the two countries. It was true, he said, that the USSR felt threat-
ened by Germany, but this fear could be removed—and in this context he 
mentioned the Rapallo Treaty. To a question by Schnurre on Anglo-Soviet 
negotiations, Astakhov said he did not think Britain would attain her goal. 
He then expatiated on the good Soviet-Italian relations, noting the Duce's 
statement that, despite the [forthcoming] establishment of the [German-
Italian] Axis, nothing stood in the way of further developing political and 
economic relations with the USSR. All this is, however, missing from 
Astakhov's short telegram reporting the same conversation.58 
(note 56 continued) majority French opinion, and prevent Chamberlain from "wrig-
gling" out again in Parliament; ibid., no.296. For the Soviet counterproposal of 
May 15, see DBFP, 3rd ser. V, no. 520; SPE, no.213; GK I, no. 342. 
57. On Major Korotkikh's statement to Col. Leon Mitkiewicz, see Polish Envoy 
to Lithuania, Franciszek Charwat, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 18, 1939, 
DiM VII, no. 51; for his talk with Jan Szembek, 25 April 1939, Szembek, Diariusz, 
IV, 573. 
58. Schnurre's report on the conversation with Astakhov, May 17, 1939, DGFP 
D, VI, no. 406; Astakhov's telegram to National Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, 
May 17, on conversation with Schnurre, GK I, no. 349, DVP 1939,1, no. 318. The 
German-Italian Axis agreement was signed on May 22. What Astakhov was to say 
to Schnurre, May 17, may have been discussed at a meeting of the Stalin Cabinet 
two days earlier. On May 15, Molotov, Andrei Zhdanov, head of the Leningrad 
Party Organization, Andrei A. Andreev, chairman of the Central Committee Con-
trol Commission, and Georgii M. Malenkov, head of the central committee depart-
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It is worth noting Schnurre's record of Astakhov's reference to the Rapallo 
Treaty of 1922, which normalized German-Soviet relations and led to se-
cret military cooperation. Furthermore, Schnurre's record of Astakhov's 
statement on good Soviet-Italian relations was in line with those made by 
Merekalov in early January to Ambassador Schulenburg, when the latter 
was in Berlin, and to Weizsacker on April 17. After Merekalov's departure 
for Moscow sometime in May, Astakhov carried on conversations with 
Schnurre. In fact, it is clear that the Astakhov-Schnurre conversation of 
May 17 prepared the ground for Molotov's declaration to Schulenburg in 
Moscow three days later. In this instance, both German and Russian records 
report the commissar's declaration that Soviet-German trade-credit nego-
tiations could continue, but that a "political basis" had to be established 
first, though Molotov refused to say what this would be.59 Hitler and 
Ribbentrop at first wanted to take up the Molotov proposal but then de-
cided to wait, fearing the Russians might trick them. Instead, they decided 
on a cautious exploration of the possibility of better relations, a task they 
entrusted to Weizsacker, who was to speak to Astakhov as if expressing his 
own opinions.60 
In the meanwhile, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations showed no progress. 
Neither Molotov nor Potemkin attended the May session of the League of 
Nations, though Halifax had expressed the hope of discussing the subject 
with one or the other. Instead, Maisky traveled to Geneva to be on hand, 
but does not seem to have been consulted. The British Cabinet Foreign 
Policy Committee met to discuss the matter on May 19, before Halifax's 
departure. They agreed that a close alliance with Russia, as proposed by 
the French, was not desirable, though the Secretary for Home Affairs, Sir 
Samuel Hoare, said failure to get an arrangement with Russia would mean 
the failure of the "peace front." Chamberlain, however, noted that both 
ment dealing with senior cadres, were with Stalin for about two hours each, while 
Molotov stayed from 8:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. See IA 1995, no. 5-6, 36. On May 
17, after the Astakhov-Schnurre conversation, Molotov met with Stalin from 7-10 
p.m., while Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, defense commissar, and Deputy For-
eign Commissar Potemkin were there between 7:30 and 9:45 p.m.; they were fol-
lowed by Lavrenty P. Beria, commissar for national security (NKVD), Malenkov, 
Potemkin—again—and third Deputy Foreign Commissar Vladimir I. Dekanozov; 
ibid., 38. 
59. Emphasis added, A.M.C. For Schulenburg's report on the conversation with 
Molotov of May 20, 1939, see DGFP D, VI, no. 424; Russian record, GK I, no. 
352 and DVP 1939 I, no. 326. On May 19, Molotov met with Stalin from 6:35-
11:50 p.m., while Zhdanov, Andreev, and Malenkov were there 6:40-8:05 p.m., 
followed by Mikoyan, 7:10-8:05 p.m.. Nikolai I. Sharonov—the newly appointed 
ambassador to Poland—was there from 8:45-11:50 p.m; others were also present; 
see IA 1995, no. 5-6, 38. 
60. DGFP D, VI, nos. 414, 437, 441. 
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the Polish and Romanian ambassadors had said in private conversations 
with Halifax and himself that any close association between Britain and 
Russia would also mean their countries' association with Moscow, which 
would in itself precipitate a European war. He also reminded the commit-
tee that there were still important "moderate elements" in Germany, whom 
a Western alliance with Russia would drive into Hitler's camp.61 Chamber-
lain may have had the German "opposition" in mind, but he was clearly 
unaware of the Rapallo supporters in Berlin. Still, he was right about the 
Romanians and the Poles. Indeed, the Polish foreign minister gave British 
Ambassador Kennard his comments and suggestions on May 22. Having 
already made his position clear to Moscow on May 10-11, Beck empha-
sized three points to the British: (1) It seemed people in Paris and London 
did not realize that Russia and Germany had no common frontier; (2) Pol-
ish-Russian relations must be reciprocal, so Poland cannot be the object of 
any agreement made between other states; (3) The projected [Franco-Brit-
ish] agreement [with the USSR] envisioned war and was perhaps good and 
useful in such a case. However, if there was no war and France and Britain 
wished to organize Europe on peaceful principles, the Soviet alliance would 
make conversations with Berlin difficult, while at the same time British 
policy would be unpopular in some of the states of Central, Northern, and 
Eastern Europe. Beck concluded by saying that his comments were not 
motivated by the desire to hamper British and French freedom of action in 
matters not engaging Poland, for every state had the right to conclude de-
fensive alliances.62 
The British government kept Polish views in mind, but only as long as 
they did not interfere with its policy goals—or run counter to public opin-
ion at home. In fact, by late May, public opinion in both Britain and France 
was calling for an alliance with Moscow and the two governments had to 
take this into account. Thus, French and British statesmen worked out a 
joint proposal, presented by Seeds and Payart to Potemkin on May 25. It 
envisaged a tripartite pact, though without a guarantee of the Baltic States. 
Furthermore, it proposed the discredited article 16 of the League Covenant 
as the basis for mutual aid, an idea that appealed greatly to Chamberlain. 
Molotov criticized the Western proposals to French and British diplomats 
61. On Cabinet discussion before Halifax's departure for Geneva, see Cabinet 
Foreign Policy Committee (36) 48th meeting, Friday, May 19, 1939, CAB 27/625, 
62-68, Public Record Office, London, [henceforth: PRO]. For the Franco-British 
talks in Geneva on the new proposal to the USSR, see DBFP 3rd ser. V, nos. 576, 
578; Foreign Office memo on the pros and cons of an alliance, ibid., no.589. 
62. For Polish views and objections, see Kennard's report on conversation with 
Beck to Under-Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan, May 22, 1939, DBFP1 ibid., 
nos. 586, 649; for Polish record of same, see GMM 396/WB/9, Polish embassy 
London, A. 12, PISM. 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 179 
in Moscow on May 27, and did so publicly in a speech to the Supreme 
Soviet on May 31. On the same day, Molotov presented the Soviet counter-
proposals, with critical remarks on the Anglo-French proposal. He named 
eight states to be defended, including the Baltic States, and demanded that 
military and political agreements be signed at the same time. On June 6, 
Halifax wrote the British ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps: "The Rus-
sian business is quite infuriating, it blocks everything and frays everybody's 
nerves." Still, he hoped it would bring results soon.63 
It is against this background that one should view an important conversa-
tion which took place in Berlin on May 30 between Weizsacker and 
Astakhov. German historian Fleischhauer sees Weizsacker's account of it 
as marking "the first German initiative." This is true, but it was also a 
reaction to Molotov's proposal of a political agreement made to Schulenburg 
on May 20. Weizsacker—acting on instructions but pretending to express 
only his own views—reported that he asked Astakhov whether the request 
to make the Soviet Trade Office in Prague a branch of the Soviet Trade 
Delegation in Berlin was meant to lead to a provisional or a longer ar-
rangement. Astakhov answered it was the latter. He then stated that he was 
informed of the Molotov-Schulenburg conversation. He said the Soviet side 
63. For the Franco-British proposal presented to Molotov on May 25, see SPE, 
nos. 229, 230 and DBFP, no.649, 679-80, Russian: GK 1, nos. 379,380, DVP 
1939, no.339. Article 16 mandated League members' severance of relations with an 
aggressor and foresaw financial and economic sanctions against him; also the League 
Council was to recommend what military action should be contributed by member 
countries. The article was not invoked against Japan after the latter's aggression 
against China, nor against Germany after the annexation of Austria and the Czech 
lands. Economic sanctions failed to stop Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia, and 
were not invoked against him when he invaded Albania in April 1939. For French 
support of an alliance with the USSR, see DDF, 2nd ser. XVI, no.289, also Suritz 
report of May 24 that the French General Staff, especially Generals Maurice Gamelin 
and Maxime Weygand, pressed for an alliance and military agreement with the 
USSR, see DVP ibid., no. 331. For Potemkin-Seeds conversation, May 25, see DVP 
ibid., no.333; for Molotov-Seeds-Payart conversation May 27, see DBFP ibid., no. 
648, 657, GK 1, no.379, and DVP ibid., no.339. For Molotov's speech to the Su-
preme Soviet, May 31, 1939, see SPE, no. 232, Degras, SDFP III, 332-340; for the 
Soviet draft proposal of June 2, see ibid., 340-41, also DBFP 3rd ser.V, p.753, SPE 
no. 233. On Russian business "infuriating," see Halifax to Phipps, June 6, 1939, 
DBFP 3rd ser. VI, no.272. There was a meeting of the "Stalin Cabinet" on the night 
of June 1-2, at which both political and military matters seem to have been dis-
cussed. Molotov stayed from 6:10 p.m.-2:50 a.m. and Voroshilov 7:40-2:50 a.m.; 
the chief of the general staff, Army Commander [later General] Boris Shaposhnikov, 
attended 11:45-2:50 a.m.; Andreev and Zhdanov stayed from a few minutes after 
10 p.m. to 2:50 a.m., and Mikoyan attended, 10 p.m.-l:30 a.m., IA 1995, no. 5-6, 
38. 
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did not see economic negotiations as a "game," and cited Molotov as say-
ing that economics and politics could not be separated in German-Soviet 
relations. He added that Potemkin had "apparently" told the German eco-
nomic attache in Moscow [Gustav Hilger] that the planned economic ne-
gotiations should not be a game. Weizsacker, for his part, hinted that Ger-
many had much to offer the USSR, to which Astakhov responded that the 
German government had rejected a Soviet offer of alliance before conclud-
ing a treaty with Poland, also that Germany had showed little understand-
ing for the Soviet view that domestic and foreign policy need not conflict 
with each other. Weizsacker then noted Astakhov's statement that he would 
ask Moscow again for its views about the branch Soviet Trade Office in 
Prague, also for information on what exactly Molotov had wished to tell 
Ambassador Schulenburg. Astakhov added that, despite mistrust of Ger-
many, Molotov did not wish to shut the door to further German-Soviet 
discussions.64 
Astakhov's record generally agrees with Weizsacker's, but gives a some-
what different presentation. In mentioning Molotov's declaration to 
Schulenburg, Weizsacker allegedly said this was different from what 
Merekalov had told the Foreign Ministry; that is, that economic relations 
could develop separately from political ones. To this Astakhov answered 
that he was familiar only with part of Molotov's conversation with 
Schulenburg and could not give a definite interpretation of the commissar's 
declaration. However, he had no grounds to believe that Molotov was defi-
nitely opposed to Schnurre's trip to Moscow and to economic negotia-
tions. He would ask the "Center" about this and then give a clarification. 
At the same time, he recalled that Merekalov had often stated in conversa-
tions with Weizsacker that "economics is condensed politics." He also re-
called that at a breakfast given by Merekalov for Schulenburg, the latter 
had agreed that an improvement in political relations could follow im-
proved economic relations. Astakhov then went on to recount Weizsacker's 
"personal" statements, noting he could not render them precisely due to 
64. Memorandum by Weizsacker, May 30, 1939, DGFP D VI, no. 451, empha-
sis added, A.M.C. There is no published record of the Potemkin-Hilger conversa-
tion. On May 29, Ribbentrop told Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico that 
Weizsacker was to speak to the Russian charge in Berlin, rather than Schulenburg 
to Molotov in Moscow. He asked Attolico not to inform Italian foreign minister 
just yet, because he had not yet fully clarified his own thoughts, but Attolico imme-
diately informed Ciano, see Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [henceforth: DDI], 8th 
ser. vol. XII (Rome, 1952), no. 53. Likewise, a member of the Italian embassy in 
Berlin told one of French Ambassador Coulondre's informants that advances, or at 
least soundings, were made recently by the Axis powers directly or indirectly to the 
Kremlin. The Italian diplomat said Ribbentrop would march with the Soviets, but 
they were turning a deaf ear, see Coulondre telegram to Bonnet, June 1,1939, DDF 
2nd ser. XVI no. 329. 
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the camouflaged and contorted manner in which they were made. The main 
points were—and here Astakhov's account agrees with Weizsacker's—that 
Hitler had given up any designs on Ukraine, giving as an example the fate 
of Carpathian Ukraine. Also, Weizsacker pointed out that Hitler had not 
made any negative comments on the USSR in his speech of April 28, when 
he denounced both the German-Polish nonaggression agreement of 1934 
and the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. Weizsacker said it was 
now up to the USSR to choose between England and Germany. Astakhov 
reported that he replied, also informally, by pointing out past German anti-
Soviet policy, good Soviet-Italian relations, also the fact that the Soviet 
Union had always desired good relations with Germany. Here he recalled 
that just before the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-
Soviet pacts, the Soviet government had proposed mutual assistance pacts 
to Germany and Poland. To this Weizsacker said: "I did not know this," as 
if catching himself unawares. Astakhov then asked about the significance 
of the rumors flying around Berlin about a German-Soviet agreement, but 
did not record an answer. Finally, he told Weizsacker he would forward his 
questions to Moscow, while his account of the rest of the conversation 
would be presented as unofficial statements.65 
Two aspects of this conversation, present in both records, are signifi-
cant. First of all, Astakhov indicated that he had been informed of at least 
part of the Molotov-Schulenburg conversation of May 20, and mentioned 
a conversation between Potemkin and Hilger, saying he would contact 
Moscow to clarify certain points. Thus, it is clear that he could hardly have 
been acting on his own initiative. Secondly, he mentioned Soviet offers of 
mutual assistance pacts to Germany and Poland, made according to 
Weizsacker's account, before the German-Polish treaty [January 1934], but 
according to Astakhov, just before the conclusion of Soviet alliances with 
France and Czechoslovakia in [May] 1935. There is no record of such a 
Soviet proposal to Poland, but proposals to Germany at this time were also 
mentioned by Kandelaki in his Berlin conversations at the turn of 1936-
37.66 Perhaps both Kandelaki and Astakhov referred to the suggestion 
Litvinov made to Schulenburg on May 8, 1935, to start negotiations for a 
nonaggression pact, or there may have been some other "concrete" proposal, 
65. See Astakhov record of conversation with Weizsacker, May 30, 1939, GK I, 
no. 384 (emphasis added, A.M.C), and his telegram to Foreign Affairs Commis-
sariat, May 30, DVP 1939 I, no. 342. The Carpathian Ukraine was part of Austria-
Hungary before 1918 and then of Czechoslovakia. It had been viewed as a poten-
tial German bridge to Soviet Ukraine, but part of it was awarded to Hungary by the 
Vienna Accord of 1 November 1938, and the rest in late March 1939, see Paul 
Robert Magocsi. Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle and London, 1993, 
reprint 1994), map 39c, 132-133. 
66. On Kandelaki, see note 40 above. 
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the trace of which has been lost. Whatever the case may be, Astakhov's 
reference to a previous Soviet proposal of a mutual assistance pact to Ger-
many in 1935 looks very much like a calculated hint directed at Hitler and 
Ribbentrop through Weizsacker, who certainly favored a return to Rapallo 
but did not make German policy. 
While the Germans were cautious, the Soviets were not shy about drop-
ping hints. Thus, on June 3, Weizsacker noted a conversation with the 
Estonian minister in Berlin. The latter, known as a good judge of Russian 
affairs, said he thought the Russians viewed the democratic states with 
greater mistrust than totalitarian ones. Also, he had the impression from 
speaking to the Russian charge d'affaires that the Russians were only wait-
ing for "a friendly gesture" to say so.67 Twelve days later, on June 15, Ernst 
Woermann, the Nazi head of the Political Department in the German For-
eign Ministry, recorded some very striking statements by Astakhov, as re-
ported by the Bulgarian minister in Berlin [Parvan Draganov]. According 
to the latter, the Soviet diplomat stated the Soviet Union had three choices: 
a pact with Britain and France, further delaying those negotiations, or a 
nonaggression pact with Germany. Astakhov said the third option was the 
most desirable for the USSR, and that different "world views" did not have 
to play any role. He also said the USSR did not recognize Romanian pos-
session of Bessarabia and feared a German occupation of the Baltic States. 
I f , however, Germany made it clear that she would not attack the Soviet 
Union, the latter would abstain from concluding a pact with the Western 
powers—but the Soviets did not know what Germany wanted.68 Gorlov 
admits that Draganov, in a report to the Bulgarian foreign office, confirmed 
these statements were made by Astakhov, but the Russian historian gives 
credence to the Soviet diplomat, who in his "Dairy" [sic] presented the 
statements attributed to him by Draganov—as made to him by the latter. 
Gorlov also notes there is a detailed, four-page unpublished report by 
Astakhov on this conversation in the Russian archives, but does not say 
when it was received by Molotov.69 Geoffrey Roberts also points out the 
discrepancy between the Draganov and Astakhov accounts, but speculates 
67. Weizsacker note, June 3, 1939, DGFP D VI, no. 469; Karl Tofer was the 
Estonian minister in Berlin. 
68. Ernst Woermann's record of a conversation with the Bulgarian minister, June 
15, 1939, DGFP D VI, no. 529; emphasis added, A.M.C. 
69. Gorlov, "Sovetsko-germanskii dialog," 21-23 (see note 46 above), and 
Astakhov's diary entry for June 14, 1939, GK 2, no. 403. Astakhov's detailed re-
port on the conversation, cited by Gorlov as f. Oil, op. 4, p.27, d. 59, 123-127, 
Foreign Policy Archives, Moscow, was not published in DVP 1939 I. Instead, there 
is a political report by Astakhov to Molotov, dated June 14, beginning with the 
words: "The last few days here passed without any special events," see ibid., no. 
370. 
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that Astakhov made the statements on his own initiative, so they could be 
seen as "an instance of personal kite flying." Roberts admits that Astakhov 
had asked Molotov for instructions on how to answer persistent questions 
put to him on Soviet policy, but concludes that Astakhov might have sounded 
out Draganov on his own initiative.70 Neither Gorlov nor Roberts is will-
ing to entertain the possibility that Astakhov had been instructed to "fish" 
for German proposals, though given the Stalin-Molotov control of Soviet 
diplomacy, this must have been the case. 
Furthermore, the Germans did not treat Astakhov as a free lance agent 
but as a bona fide Soviet representative, whom they expected to transmit 
their statements to Molotov. Weizsacker had done this on May 30. The 
next to do so was Schulenburg, who was instructed to follow up on the 
Draganov report. During a brief stay in Berlin, the ambassador visited 
Astakhov on June 17, and told him there were no serious problems be-
tween Germany and the Soviet Union. Schulenburg reported Astakhov's 
claim that Weizsacker's statements were rather general and vague, noting 
the Soviet diplomat had said the same to the Bulgarian minister, probably a 
reference to Astakhov's statement to Draganov that the Soviet Union did 
not know what Germany wanted. The ambassador denied this, and re-
peated the statement, made to him personally by Ribbentrop, that Ger-
many did not fear England and France, because she had a strong line of 
fortifications, but "an agreement with Russia makes sense." Schulenburg 
also reported Astakhov as saying that things had gone well for Germany 
and Russia when they were friends, and badly when they were not. The 
ambassador, for his part, said that Germany had experienced difficulties in 
fulfilling Mikoyan's "A and B programs" [Soviet demands in the projected 
trade agreement] because of her own needs, but that the situation had im-
proved after the "union" with Czechoslovakia. This was clearly a hint that 
Germany would welcome the renewal of German-Soviet trade-credit nego-
tiations. Astakhov's account of this conversation is generally in keeping 
with Schulenburg's, except for his statement on German-Russian relations 
as reported by the German ambassador.71 
70. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, 78. 
71. Schulenburg account, June 17, DGFP D, VI, no. 540, emphasis added, A.M.C; 
Astakhov account, DVP 1939 I, no. 378. Mikoyan's A and B programs referred to 
1938 Soviet demands for German manufactured goods, especially armaments; for 
these programs and German deliveries to the USSR as agreed on 19 August 1939, 
see GK 2, no. 575, 284-285; for the C program (list) of Soviet deliveries to Ger-
many, not published in GK 2, see Zorya and Lebedeva, "Around the Non-Aggres-
sion Pact," International Affairs, no. 10 (1989), 101. Timber led the way, followed 
by agricultural goods and phosphates, but raw cotton, manganese ore, gas oil, and 
other goods were also included. See also note 126 below. 
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In the meanwhile, Anglo-Soviet negotiations were stalemated because, as 
Seeds was informed from London on June 12, the British government could 
not agree that guarantees be imposed on states unwilling to receive them. 
Indeed, like Poland and Romania, the Baltic States did not want to be 
guaranteed by the USSR, while the latter insisted that their security must 
be guaranteed. On June 13, a Pravda editorial written by Zhdanov expati-
ated on the need to defend the Baltic States [Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, 
but not Lithuania] against aggression. Seeds was to have traveled to Lon-
don for consultations but came down with flu, so Robert Strang, a high 
official in the Foreign Office, left London for Moscow on June 14 with a 
new set of proposals.72 Seeds handed them to Molotov on June 15. They 
provided for consultation in case of a threat to one of the states envisaged, 
but still included article 16 of the League Covenant as the basis for aid. 
Molotov rejected the proposal the next day, insisting on the inclusion of 
the three Baltic States and full reciprocity. By this time, Chamberlain and 
the cabinet, as well as most British officials and diplomats, saw an alliance 
with the USSR as necessary, if only to prevent a German-Soviet pact. At a 
meeting of the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee on June 20, Lord 
Chatfield, the minister for Coordination of Defense, said a treaty of mu-
tual defense with Russia would at least prevent the Soviets from making a 
pact with Germany. Halifax agreed, but said that if Germany invaded Po-
land, nothing could prevent a Soviet-German arrangement to partition that 
country.73 There were, of course, some British officials and diplomats who 
still opposed an agreement with Moscow. Sir Nevile Henderson, the pro-
German British ambassador in Berlin, wrote Halifax on June 17 that he 
was uneasy about the negotiations with the Russians because: "History 
contains nothing but examples of the unwisdom of putting one's faith in 
the Slavs; they have always and invariably proved a bitter disappointment 
to their allies from the days of Maria Theresa to 1917." This diatribe earned 
an ironic marginal comment from one Foreign Office reader: "What about 
1812-1815?"74 
72. Foreign Office Memorandum: "Instructions for Sir William Seeds, June 12, 
1939," DBFP 3rd ser. v. VI, no. 35. Robert Strang was head of the Central Depart-
ment, Foreign Office, 1937-39, and assistant under-secretary of state, 1939-43. 
73. For the British proposal and Molotov reply, June 15, 16, see SPE, nos. 245-
246; DBFP, 3rd ser. VI, nos. 73, 103, 122,123; Zhdanov article of June 13, Franco-
British proposals and Molotov rejection, GK 2, no. 401, 404, 406, 407; DVP 1939 
I no.373. The visitor record for the "Stalin Cabinet" on June 15, shows Molotov; 
Voroshilov; Andreev; Nikolai M. Shvernik, president of the Trade Union Federa-
tion; Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Beria. Molotov stayed the longest, 11:10 p .m-
3:10 a.m., see IA 1995, no. 5-6, 40. For the British cabinet meeting of June 20, see 
CAB. 27/626, 39, PRO, emphasis added, A.M.C. 
74. For N. Henderson to Halifax, June 17, and marginal comment, F.0. 800.315, 
217, PRO. 
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On the Berlin-Moscow sector, the Germans were still cautious, while the 
Russians insisted on their economic demands. Schulenburg told Molotov 
on June 28, that he was instructed by Ribbentrop to say Germany desired 
not only a normalization but also an improvement of mutual relations, and 
that this was approved by Hitler. Molotov, however, replied that it would 
be better for the German embassy to answer Mikoyan's questions [regard-
ing a trade-credit agreement], and only then would a decision be made as 
to whether Schnurre should come to Moscow.75 Molotov's arrogant stance, 
confirmed by Potemkin in a conversation with Schulenburg on July l,76 led 
to the suspension of German probing and thus the interruption of German-
Soviet diplomatic conversations in both Moscow and Berlin. However, pre-
sumably to encourage the Germans, the Russian air attache in London, 
Ivan Cherny, told the assistant German air attache that the Soviet govern-
ment had no interest in concluding a pact with Britain and France. In a 
telegram of June 29 reporting this item, the German ambassador in Lon-
don, Herbert von Dirksen, also transmitted the correct version of the pro-
posal sent that day to the British ambassador in Moscow. He did so with-
out citing the "reliable source," which was perhaps so well established by 
this time that it needed no mention. In this proposal, presented to Molotov 
on July 1, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland were to be listed as guaranteed 
states in a separate, secret annex to the alliance treaty—which was a French 
suggestion. The British and French also insisted that besides Poland, the 
guarantees include Romania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland.77 On June 29, Pravda published another 
article by Zhdanov, titled: "The British and French Governments do not 
want agreement with the USSR."78 
On July 3, Molotov handed the British and French ambassadors a 
counterdraft excluding Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland from 
the projected guarantee. He told the ambassadors orally that the Soviet 
government would only agree to the inclusion of the last two if Poland and 
Turkey concluded mutual assistance pacts with the USSR. The Soviet draft 
also stipulated assistance in case of direct or indirect aggression, defining 
75. Schulenburg telegram, June 29, 1939, DGFP D VI, no. 579; Soviet record 
GK 2, no. 442, also Schulenburg July 3, DGFP ibid., no. 607. 
76. Potemkin-Schulenburg conversation, July 1,1939; Russian record, DVP 1939 
I, no. 402; no German record published. 
77. German Ambassador, London, Telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 
29, 1939, DGFP D VI, no.581. Anglo-French draft handed to Molotov, July 1, 
1939, DBFP 3rd ser., VI, no. 209; SPE no. 271; GK 2, no. 453. Thirty-eight visitors 
to Stalin were listed on the evening of July 1; of these, Molotov, Voroshilov and 
Kaganovich stayed about five hours, I A 1995, no. 5-6, 42. 
78. Zhdanov article, June 29, SPE no.269, Degras, SDFP, III, pp. 352-353. 
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the latter as "an internal coup d'etat or a reversal of policy in favor of the 
aggressor." Furthermore, Molotov insisted orally on the simultaneous en-
try into force of the military and political agreements. Of course, he knew 
very well that Poland and Turkey did not wish to ally with the USSR, so his 
proposal may have been intended to drag out the negotiations. In any event, 
on July 6, the British ambassador was instructed to agree to the omission 
of Switzerland and the Netherlands, but to reject the simultaneous entry 
into force of the military and political agreements, also the Soviet defini-
tion of indirect aggression. However, the instruction to Seeds reiterated the 
July 1 inclusion of the list of guaranteed states in an unpublished protocol. 
This suggests that Britain and France were willing to bypass Polish, Roma-
nian, and Baltic objections. Indeed, on July 7, the Polish charge d'affaires 
in London, Antoni Jazdzewski, was informed "briefly" about the state of 
Anglo-Soviet negotiations. In particular, he was told that "the Soviet Union 
must obtain some compensation for coming to our assistance in the event 
of our having to implement our guarantee to Poland." This implied Anglo-
French readiness to conclude a military and political treaty with the USSR 
and making some concessions to the latter's demands. On July 8, the am-
bassadors handed a new draft agreement to Molotov, to which the com-
missar added a draft supplementary letter stipulating the conditional inclu-
sion of the Netherlands and Switzerland. This letter also defined indirect 
aggression as the action of any of the guaranteed states under the threat of 
force by another power, or without any such threat, involving the use of its 
territory and forces by that power for the purposes of aggression, and con-
sequently the loss of the state's independence. On July 11, Halifax sug-
gested to the French that, in return for Russian acceptance of the Anglo-
French formula on indirect aggression (which was limited to change of 
policy under direct threat, as in the Czechoslovak case in 1938), both gov-
ernments should agree to the Russian demand for the simultaneous signing 
of the military and political agreements. The French at first opposed this, 
but then advised the British to accept the Soviet demand rather than risk 
the breakdown of negotiations.79 
79. Soviet counterdraft, July 3, 1939, SPE no. 273; GK 2, no.458, emphasis 
added, A.M.C. On the stipulation of conditionally including the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, see Molotov to Soviet Ambassadors Maisky and Suritz, July 3, 1979, 
SPE no. 274, GK 2, no. 459. Halifax instructions to Seeds, July 6, 7, 1939, DBFP 
3rd ser. VI, nos. 251-253; on conversations with Molotov, see Seeds to Halifax, 
DBFP ibid., nos. 279, 281-282. Correspondence on linking the Anglo-French defi-
nition of indirect aggression with signing a military-political agreement, see DBFP, 
ibid., nos. 290, 295, 307. For the Anglo-French proposal of July 8, and Molotov's 
supplemental letter July 9, see SPE nos. 278. 279, GK 2 nos. 465, 467, DVP 1939 
I, no. 417. For information to Poles, see Halifax to Clifford Norton, British charge 
d'affaires, Warsaw, July 12, 1939, DBFP, ibid., no. 306, cf. Jazdzewski telegraphic 
report on July 7 conversation with Ivone Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office, Warszawa, 
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Meanwhile, on July 7, Berlin made a move that proved crucial for rapproche-
ment with Moscow. On that day, the German embassy in Moscow was in-
structed to offer Mikoyan a credit of 200 million reichsmarks—the same 
amount as in the 1935 agreement and as offered in December 1938—and 
also to propose a list of issues to be discussed in negotiations for a trade-credit 
agreement. Three days later, the embassy reported that Mikoyan had received 
these proposals with great interest, saying he would inform his government 
and give an answer soon.80 On July 19, Astakhov reported to Molotov, with 
whom he was obviously in close touch, that the Germans let no opportunity 
slip "to let us understand their readiness to change their policy toward us, and 
that all depended only on us."81 Clearly, the German side was anxious to 
proceed with talks. Moscow was forthcoming as well, for Stalin decided that 
E. I. Babarin should return to Berlin as deputy head of the Soviet Trade Del-
egation to negotiate the trade-credit agreement. On July 13, Babarin attended 
a meeting of the "Stalin Cabinet," so it is likely that he received his new 
instructions that evening. Schulenburg reported the decision on sending Babarin 
on July 16, and the Soviet press announced his departure to conduct negotia-
tions in Berlin on July 22. Ribbentrop assumed that Astakhov and Babarin 
would immediately report every German statement to Moscow, so the German 
experts were instructed to infiltrate certain statements by Hider into the negotia-
tions and to keep in close telephone touch with the German foreign minister.82 
teleg. szyfr. no. 120, 121, Polish embassy, London, archives, A. 12, ciphers, PISM. 
For French views and advice to the British, see: DDF, 2nd ser., XVII (Paris, 1984), pt. 
II (documents from June 29 through July 11). 
80. For Weizsacker's instruction to the Moscow embassy, July 7, 1939, see DGFP 
D VI, no. 628, also Schulenburg report of JulylO, ibid., no. 642. No Russian record of 
this conversation has been published, but Schulenburg reported earlier, June 29, that 
Molotov told him that day (telegram sent June 29, 2 a.m. so referred to June 28) he 
approved Mikoyan's attitude in his conversation with Hilger, and that after this mat-
ter was settled it might be useful for Schnurre to come to Moscow; ibid., no.579; 
Russian record, GK 2, no. 442. On the evening of July 10, Stalin saw Molotov, 
Voroshilov, Beria, Kaganovich and Mikoyan; Molotov came at 8.45 p.m., the rest at 
9 or 10 p.m., see: I A 1995, 5-6, no. 44. 
81. Astakhov letter to Molotov, July 19, 1939, GK 2, no. 485.. 
82. For an earlier Mikoyan-Hilger conversation mentioning Babarin on June 2, see 
ibid., no. 388. Schulenburg's report on this conversation does not mention Babarin, 
DGFP D VI, no.465. Babarin had gone to Berlin earlier but returned, presumably to 
receive new instructions. The July 13 session of the "Stalin Cabinet" was attended by 
a total of seventeen visitors, of whom Molotov, as usual stayed longest, from 1:45 to 
7:15 p.m; Babarin came at 6:45 and left at 7:05 p.m, see I A 1995, no.5-6, 44. For 
Schulenburg's report on Babarin trip, July 16, see DGFP ibid.,no.677. For Weizsacker's 
July 22 instruction to Schulenburg on the end of the waiting period mandated to him 
at the end of June, and instructing him to start political conversations, ibid., no. 700. 
For Schnurre's daily telephone contact with Ribbentrop during the talks with Babarin, 
see his letter to Schulenburg, August 2, ibid., no. 756. 
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Babarin paid a visit to Schnurre on July 18, and stated he had been empowered to 
negotiate a trade treaty in the German capital, while the German ambassador was 
to pick up the threads in Moscow.83 It seems Stalin had decided that trade negotia-
tions could, after all, go forward before establishing a "political base" or, as is 
more likely, that he expected the trade negotiations to lead to a political agreement. 
Perhaps sending Babarin to Berlin marked another date at which Stalin decided to 
throw in his hand with Hitler? 
Japan was also an element in Soviet policy in 1939. Some historians see the 
fighting between Japanese and Soviet forces in summer 1939 in the Far 
East, on the frontier between Manchukuo and Mongolia, as very impor-
tant or even central to Stalin's policy at this time. However, it does not 
seem to have been significant, given the small size of the forces involved.84 
Furthermore, the brilliant Soviet intelligence agent in Tokyo, Richard 
Sorge—who had excellent contacts in high Japanese government circles— 
reported in June that the Japanese army would not be ready for a major 
offensive for another two years or so, and the Japanese government did not 
plan a war against the USSR.85 This information, together with Soviet mili-
tary reconnaissance reports, should have convinced Stalin that there was 
no threat of a major war with Japan. However, it is impossible to evaluate 
the role of this protracted, distant conflict in Stalin's European policy, be-
cause the records of high-level Politburo and Stalin Cabinet foreign policy 
83. See Schnurre's report on conversation with Babarin, July 18, 1939, GDFP D 
VI, no. 685. 
84. On May 11, Japanese-sponsored Manchukuo (Manchurian) cavalry units 
had driven Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolian troops across the Holha River on 
the disputed Nomonhan/Ghalkin Gol section of the frontier between Manchukuo 
and Mongolia. Three days later, a Japanese reconnaissance unit advanced into this 
area, but was destroyed by Soviet troops on May 28. The Japanese Kwantung Army 
then decided to send its 23rd division, later supplemented by additional forces, all of 
which were combined later into the 6th Army. The Japanese attack began with the 
bombing of Soviet positions on June 28, and developed into a land offensive in the 
first days of July, but ran into Georgii K. Zhukov's armored and motorized troops, 
with good artillery support, so it stalled two days later. The Japanese launched 
another attack on July 23 and pushed the Soviet forces back in two days, but suf-
fered heavy casualties. What followed was a war of attrition until Zhukov launched 
a victorious offensive on August 20, totally defeating the Japanese forces by August 
31. The Japanese 6th Army numbered about 75,000 men while Zhukov's 1st Army 
Corps numbered 57,000, but the Japanese were spread out over a large area. An 
armistice was agreed by Molotov and Japanese Ambassador Shigenori Togo in 
Moscow on September 15, and signed locally the next day, see DVP 1939, pt. II., 
docs. 586, 591. For a discussion of the political and military aspects, see Jonathan 
Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, ch. 5. 
85. For Richard Sorge telegram, see Haslam, ibid., 131; this telegram was not 
published in DVP 1939 1. 
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discussions are unavailable. Another event in the Far East that may have 
caused some concern in Moscow involved British policy in that region. 
After the Japanese blockade of the British concession at Tientsin in June, 
the British government signed an agreement with Japan on July 22, recog-
nizing Japanese gains in China. This was resented in Moscow, which was 
supporting Chiang Kai-Shek. 
However, it is likely that another development concerning Britain was 
more worrisome to Stalin, because it was closer to home. The British gov-
ernment now showed a renewed interest in reaching an agreement with 
Hitler, and this became public knowledge through leaks to the British press. 
Helmuth Wohlthat, a high official in Hermann Goering's Four-Year Plan 
Office, conducted talks in July with some prominent British officials in 
London. They included Chamberlain's close adviser Sir Horace Wilson, 
who allegedly expressed great interest in a peaceful settlement with Ger-
many by way of a nonaggression pact, which would make it possible for 
Britain to discard her East European guarantees. There was also talk of a 
large loan to Germany. Some details of Wohlthat's conversations were leaked 
to the press by Robert S. Hudson, secretary of the Board of Overseas Trade, 
who had earlier led a British trade delegation to Moscow. These leaks ap-
peared in the British press on July 22, with the charge that at least one 
member of the government was involved in a new attempt at appease-
ment.86 
Meanwhile, however, the British and French governments had agreed 
on July 12 to include in the treaty a formula on indirect aggression closer 
to the Soviet version. On July 17, the two ambassadors presented a draft to 
Molotov including their agreed definition of indirect aggression. This as-
sumed armed Soviet action in case a state changed its policy under a clear 
threat of force by another power, and this change involved the abandon-
ment of its independence or neutrality, but in other cases there were to be 
consultations. Assistance was to be given according to League of Nations 
principles, but without the need to follow League procedure or await its 
action. They also proposed a secret protocol listing the countries to be 
guaranteed—which included Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Fin-
land. Molotov rejected the Anglo-French formula on indirect aggression, 
saying it did not cover all contingencies. He offered Czech President Emil 
Hacha's acceptance of Hitler's terms in mid-March 1939 as an example of 
a state bowing to a threat without it being acknowledged as such. He then 
86. For Wohlthat's July 24 report on his London talks, see DGFP D VI, no.716; 
for confirmation by German Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen, see ibid., nos.710, 
746, 752. British historians deny that Wilson made the proposals reported by 
Wohlthat, since there is no British documentary confirmation, Watt, How War Came, 
399-400. For press reports and Chamberlain reactions, ibid., 400-401. Wilson 
made the same proposal to Dirksen on August 3, 1939, DBFP 3rd ser. VI, no. 533. 
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said that if the British and French did not accept the Soviet formula on 
indirect aggression, there was no point in continuing the conversations. 
After this ultimatum, however, he went on to insist that the political and 
military agreements should be signed at the same time and declared this 
was the "fundamental principle." Once this was settled, he said: "The ques-
tion as to how agreement on the text of the political articles was to be 
recorded was a technical matter of secondary importance." Finally, he asked 
whether or not the British and French governments "were really willing to 
open military conversations." The two ambassadors assured him they were 
and French Ambassador fimile Naggiar even said his government would be 
willing to begin military conversations immediately, without waiting to 
sign the political agreement. Seeds, however, stated the British government 
was ready to start technical conversations only if agreement was reached 
on the article under discussion. Naggiar then asked whether the Soviet 
government would agree to open military talks at once before the conclu-
sion of political discussions, but proceeding parallel with them. Molotov 
said he thought the Soviet government might agree. Stalin won this point, 
which was presumably the goal of Molotov's diatribe, for the ambassadors 
were authorized on July 21 to agree to the Soviet demand for the simulta-
neous entry into force of the military and political agreements. They in-
formed Molotov of this on July 22—the day that the leaks appeared in the 
London press—whereupon he insisted that military conversations start at 
once without resolving outstanding issues in a political agreement. The 
Anglo-French agreement to this demand was transmitted on July 21 by 
"the reliable source" to the German embassy in London, which reported it 
to Berlin. On July 25, the appropriate instructions were sent from London 
to Ambassador Seeds.87 
The Polish government was skeptical of positive results in these negotia-
tions. It viewed bargaining with the Soviets as shopping in an "oriental 
bazaar," that is, dealing with a devious merchant who constantly upped 
the price. In any case, as mentioned earlier, the Poles were certain the Sovi-
ets would help them in the event of German aggression, for "the Soviet 
government would be anxious to see Hitler as far from its frontiers as 
possible." Meanwhile, Beck warned that any Anglo-French commitments 
involving Poland or the Baltic countries would have "an unfortunate ef-
fect." This was a veiled warning against pushing them into Germany's arms, 
87. For the Anglo-French proposal of July 17, see SPE no.286, DBFP 3rd ser. VI, 
no.338, emphasis added, A.M.C; French urging acceptance of Soviet demands, ibid., 
no.337; Halifax insisting on the British formula on indirect aggression, ibid., no.338; 
British agreement to military conversations, ibid., no.435. For secret information 
on French views and "reliable source" report on Halifax instruction to Seeds of 
July 21, see Dirksen telegram, July 21, DGFP D, VI, no.695. 
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which the British always feared and thus wished to avoid. It is worth not-
ing, however, that the British envisaged the passage of Soviet troops in the 
event of a German attack on Poland. Thus, "the instructions to the British 
Military Mission to Moscow August 1939" for staff conversations with 
Russia did not preclude Russian entry into Poland, though they indicated 
some naivete about the beliefs of the Polish and Soviet governments. The 
real reason for Polish opposition was fear that the Russians would stay— 
which was true—but also the alleged fear that the Soviet sojourn there 
would lead to "communizing the peasantry," which was not a Polish pho-
bia. At the same time, the authors of the memorandum believed the Rus-
sians were not enthusiastic about having their troops in Poland for fear 
they would come under "bourgeois influences," which was not a fear en-
tertained in Moscow. Finally, the "Instructions" perceived the real prob-
lem to be that while the Poles might accept Russian "air forces" and raw 
materials, they did not want Russian soldiers on their soil. The conclusion 
to this section read: "The position is one that will have to be handled with 
considerable tact."88 
Meanwhile, as instructions were being drawn up for the British delega-
tion in preparation for its depature, Anglo-Soviet relations were at a low 
ebb. On July 31, R. A. Butler, the parliamentary undersecretary of state for 
foreign affairs, stated in the House of Commons that the chief difference 
between the Western powers and Moscow was "the question whether we 
should infringe the independence of the Baltic States or not." This infuri-
ated the Kremlin. Izvestiia commented on August 2 that the chief differ-
ence was in the British formula leaving a loophole for an aggressor to do 
just that. That same day, the Anglo-French formula on indirect aggression, 
defined as a clear threat to the independence of a Baltic State and consulta-
tion in other cases, was offered again to Molotov, who did not welcome it. 
At this point, the Western-Soviet negotiations lapsed, though the British, at 
least, expected them to continue parallel to the military talks. On August 4, 
just as Strang was ordered to leave Moscow for London, the French and 
British delegations set out for Russia on a small, slow merchant ship, "The 
City of Exeter." They arrived in Leningrad on August 10, and reached 
Moscow the next morning. Travel on a merchant ship was chosen because 
the RAF could not spare its two Sunderland flying boats to accommodate 
the joint mission, while a railway trip through Germany was clearly unad-
visable and Halifax thought that sending the mission on a destroyer through 
the Baltic would be provocative. In any case, the British delegation mem-
bers were told they were only negotiators, for the final agreement to 
any military convention rested with the French and British governments. 
88. For Polish views as reported from Warsaw on July 21 and 31, see DBFP 3rd 
ser. VI, nos. 394, 489. Instructions to British military mission, on Polish-Russian 
relations, ibid., Appendix V, 772. 
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Moreover, "the main issue is to define the circumstances in which France 
and Great Britain would assist the Soviet Government should the latter feel 
obligated to defend the independence or neutrality of one of the Baltic 
States. Agreement on this point has not been reached." Thus, they were 
instructed: "Until such time as the political agreement is concluded, the 
Delegation should therefore go very slowly with the conversations, watch-
ing the progress of the political negotiations and keeping in very close touch 
with His Majesty's Ambassador." By contrast, the French delegation was 
given full powers to negotiate and told to return with a signed agreement. 
On August 12, the day the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks began in 
Moscow, Chamberlain is said to have approved a new definition of indi-
rect aggression very close to the Soviet one, but as it turned out, there was 
no opportunity to discuss it.89 By that time, the Soviet leadership had other, 
increasingly tempting German proposals to consider, which allowed them 
to take an ever stiffer attitude toward France and Britain in the Moscow 
negotiations. 
As mentioned earlier, the "reliable source" had informed the German em-
bassy in London on July 21 of the forthcoming Anglo-French-Soviet nego-
tiations. This impelled the Germans to speed up their efforts to reach an 
agreement with the USSR, which were evident in the talks that now took 
place in Berlin. The German-Soviet trade-credit negotiations provided an 
excellent opportunity for both sides to sound each other on a possible po-
litical deal. Indeed, at this time the future German-Soviet agreement on 
spheres of influence was outlined in talks between Schnurre on the one 
hand and the two Soviet representatives, Astakhov and Babarin, on the 
other. In a preliminary conversation between Schnurre and Astakhov on 
July 24, the former gave the German view of three stages in improving 
relations: a trade-credit agreement, press and cultural relations, and politi-
cal rapprochement. He said there was no conflict between Soviet and Ger-
man interests, and Germany did not envisage doing anything in the Baltic 
or in Bessarabia that would harm Soviet interests.90 The most significant 
89. On Butler statement, July 31 and hvestiiaAugust 2, see DBFP; ibid., no. 
512, also SPE no. 300 and Degras SDFP III, 356. For the Anglo-French draft on 
indirect aggression, August 2, see SPE no.301, GK 2, no. 519; on Molotov reac-
tion, DBFPi ibid., nos. 525,527. Instructions to British delegation to go slow, DBFP, 
ibid., pp. 762-763. For instruction to French delegates, DDF, 2nd ser., vol. XVII 
(Paris, 1984), doc. 364. On a definition of indirect aggression allegedly approved 
by Chamberlain, August 12, see Sidney Aster, 1939. The Making of the Second 
World War (New York, 1973), 300; the text of the definition is not given. 
90. No German record of this conversation was printed, but see Fleischhauer, 
Der Pakt, 268; for Astakhov record, see GK 2, no.294 and DVP 1939 I, no. 4 3 4 ; 
see also his diary notes of conversations with Peter Kleist, a member of Ribbentrop's 
office, and Schnurre, July 24, ibid., no.431. 
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conversation took place on July 26. According to Schnurre's report, he 
talked with Astakhov and Babarin during dinner in the Ewest Restaurant, 
and the conversation lasted until about 12.30 a.m. The German official 
again listed the three stages for improving relations, then stated there was 
no conflict of interest between Germany and the USSR in the region stretch-
ing from the Baltic to the Black Sea—which was to be the slogan used in 
German declarations to Moscow from now on. According to Schnurre, 
Astakhov said it was clear the Danzig and Corridor questions would be 
resolved one way or another to Germany's advantage. He then asked 
whether the former Austrian lands would also return to Germany, espe-
cially the Galician and Ukrainian regions. Schnurre replied that in all these 
matters there was no conflict of interest between Germany and Russia. He 
also said it would be even easier to reach an understanding on Poland, and 
emphasized that his statements were sanctioned by Ribbentrop. Astakhov 
said he would report all this to Moscow. At this point, the trade-credit 
issue came up, but Schnurre gave no details in his report. He concluded by 
stating his opinion that the Soviet government had not yet made up its 
mind and was drawing out negotiations with England in order to keep 
both the British and the Germans guessing.91 
In his record of the conversation, Astakhov did not report making the 
statements attributed to him by Schnurre. Instead, he wrote that the Ger-
man official had gone all out in expressing the German wish for better 
German-Soviet relations, assuring the Soviet diplomats that Germany had 
no intention of acting against Soviet interests in the Baltic States, and that 
she had given up any interest in Ukraine. Astakhov commented that it was 
not clear whether this included the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire.92 Molotov congratulated Astakhov in a telegram sent 
on July 28, for merely listening to Schnurre's declarations and saying he 
would transmit them to Moscow.93 Although Gorlov acknowledges this 
contact between Astakhov and Molotov, he does not admit it implies pre-
vious reports and instructions. Nor does he see any indication of this in 
Molotov's telegram to Astakhov of July 29, replying to the latter's report. 
The commissar wrote that if the Germans were sincere in their wish to 
91. By Galician and Ukrainian regions, Astakhov meant former East Galicia— 
later western Ukraine—then in Poland, and Carpathian Ukraine, then in Hungary; 
both had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Revised Polish estimates of 
the 1931 census figures show the Ukrainians and Poles of eastern Poland at just 
under 5 million each; in this part of Poland, there were also about 2 million 
Belorussians and one and a quarter million Jews, see Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland's 
Holocaust (Jefferson, N.C., 1998), 297, note 14. For Schnurre's record of the July 
26 conversation, see DGFP, D, VI, no.729. 
92. For Astakhov record, see GK2, no.503, and diary notes, DVP 19391, no.421. 
The "Stalin Cabinet" met on July 26 and 27, see: IA 1995, no. 5-6, 45. 
93. For Molotov to Astakhov, July 28, see GK 2, no. 503. 
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improve relations with the USSR, then they must say just how they thought 
this should be done. He noted Schulenburg had also said recently that Ger-
many wished to improve relations with the USSR, but had made no con-
crete proposals. Molotov concluded: "The matter depends entirely on the 
Germans. Of course, we would welcome any improvement of political re-
lations between the two sides."94 Clearly, Stalin and Molotov wanted the 
Germans to say exactly what they were willing to pay for a political agree-
ment with Moscow. 
Indeed, the Germans were now more than interested; they were anx-
ious. The Franco-British decision to send a combined military delegation 
to Moscow to negotiate a military alliance with the USSR had a galvaniz-
ing effect on Hitler and Ribbentrop. They ordered Weizsacker to instruct 
Schulenburg on July 29 to sound out Molotov on his impressions of the 
Berlin talks between Babarin, Astakhov, and Schnurre. Ribbentrop showed 
his impatience by making the German position official on August 2; he 
then repeated personally, to Astakhov, Schnurre's statement on the absence 
of conflict between German and Soviet interests in the area between the 
Baltic and Black Seas, and said that an agreement could be reached with-
out difficulty. As for Poland, he thought Germany could destroy it in a 
military campaign of a week to ten days, though he hoped this would not 
be necessary. Astakhov repeated Molotov's message that Moscow awaited 
concrete proposals, to which Ribbentrop answered that he wanted to know 
first if the Soviet government was interested in conducting talks either in 
Berlin or in Moscow.95 Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to repeat his 
statements to Molotov, and the ambassador did so on August 3. However, 
Molotov was unforthcoming despite Schulenburg's repetition of 
Ribbentrop's statement on there being no conflict of German and Soviet 
interests between the Baltic and Black Seas. The commissar reminded the 
ambassador of German support for Japanese aggression against the USSR, 
and insisted on the economic agreement being signed first. He also used a 
phrase similar to the one in his July 29 telegram to Astakhov: "Now every-
thing depends on the German side's line of conduct." Schulenburg had the 
impression that the Soviet government still mistrusted Germany and would 
conduct long negotiations with the French and British, whom it also dis-
94. For Molotov to Astakhov, July 29, after receipt of Astakhov's full report, see 
GK 2, no. 511; Gorlov, "Sovetsko-germanskii dialog," 28. (See note 46 above). 
95. On sounding out Molotov's reaction to the talks with Babarin and Astakhov, 
see Weizsacker to Schulenburg, July 29,1939, DGFP D VI, no. 736; on Ribbentrop's 
statement to Astakhov, August 2,1939, see his telegrams to Schulenburg, August 3, 
4, ibid. , nos. 758,770, and Schnurre report of August 3, ibid., no. 761. For Astakhov 
report, see GK 2, no. 523, longer version in DVP 1939 I, no. 445. Schnurre wrote 
of the Astakhov-Ribbentrop meeting as taking place on August 3, but both Astakhov 
and Ribbentrop give August 2 as the date. 
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trusted. He wrote that the Germans would have to make strenuous efforts 
to bring the Soviet government around.96 
While the Germans pressed for negotiations, Molotov kept insisting that 
they make concrete proposals and that the trade-credit agreement be signed 
first. On August 8, Astakhov sent Molotov a list of what the Germans were 
ready to concede, and it was a great deal: disinterest in the fate of the Baltic 
States—except for Lithuania—and also Bessarabia, as well as "Russian 
Poland" [central Poland, including Warsaw, part of the Russian Empire in 
1914]. They also distanced themselves from any aspirations to Ukraine. In 
exchange, they wished to receive confirmation of Russian disinterest in 
Danzig and in former German Poland [western or Prussian Poland in 1914], 
with adjustments in Germany's favor up to the Warta, or even the Vistula 
line, and also in Galicia. Of course, discussions on the above could only 
take place if there was no Anglo-French-Soviet military and political agree-
ment.97 Two days later, on August 10, Astakhov cabled that according to 
Schnurre, who had just returned from seeing Ribbentrop at Obersalzburg 
on August 8-9, the Germans wanted to know the Soviet attitude toward 
either a peaceful or military solution of the Polish-German dispute over 
Danzig and the Corridor. If there was war, Germany would not impinge on 
Soviet interests, but wanted to know what these were. There was no con-
flict between German and Soviet interests in the region between the Baltic 
and Black Seas, but the conclusion of a Soviet pact with Britain and France 
would be a bad introduction to Soviet negotiations with Germany. Thus, it 
is clear that on August 8-9 Hitler decided to press Stalin for an agree-
ment.98 On August 11, Molotov telegraphed Astakhov that the list of Ger-
man objectives cited in his letter of August 8, "interests us," but their dis-
cussion required preparation. Intervening steps should take the form of a 
96. For Schulenburg's report on his conversation with Molotov, August 3,1939, 
see DGFP D VI, no.766; Molotov's record, GK 2, no. 525, DVP 1939 I, no.446. 
Stalin had eleven visitors on the evening of August 4. Molotov and Voroshilov were 
there twice at the same time: 5 .00-9.15, and again 10.30-11.50 p.m., IA 1995, 5 -
6, 47. 
97. By Galicia, Schnurre meant East Galicia, now western Ukraine, see Astakhov 
letter to Molotov, August 8, 1939, GK 2, no. 534, DVP 1939 I, no. 455. On the 
evening of August 8, Stalin had 21 visitors; Molotov was there twice: 5.35-6.45, 
and 9.55 p.m. tol2.00 midnight, IA ibid. 
98. See Astakhov telegram to Molotov, August 10, 1939, GK 2, no. 538, DVP 
1939 I, no. 460; there are minor stylistic differences between the two texts. For 
Hitler's final decision on August 8-9 to seek an agreement with the USSR, see 
Fleischhauer, Der Pakt; 292-295. On the evening of August 10, Stalin had 23 visi-
tors. Commissar for Defense Voroshilov and the Chief of the General Staff, 
Shaposhnikov, visited twice; Zhdanov came as usual; Molotov was absent but prob-
ably saw Stalin earlier. The first visitor, Malenkov, arrived at 3.30 and the last 
visitors left at 1 a.m.; see: IA 1995, 5-6, 47-48. 
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trade-credit agreement, and agreement on other questions. He expected 
the negotiations to take place in Moscow." 
Astakhov's account of what the Germans were ready to offer, and then 
his report of what Schnurre had told him on August 10, may have con-
vinced Stalin and Molotov that the time had come to begin "concrete" 
negotiations, or this may have been due to some military information, or a 
combination of both. Fifty years later, in late December 1989, Alexander 
N. Yakovlev, Central Committee member and chairman of the commission 
to examine Stalinist crimes and rehabilitate the victims, told the Second 
Congress of People's Deputies about the decision to begin negotiations with 
the Germans. He stated that Stalin was informed on August 7 of German 
readiness to start military action [against Poland] any day after August 25. 
He said the situation was discussed on August 11 at a Politburo meeting, 
which also took into account Hitler's attempts to establish direct contact 
with Chamberlain and the pessimistic prognosis of the [forthcoming] mili-
tary negotiations [with the Anglo-French delegation] in Moscow. In view 
of all the above, it was decided to begin an official discussion of the ques-
tions raised by the Germans and to inform Berlin accordingly. This deci-
sion, said Yakovlev, led to the beginning of German-Soviet negotiations at 
Molotov's meeting with Schulenburg on August 15.100 
The news allegedly received by Stalin on August 7 may have come from 
German diplomat Rudolf von Scheliha, a paid Soviet agent in the German 
embassy, Warsaw, with extensive contacts in high German political and 
military circles. According to a Russian document, Scheliha reported on 
August 7 that according to the German military attache at the German 
embassy in Warsaw, Colonel Gerstenberg, who had just returned from Ber-
lin, Hitler had decided on war and the start of military action against Po-
land was expected any day after August 25.101 This is the same wording as 
that used in the Yakovlev report. However, there is no record of Hitler 
99. See Molotov's telegram to Astakhov, August 11, 1939, GK 2, no. 540. 
100. For Yakovlev's report on the secret protocol, December 24, 25, 1989, see 
note 3 above. On the commission, the rifts within it, and Yakovlev report of De-
cember 23, 1989—but not the key report of Dec. 24—see Bezymensky, "The Secret 
protocols of 1939" in Gorodetsky, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991, 80-83. 
101. Some of Rudolf von Scheliha's reports were published in SPE, where his 
name is consistently misspelled as "von Scheliah"; for his report of August 7, see 
ibid., no. 308. Gerstenberg was presumably Alfred Gerstenberg, the German mili-
tary attache in Bucharest in September 1940. Von Scheliha, a counselor in the Ger-
man embassy, Warsaw, was recruited in 1937 by Soviet intelligence for money he 
needed to keep up his lavish lifestyle. In August, presumably after he sent this re-
port, he was transferred to the Information Section of the German Foreign Minis-
try, Berlin, where he continued to gather valuable information for Moscow until his 
arrest in October 1942; he was executed. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg 
Gordievsky, KGB. The Inside Story (New York, 1990), 240-241, 255-256, 276. 
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making such a decision around August 5-7 , though it is known that he was 
furious at the Poles over a crisis in Polish-Danzig relations and reports 
about the mistreatment of Germans in Poland. (The French and British 
ambassadors cabled their government that these reports were false). It is 
also known that Hitler fumed at the Poles to Hungarian Foreign Minister 
Istvan Csaky, whom he received at Berchtesgaden on August 8, but said he 
still hoped the Poles would be reasonable. Also, the German ambassador 
to Poland, Hans Adolf von Moltke, was instructed not to return to Po-
land.102 Thus, if Gerstenberg had said what Scheliha reported on August 7, 
this was based probably on rumors in high German military circles and not 
on any decision by Hitler. Finally, according to German records, Hitler did 
not tell his military and political leaders of the date of the attack on Po-
land—August 26—until August 22. Indeed, it is clear he set this date on 
August 21, when he had the agreement with Stalin in the bag. (On August 
25, the attack date was changed to September 1). It is possible, though not 
mentioned by Yakovlev, that Stalin knew of the meeting on August 7 of a 
group of British businessmen with Hermann Goering on the island of Sylt 
to sound out peace possibilities.103 Whatever the case might be, on August 
12—the very day on which the Anglo-French and Soviet military conversa-
tions began in Moscow—Astakhov told Schnurre that he had instructions 
from Molotov to say the Soviet government was interested in discussing 
the groups of questions that had been raised earlier, but this could only be 
undertaken gradually and in Moscow, leaving the choice of negotiator to 
the Germans.104 Hitler rejoiced and shared the good news with Italian For-
eign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, who was visiting with him at the time.105 
Perhaps August 11 marked the moment of Stalin's final decision to align 
with Hitler—or was it a significant step forward in this direction? 
102. For Hitler-Csaky conversation, see DGFP D, VI, no. 784; instruction to 
Moltke not to return to Warsaw, DGFP D, VII (London, Washington, 1956), no. 
99. 
103. It was actually Chamberlain who was sounding out Hitler, as witness Sir 
Horace Wilson's conversation with German ambassador Dirksen on August 3 (see 
note 86 above). Goering told the British businessmen at Sylt on August 7, that no 
Anglo-German conversations were possible unless Britain and Poland settled the 
Danzig question with Germany. Later, Wilson proposed a nonaggression pact, again 
in secret conversations with Fritz Hesse, press attache at the German embassy, but 
Hitler's answer on August 20 was that Germany must have her demands on Poland 
settled first, see Watt, How War Came, 404 ff. On August 11, Stalin saw Molotov 
at 7.45-10.30 p.m. and Voroshilov, at 7:40-10:30 p.m. See IA 1995, no. 5-6, 48. 
For Hitler's statement of August 22, that the attack on Poland would begin August 
26, see DGFP D VII,, no. 192. 
104. See Astakhov's letter to Molotov, August 12, 1939, GK 2, no. 541, DVP 
1939 I, no. 462, and Schnurre telegram to Schulenburg, August 14, DGFP D VII, 
no. 50. 
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The Germans did not waste time after hearing Astakhov's message of 
August 12. After two days of frenetic consultations, Ribbentrop instructed 
Schulenburg to transmit, through Molotov, Hitler's personal message for 
Stalin, and the ambassador did so on the evening of August 15. Hitler 
proposed that Ribbentrop come to Moscow as soon as possible to lay the 
Fiihrer's views before Stalin. The key part of the message read: 
The Reich Government are of the opinion that there is no question between the 
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction 
of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic 
States, Poland, South-Eastern questions, etc. 
Molotov said he would give an answer after communicating the message 
to his government, but he made a significant statement. He referred to 
what had been reported to him in June by the Soviet minister in Rome as 
the "Schulenburg Plan" to improve German-Soviet relations. He said this 
"plan" stipulated: (1) German-Soviet cooperation in regulating Soviet-Japa-
nese relations and the liquidation of their frontier conflicts; (2) the conclu-
sion of a nonaggression pact and a mutual guarantee of the Baltic States; 
(3) a broad economic agreement between the two powers. Molotov now 
asked whether the German government was interested in "refreshing" or 
supplementing existing German-Soviet agreements, or in a nonaggression 
pact? If so, there could be concrete negotiations. Schulenburg said he would 
telegraph Molotov's questions to Berlin.106 This was certainly a direct So-
viet proposal. 
105. Schmidt record of Hitler-Ciano conversations at Obersalzburg, August 12, 
ibid., no. 43, p. 49; Italian record, DDI, 8th ser., vol. XIII (Rome, 1953), no.4, p. 6. 
106. Emphasis added, A.M.C. The German-Soviet agreements Molotov had in 
mind were the Rapallo Treaty, 1922 and the Treaty of Berlin, 1926. For Ribbentrop's 
instruction to Schulenburg and the latter's record of conversation with Molotov, 
August 15, DGFP D VII, nos.51, 56, 79; Russian record, GK 2, no. 556, DVP 
1939, I, no.468. This record was first published in Russia, along with records of 
German-Soviet conversations on August 17, 19, the German-Soviet Credit Agree-
ment of August 19, also a translation of the German text of the nonaggression pact 
and secret protocol of August 23 1939, and other documents in: International Af-
fairs, no. 10 (1989), 81-116, 143. For Soviet Charge d'Affaires Leon B. Helfand's 
report from Rome, June 26,1939, on the so-called Schulenburg Plan, see GK 2, no. 
437, longer version in DVP 1939 I no. 399. This may have been an Italian effort, 
perhaps inspired by Berlin, to speed up the German-Soviet agreement, for the coun-
selor of the German embassy, Moscow, Werner von Tippelskirch, reported on June 
26, that the Italian ambassador, Augusto Rosso, told him the previous day he had 
received a telegram from his government saying the moment had come to bring 
about the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, see DGFP, D VI, 
no.569. Helfand is not listed in vol. I. of the Russian diplomatic dictionary (Mos-
cow, 1984), presumably because he defected to the West in summer 1940. 
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Though Molotov and Stalin did not seem to be in a hurry to conclude an 
agreement with Germany, they gave Hitler—who was in a hurry—some 
indirect encouragement. On August 16, an official in the News and Press 
Department of the German Foreign Ministry reported that a M. Legrenier 
(not identified) and a Mr. Barnes, described as a former correspondent of 
the New York Herald Tribune in Moscow, both of whom were known to 
enjoy excellent relations with the Soviet embassy in Berlin, had each given 
independent but similar accounts of their conversations with Astakhov and 
the Soviet press attache, Smirnov. The Soviet diplomats were reported as 
saying that Moscow intended to draw out negotiations with the Western 
powers until Germany settled the Danzig question with Poland, a settle-
ment in which Moscow did not expect the Western powers to be involved. 
After this, Russia would enter into political discussions with Germany. This 
statement was also noted by an official of Ribbentrop's office.107 It must 
have made Hitler even more eager to secure an agreement with Stalin. 
It has been known for some time that the German proposals which 
Schulenburg put to Molotov on August 15 were reported that day to Wash-
ington by the American ambassador in Moscow, Laurence A. Steinhardt. 
They had been communicated to Charles Bohlen of the U.S. embassy by his 
tennis partner, Hans Heinrich ("Johnny") von Herwarth, first secretary at 
the German embassy, Moscow, and personal assistant to Ambassador von 
Schulenburg. Both were covert opponents of the Nazi regime, but wished 
for the peaceful return of Danzig and part of the Polish Corridor to Ger-
many. Indeed, Schulenburg hoped a German-Soviet agreement would ac-
complish this aim and thus prevent war. It is worth noting that information 
on earlier German-Soviet talks had also reached Washington and had pro-
voked a reaction from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Herwarth had passed 
on to Bohlen the contents of the Schulenburg-Molotov conversation of 
August 3, which the U.S. embassy transmitted to Washington. There is no 
evidence that it was passed on to the British, French, or Polish govern-
ments, but Roosevelt warned the Soviet ambassador to the United States, 
Konstantin A. Oumansky, that if war broke out in Europe and the Far 
East, and if the Axis powers were victorious, then both the United States 
and the USSR would be affected, but the latter would be affected immedi-
ately. Therefore, the president believed that an agreement against aggres-
sion on the part of other European powers would have a stabilizing effect. 
This message was repeated by Steinhardt to Molotov on August 16, but it 
107. Report on Soviet diplomats' statements by Legrenier and Barnes, DGFP D 
VII, no. 84. Ralph Barnes had been the New York Herald Tribune correspondent in 
Berlin, then Moscow, and in 1939 he was again in Berlin. 
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did not seem to have any effect.108 After this, Washington did pass on 
Steinhardt's second report to the British. On August 17, the U.S. Under-Secre-
tary of State, Sumner Welles, told the British ambassador in Washington, Sir 
Ronald Lindsay, that the German ambassador in Moscow had seen Molotov 
two days earlier and transmitted an oral statement from Hitler to Stalin to the 
effect that Germany had no aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union, 
and that there was no conflict of interest between the two powers "from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea." Thus, Germany was ready to discuss any territorial 
questions in Eastern Europe and conversations should start very soon be-
cause she was ready to send a negotiator to Moscow immediately.109 How-
ever, this message was intercepted and delayed, most likely by Francis Herbert 
King. Six years later, at the Potsdam Conference, Anthony Eden told Bohlen 
that due to a communist spy in the Foreign Office code room, it was not 
received until after Berlin had announced Ribbentrop's forthcoming visit to 
Moscow. The Lindsay telegram was, indeed, officially registered in the for-
eign office on August 18 at 9.30 a.m., but was not received in the Central 
Department until August 22.110 Halifax told the U.S. ambassador, Joseph F. 
Kennedy, on August 23, that [Sir Robert G.] Vansittart [the chief diplomatic 
adviser to the Foreign Office] "believes there is a provision in the agreement 
providing for the fourth partition of Poland."111 Perhaps, Vansittart had read 
the Lindsay telegram, or perhaps also the report sent that day to Paris by the 
French ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre. Whatever Vansittart's source, 
he informed Halifax, who passed it on to Kennedy. 
108. For Steinhardt report, August 15, 1939, see FRUS 1939, I, 334-35; see 
also Charles Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1939 (New York, 1973), 80-82, and 
Hans von Herwarth, with S. Frederick Starr, Against Two Evils (New York, 1981), 
159-160. For report on German proposals of August 3, see U.S. Charge in the Soviet 
Union (Grummon) to secretary of state, Moscow, August 3, 1939, FRUS 1939, I, 
292-293. For President Roosevelt's warning to Ambassador Oumansky, with re-
quest that Steinhardt repeat it to Molotov, see under secretary of state to Steinhardt, 
August 4,1939, ibid., 293-294; for Steinhardt's report on conversation with Molotov, 
August 16, ibid., 296-298; Russian record: SPE no.329, GK 2, no. 564. 
109. For Welles' report on German proposals of August 15 to the British ambas-
sador, see Sir Ronald Lindsay to Halifax, Washington, August 17, 1939, DBFP 3rd 
ser. VII (London, 1954), no.41. 
110. See Watt, "Francis Herbert King," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
3, no. 4 (1988): 79, and his "An Intelligence Surprise: The Failure of the Foreign 
Office to Anticipate the Nazi-Soviet Pact," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
4, no. 3 (1989): 524; here Watt names the Soviet agent as John Herbert King. For 
Eden to Bohlen at Potsdam, see Bohlen, Witness to History, 80-82. Herwarth writes 
that the message was not deciphered until after the spy was replaced, Against Two 
Evils, 161, but this is incorrect because King was arrested after September 4, see 
note 116 below. 
111. Kennedy to secretary of state, August 23, 1939, FRUS, 1939, I, 339-340. 
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There is no documentary evidence that the British government commu-
nicated the contents of Lindsay's telegram—once it had reached the For-
eign Office Central Department on August 22—either to the French or the 
Polish governments. The same is true of the information regarding the 
German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact signed on August 23. This news was 
transmitted again by Herwarth to Bohlen, reported by Steinhardt to Wash-
ington on August 24, and communicated by the latter that same day to the 
British ambassador in Moscow.112 It must be assumed that the latter in-
formed his government, but there is no published document showing the 
State Department transmitted this news to the British or French ambassa-
dor in Washington. It is also clear that the Polish ambassador in Washing-
ton was not informed, even though some high U.S. officials were fully cog-
nizant of what it meant for Poland. Instead, President Roosevelt decided to 
launch another appeal for peace to European heads of state, including Hitler 
and President Ignacy Moscicki of Poland.113 It is also strange that though 
Ambassador Coulondre had warned Paris on August 22 of an imminent 
German-Soviet agreement, and two days later communicated reports from 
high Berlin circles that a German-Soviet understanding had been reached 
"regulating" the situation in Eastern Europe—including a partition of Po-
land along the Vistula River—there is no evidence of this being communi-
cated to the Polish ambassador in Paris. Vansittart probably heard of it 
through his own channels in Berlin or Paris. Perhaps French Premier Daladier 
hoped that, despite the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, French agree-
ment to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland—sent to General Jo-
seph Doumenc in Moscow on the night of August 21—might still allow the 
conclusion of a Franco-British-Soviet alliance to deter Hitler from war, even 
if it meant the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland, as reported by Coulondre 
three days later on August 24. (In fact, Bonnet may have envisaged this in 
112. See Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 166-167, and Bohlen, Witness to His-
tory, 82-83; Steinhardt to secretary to state, August 24, 1939 noon (received Wash-
ington, August 24 11:15 a.m.), FRUS, 1939, I 342-343; on informing the British 
ambassador and his incredulity, see Steinhardt to secretary of state, August 24, 5 
p.m (received 5:.40 p.m), ibid., 343-344. For Polish text and comments, see Piotr S. 
Wandycz, "Telegram Steinhardta," Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 84 (Paris, 1988): 204-
207. 
113. Under Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle noted in his diary on August 24 that 
in view of what was known in Washington about the German-Soviet agreement to 
partition Poland, "a strong message" to the latter, as urged from London by Am-
bassador Joseph P. Kennedy, would have to start with some such words as: "In view 
of the fact that your suicide is required, kindly oblige" etc., see Adolf A. Berle, 
Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971 (New York, 1973), 243. For Roosevelt's peace 
appeal of August 24 to Moscicki and the latter's reply see FRUS 1939, I, 361-62, 
368. 
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May).114 If so, it would not be in Daladier's interest to inform the Polish 
government of the Coulondre report. 
The grounds for the decision of the British and French governments not 
to communicate to the Poles the terms of the forthcoming Nazi-Soviet agree-
ment, and then the agreement itself, are not known. It is most likely they 
still hoped to secure Soviet alliance or neutrality, if need be, at Poland's 
expense. Furthermore, in the second half of August, Hitler was intensifying 
his pressure on Poland, so British and French statesmen were primarily 
focusing on this crisis, which threatened to erupt into war. But it is also a 
fact that, though Halifax had mentioned the possibility of a German-So-
viet agreement at a Cabinet meeting in June, the Foreign Office—like the 
Poles—refused to take it seriously, and this despite a number of reports 
received between May and July 1939.115 In particular, Krivitsky's warnings 
about the imminence of a Nazi-Soviet pact had been dismissed by the for-
eign office as "twaddle," "rigmarole," and "directly contrary to all our 
other information." It was only after the conclusion of the pact that he was 
listened to with more respect. After this, he was instrumental in unmasking 
Soviet spies in the Foreign Office. According to an unpublished entry in 
Under-Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan's diary on September 4, a 
telegram was received that day from Washington with some information 
on "leaks over the last four years, from someone in communications." 
King was arrested soon thereafter and on September 26, Cadogan noted 
that investigators were "on the track of others" who remain unknown. In 
any case, the whole staff of the communications department was dismissed 
and a new order established, though Soviet moles elsewhere would con-
tinue espionage on Moscow's behalf for many years to come.116 
114. See Coulondre to Bonnet, August 22, 1939, DDE< 2nd ser. XVIII (Paris, 
1985), no. 253, 301-302 (the document heading erroneously lists Fran^ois-Poncet 
as the ambassador, whereas he was then French ambassador in Rome, A.M.C); for 
Coulondre report, August 24, on German information about the partition of Po-
land, see ibid., no.377, 451 (here Moscow is erroneously listed instead of Berlin, as 
the origin of the telegram A.M.C). For Bonnet's note of a conversation with Suritz, 
May 26, with the former's comment on abandoning the Baltic States and part of 
Poland as the price of the Soviet alliance, see DDF 2nd ser. XVI, no. 289. However, 
the editorial note states this may have been written by Bonnet later to justify his 
policy (presumably, his appeasement of Germany, A.M.C) see ibid., p. 571. For 
Daladier telegram to Doumenc of August 21, received the next day, see discussion 
of Moscow negotiations later in this paper. 
115. See Watt, "An Intelligence Surprise," especially the appendix listing twenty-
two "Warnings or intimations of Nazi-Soviet Negotiations which are recorded as 
having reached British representatives, April-August 1939," 532-534. 
116. On the arrest of King and others, see Watt, "Francis Herbert King," 7. 
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As mentioned earlier, Poland was frequently blamed by Soviet and Western 
sources, both at the time and since, for the breakdown of the Anglo-Franco-
Soviet military negotiations in Moscow. However, German documents avail-
able since the late 1950s, as well as recently published Russian documents, 
do not support this conclusion. Indeed, one Russian document throws new 
light on Stalin's thinking just before the Anglo-French mission arrived in 
Moscow. On August 7, Stalin dictated instructions to Voroshilov on how 
to conduct the negotiations with the British and French military delegations. 
By this time, of course, the "Vozhd" knew that Hitler was ready to offer him 
what he wanted regarding Poland, the Baltic States, and southeastern Europe. 
What is striking in these instructions is Stalin's deep distrust of France and 
Britain and the listing of Russian demands that he expected their representa-
tives to refuse. The instructions are worth quoting in full: 
1. agreement by both sides on secrecy; 
2. first, present our full powers to conduct negotiations, and then ask the 
leaders of the Anglo-French delegation whether they also have full 
powers from their governments to sign a military convention with the 
USSR. 
3. If they do not have such full powers, show surprise, throw up your 
hands, and "respectfully" ask what was the purpose of their govern-
ments in sending them to the USSR. 
4. If they answer that they were sent to negotiate and prepare the ground 
for signing the military convention, ask them if they have any plan to 
defend the future allies, i.e. France, England, USSR etc., against ag-
gression by the aggressors' bloc in Europe. 
5. If it appears that they don't have any concrete plan of defense against 
aggression in one variant or another, which is unlikely, then ask them 
on the basis of what questions, what defense plan, the French and 
English think they will conduct negotiations with the military delega-
tion of the USSR. 
6. If the French and English still insist on negotiations, then direct these 
to the discussion of separate, principal questions, mainly on allowing 
the passage of our armies through the Vilna corridor and Galicia, also 
through Romania. 
7. If it appears that the free passage of our armies through the territory of 
Poland and Romania is ruled out, then declare that without [the fulfill-
ment of] this condition agreement is impossible, because without the 
free passage of Soviet armies through the indicated territories any vari-
ant of defense against aggression is doomed to failure, [and] that we 
do not consider it possible to participate in an undertaking that is 
doomed to fail. 
8. To requests that we show the French and English delegations our de-
fense factories, institutes, military units and military instruction centers, 
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say that after the visit of the pilot Lindbergh to the USSR in 1938, the 
Soviet government forbade showing defense enterprises and military 
units to foreigners, except to our allies—when these appear on the 
scene.117 
It is true that in his earlier memorandum on Soviet ideas for the negotia-
tions, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Boris M. Shaposhnikov, had 
specified the passage of Soviet troops through Poland (against Germany) 
and through Romania (to aid Turkey).118 These would, indeed, be the logi-
cal directions of Soviet military action against Germany—if it was intended. 
However, no Russian documents have surfaced to prove that it was. More-
over, Stalin's instructions to Voroshilov indicate that a Franco-British agree-
ment to Soviet demands was not expected. Indeed, Voroshilov told a mem-
ber of the French delegation almost at the outset that he did not believe the 
Polish and Romanian governments were asking for Soviet help, and ac-
cording to a French report, the Soviet demands for troop passage through 
those countries did not seem to be sincere.119 
In fact, the Soviet government had not raised the issue until Voroshilov 
did so at the first official meeting of the delegations on August 12, and 
made it the key Russian condition two days later. It is worth noting that on 
that day, August 14, Voroshilov asked for a fifteen-minute interval when 
the head of the British delegation, Admiral Ernie Drax, asked how Soviet 
armed forces would be used if permission were given for passage through 
the Poland and Romania. After the interval—when Voroshilov clearly con-
sulted Stalin—he read a statement that talks could not go on since, without 
117. See DVP 1939, I, no. 453, p.584 (trans. A.M.C). Voroshilov was with 
Stalin on August 7 between 6.35 and 10 p.m; other visitors included Molotov, 
Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, see: I A 1995, no. 5-6, 47. The Lindberghs 
had paid flying visits to the USSR in 1931 and 1933, and flew in for a short visit in 
August 1938. They received royal treatment, so the Russians were greatly angered 
by a report on Lindbergh's negative remarks on the Russian air force and bad Soviet 
conditions, also his expectation that the Soviet system would collapse. The report 
was printed in the London news sheet, The Week, see Wayne S. Cole, Charles A. 
Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II (New 
York and London, 1974), 29. 
118. For Shaposhnikov's memorandum of August 4, 1939, see GK 2, no. 527; 
DVP 1939, I, no. 447; on passage through Poland and Romania, p.575. 
119. In his end report on the negotiations, Jacques Antoine Williaume, French 
corvette captain and professor at the ficole de Guerre Navale, noted that at the 
August 14 session, there was an atmosphere of great doubt about the sincerity of 
Soviet demands for troop passage through Poland and Romania. He also recorded 
Voroshilov as saying: "Je ne crois pas que la Pologne et la Roumanie demandent 
notre aide," see Williaume report, Monday, August 14, section 29, DDF 2nd ser. 
XVIII, Addenda, V, p. 598. 
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a positive solution to this question, the attempt to conclude a military con-
vention was "doomed to failure." However, once a positive answer was 
received, the Soviet military mission would be willing "to set out its plan 
for joint action against aggression in Europe." Three days later, in the early 
afternoon of August 17, he announced that the negotiations were suspended 
until August 20 or 21, justifying this by the lack of a Franco-British reply 
on the passage of Soviet troops through Poland and Romania. However, 
he agreed with the British suggestion that the negotiations resume on the 
later date.120 
The suspension of the Moscow talks led to strenuous Anglo-French ef-
forts—more French than British—to secure the Polish government's agree-
ment to the passage of Soviet troops. However, the Poles said the Russians 
were not to be trusted. There was no assurance, they said, that once they 
were on Polish soil, they would fight the Germans. The USSR was expected 
to be neutral in a Polish-German war, so once the Russians came in they 
would not fight but just stay, i.e., annex eastern Poland. There was also 
mention of the Pilsudski dogma that no foreign troops could be allowed on 
Polish soil, and of the Polish belief that while the Germans threatened the 
Poles with physical destruction, the Soviets threatened to destroy their souls. 
Ultimately, all that could be obtained on August 19 was Polish agreement 
for the Anglo-French military mission either to convey the Poles' negative 
answer, or to say the question had not been raised in Warsaw. Captain 
Beaufre, sent to the Polish capital from Moscow, left with this message on 
August 20, arriving in Moscow the next day. The French military attache 
in Warsaw, General Felix Musse, telegraphed the news to Paris that after-
noon and, according to Beaufre, also to General Doumenc in Moscow.121 
120. For the Russian record of the military talks through August 17, see: SPE 
nos. 314-317, 319, 327-328, 33; GK 2, nos. 546-548, 559-560, 566, and sum-
mary in DVP 1939, I, no.506; British record, DBFP D 3rd ser., VI, appendix V; 
French record, DDF 2nd ser., XVII, part II, and Addenda; XVIII, part I. 
121. For Beaufre's account of his Warsaw mission, see note 6 above; for French 
documents on the efforts to obtain Polish assent to Soviet troop passage, August 17-
20, see DDF 2nd ser. XVIII, note 108. See also account by Leon Noel, Polonia Restituta. 
La Pologne entre deux mondes (Paris, 1984), ch. XXL In writing this negative ac-
count of prewar Poland, the aged ambassador did not bother to read the DDF docu-
ments, but relied on his memory and older sources. For the Polish side, see Lukasiewicz 
papers, "Franco-British-Soviet Negotiations in Moscow," Diplomat in Paris, 233-
252 and Dyplomata w Paryzu, 283-304. For Polish diplomatic documents on Anglo-
French-Soviet negotiations, see "Polskie akty dyplomatyczne odnosz^ce si^ do rokowan 
brytyjsko-francusko-sowieckich w okresie przed wybuchem drugiej wojny aswiatowej," 
Bellona, styczen-marzec (1955): 60-77. See also the notes on the allied negotiations 
with Russia and pressure exerted on Poland, written later from memory by the Polish 
Chief of Staff, General Wadaw Stachiewicz, Wiernosci dochowas zobiierskiej, edited 
by Marek Tarczynski (Warsaw, 1998), 126-140. 
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It should be noted that just before and during the Moscow negotiations, 
Soviet hints to the Germans seemed designed to increase Berlin's desire for an 
agreement with the USSR. Thus, on August 10, Schulenburg reported from 
Moscow that according to "a reliable source," the British were conceding the 
Soviet right, in the event of a direct attack on a Baltic State, to move in troops 
under the guarantee, even if the state in question did not request assistance. 
This may have referred to a new formula discussed in the Foreign Office. If 
so, it could have been obtained by King and passed on to Moscow. On Au-
gust 14, the German embassy in London passed on another report from the 
"reliable source" that Strang, who had just returned from Moscow, was opti-
mistic about an alliance between Britain, France, and the USSR Furthermore, 
as mentioned earlier, on August 16, the German Foreign Ministry learned 
that, according to Astakhov and Smirnov , the Soviet side was deliberately 
drawing out the negotiations until the Danzig-Corridor question was settled 
to Germany's advantage Finally, on August 17, the German embassy in Lon-
don reported that according to the "reliable source," the Moscow negotia-
tions were going well and the Poles were ready to begin staff talks with the 
Soviets.122 This news is unlikely to have come from the Anglo-French mission 
or the British Foreign or War Offices, so it may have been a Soviet fabrication 
meant to worry the Germans. 
As it turned out, the Soviet leaders did not wait for the results of Anglo-
French efforts in Warsaw, but decided to suspend the military negotiations 
before these efforts began. In fact, there was a direct connection between 
Hitler's instruction of August 16 to Schulenburg to see Molotov, and the 
suspension of the military negotiations by Voroshilov the next day. Hitler's 
directive to Schulenburg to seek an immediate appointment with Molotov 
led the ambassador to instruct Counselor Hilger at 10 a.m. on August 17 
to request an audience for the ambassador with the commissar. On hearing 
this, Stalin ordered Voroshilov to confront the French and British military 
delegates with the demand that they provide an answer on Soviet troop 
passage through Poland, and as mentioned earlier, the negotiations were 
suspended that afternoon until August 21. Stalin also instructed Molotov 
on August 17 to see the German ambassador by 8 p.m. at the latest, to hear 
what he had to say.123 When Molotov met with Schulenburg that evening, 
122. Schulenburg report, August 10, see DGFP D VII, no. 14. On Strang being 
optimistic (which he was not), see report of August 14, ibid., no.55. For Legrenier 
and Barnes on Astakhov and Smirnov statements, see note 107 above; report on 
alleged on Polish-Russian staff talks, August 17, DGFP, ibid., no. 99. 
123. For the linkage between Schulenburg's message to Hilger and the suspen-
sion of the military negotiations on August 17 by Voroshilov, see Fleischhauer, Der 
Pakt, 320-321 . For the Russian record of the discussions by military delegations 
on August 17 and the suspension of talks, see GK 2, no. 566. 
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the German ambassador declared his government was ready to conclude a 
nonaggression pact with the USSR and to give a joint German-Soviet guar-
antee to the Baltic States. It was also ready to use its offices to improve 
Soviet-Japanese relations. Furthermore, Hitler believed that given the dan-
gerous situation—imminent war with Poland—Ribbentrop was ready to 
come to Moscow as the German plenipotentiary any time after August 18, 
to negotiate and sign the nonaggression agreement. Schulenburg also gave 
the commissar an aide-memoire to this effect. Molotov, for his part, gave 
the ambassador an aide-memoire stating that the first step should be the 
conclusion of the trade-credit agreement, and then the signature of a non-
aggression pact or confirmation of the neutrality treaty of 1926; this should 
be signed simultaneously with a secret protocol on the interest of the two 
parties in these and other questions of foreign policy. The protocol would 
be an organic part of the pact. Schulenburg asked about the secret proto-
col, but Molotov said that first there must be a draft of the nonaggression 
pact, or the confirmation of a neutrality agreement. Ribbentrop could come 
to Moscow that week, or the next.124 
Two days later, on August 19 at 9.30 p.m. Paris time—11.30 p.m. Mos-
cow time—Daladier received a telephone message from General Musse in 
Warsaw on the failure of French efforts to get the Poles to agree to the 
passage of Soviet troops. Even if this news reached Stalin immediately, ei-
ther from Warsaw or from Paris, it is unlikely it could have been deci-
phered until late that night, and in any case, Molotov had proposed a non-
aggression agreement and secret protocol to the German ambassador two 
days earlier. What is more, on the afternoon of August 19—that is, before 
the Polish reply was reported by Musse to Daladier in Paris and/or to 
Doumenc in Moscow—Molotov twice called in Schulenburg to see him. 
On the second occasion, he handed the ambassador the proposed Soviet 
text of the nonaggression treaty, though he did not supply a draft of the 
secret protocol, saying this would be negotiated later. It is significant that, 
unlike previous Soviet nonaggression pacts, this one did not stipulate abro-
gation if one of the parties was involved in aggression against a third coun-
try. Thus, Hitler knew that Moscow had no objection to his attack on 
Poland. As in the Soviet aide-memoire of August 17, the postscript to the 
Soviet draft of August 19 stated the pact would come into force only with 
the simultaneous signature of a separate protocol based on points of inter-
est to the foreign policy of both sides, and that this protocol was to form an 
124. Emphasis added, A.M.C. For the Russian record of the Molotov-Schulenburg 
conversation, August 17,with Russian and German aide-memoires, see GK 2, no.570, 
DVP 1939 I, no. 470; German record and same, DGFP D VII, no. 105. 
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integral part of the pact.125 Thus, it is clear that the Soviet side stipulated 
this condition. As for the German-Soviet trade-credit agreement, it was 
signed in Berlin on August 19. However, as Schnurre told Fleischhauer 
many years later, the directive for Babarin to sign did not arrive from Mos-
cow until very late that night.126 
It is not known exactly what impelled Stalin to have Molotov give 
Schulenburg a draft of the nonaggression pact on August 19, though it can 
be assumed that Hitler's pressure for Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow within 
the next few days may have been the key factor. However, Fleischhauer 
and most Russian historians offer another explanation, which is in general 
agreement with part of Yakovlev's report of December 23, 1989, on the 
nonaggression pact. Yakovlev stated that on August 19-20, Stalin received 
documented indications that England, France, and Poland would not change 
their attitude. Yakovlev went on to say that Stalin apparently hoped to 
influence England and France by concluding the pact but miscalculated, 
for after it was signed the Western powers lost all constructive interest in 
the USSR.127 However, it should be noted with regard to the first statement 
that Molotov had told Schulenburg two days earlier, on August 17, that 
the Soviet government was ready to sign a nonaggression pact with Ger-
many, and that a secret protocol must be an integral part of it. As for 
Yakovlev's second statement, it is not true that France and Britain lost 
interest in a treaty with the USSR, as witness Daladier's agreement on Au-
gust 21 to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland. The British de-
clared their agreement on August 24, that is, after the signing of the nonag-
gression pact (see below). Still, it is possible that Stalin intended to use the 
pact as a lever to force the western powers to grant his demand regarding 
Poland and Romania, for he could only have welcomed British and French 
approval of Soviet military entry into those countries. Or he might have 
calculated that if he had agreements with both sides and Germany seized 
western, northern, and central Poland, he could annex eastern Poland and 
125. Emphasis added, A.M.C. For the German record of the Molotov-
Schulenburg conversations August 19, see: DGFP D VII, no.132; Russian record: 
GK 2, no. 572, DVP 1939 I no.474. Fleischhauer believes the fighting in the Far 
East was at the heart of Stalin's nonaggression draft proposal, Der Pakt, p.332, but 
see note 84 above. 
126. For Schnurre's account of the delays, see Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 522, note 
471 to part III; for the text of the agreement, except part C, listing what the USSR 
was to supply to Germany, see: GK, 2, no.575; on part C, see note 71 above. For 
the text of the Credit Agreement, see also Edward F. Ericson, Feeding the German 
Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (London, 1999), Ap-
pendix B; for lists of goods exchanged by Germany and the USSR, 1939-41, ibid., 
Tables 2.7-3.1. 
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justify this by Soviet security reasons without jeopardizing an alliance with 
the Western powers. Whatever Stalin's calculations may have been, on 
August 21, he agreed to Hitler's personal request that Ribbentrop come to 
Moscow and the date was set for August 23.128 He could hardly refuse the 
Fiihrer's request without risking the loss of the nonaggression pact. 
As mentioned earlier, the German and Soviet governments announced 
the signature of the economic agreement and Ribbentrop's forthcoming 
visit to Moscow on August 21 and 22 respectively. The Anglo-French-So-
viet talks, suspended on August 17, resumed at 11.03 a.m. on August 21, 
but were adjourned at 5.25 p.m. for an indefinite time. They were not 
resumed despite Daladier's instruction, sent to General Doumenc on the 
night of August 21, that France agreed to the passage of Soviet troops 
through Poland, that is, through the Wilno corridor and, if necessary, also 
through Galicia and Romania. Delivery of this instruction was delayed by 
Soviet intelligence for several hours, so it was conveyed by the French gen-
eral to Voroshilov at 6.30 p.m. the next day. The latter did not find it 
sufficient because the British delegation had not announced its government's 
agreement, even though they did not dissent. [Drax was instructed to asso-
ciate himself with Doumenc on August 24]. Moreover, Voroshilov now 
made a new demand: that the Polish and Romanian governments them-
selves give their agreement, and Molotov repeated the same demand to 
Naggiar.129 The French government seized on this straw to pursue an agree-
ment with the USSR regardless of the nonaggression pact. In 1946, Daladier 
defended himself publicly against charges of preventing an Anglo-French-
Soviet alliance in 1939. He claimed to have called in Polish Ambassador 
Lukasiewicz on the morning of August 21 and told him that if he did not 
inform him that afternoon, after telephoning Warsaw, that the Polish 
127. For Yakovlev's statement of December 23, 1989 on information received 
by Stalin on August 19-20 that Britain, France, and Poland did not intend to change 
their position, and on Polish refusal of the passage of Soviet troops, see 1939 God, 
486, also other sources listed in note 3 above. 
128. For Schulenburg's delivery of Hitler's message to Molotov August 21, and 
the latter's communication of Stalin's agreement to Ribbentrop's arrival on August 
23, see DGFP D VII, nos. 157, 159; for the Russian texts of the Hitler-Stalin mes-
sages, see GK 2, nos. 582, 583; Stalin message, DVP 1939 I, no. 478. Fleischhauer 
sees August 21 as the date of Stalin's decision to line up with Hitler, Der Pakt, 339. 
The question of Ribbentrop's arrival may have been discussed on the evening of 
August 20, when Stalin saw 14 visitors, of whom Molotov stayed the longest as 
usual, from 6 to 10.35 p.m., see: IA 1995, 5-6, 48-49. 
129. For Daladier to Doumenc, August 21, see DDF, 2nd ser., vol. XVIII, no.182, 
p.232 and note 5. Voroshilov's conversation with Doumenc, August 22, SPE no.342; 
for Doumenc to Daladier, August 23, 1.32 a.m., DDF ibid., no. 268 (the document 
number is misprinted as 2 instead of 268); Naggiar's report on Molotov to Naggiar, 
ibid., no. 267. On Drax associating himself with Doumenc, August 24, ibid., no.348. 
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government agreed to the passage of Soviet troops, he, Daladier, would 
raise the whole question of the Franco-Polish alliance at a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers. If, however, the ambassador did not manifest Polish 
opposition by the afternoon, Daladier would telegraph General Doumenc 
authorizing him to sign the military convention that was proposed [by the 
Soviets]. However, Ambassador Lukasiewicz denied Daladier had presented 
him with this ultimatum. The ambassador wrote that if this had occurred, 
he would have refused to accept it, or proposed it be sent to Ambassador 
Noel for delivery in Warsaw, or he would have threatened to resign and 
made this public, something that would have been very inconvenient for 
Daladier.130 As mentioned above, Daladier sent the French agreement to 
Doumenc anyway. 
The Polish government and press received the news of the nonaggression 
pact calmly. In an instruction of August 23 to Polish diplomatic posts, Beck 
wrote the pact was proof of the Soviets' double-dealing, indicating they did 
not want to engage themselves on either side, but would welcome the pos-
sibility of a European war. He took comfort from the assumption that like 
other Soviet nonaggression pacts, this one too must have a clause abrogat-
ing the agreement if one of the parties became involved in hostilities with a 
third party.131 British Ambassador Kennard reported on August 24 that 
Polish reaction to the news of the pact was calm; the Polish press was 
taking the line that Russia was withdrawing from Europe, and nothing had 
changed.132 This view, as well as the fact that Britain supported Soviet troop 
passage only if Germany attacked Poland, made it easier for the Poles to agree 
to a formula allowing the continuation of the Franco-British-Soviet talks in 
Moscow. As General Musse wrote in his final report, Ambassador Noel made 
an urgent demarche to Beck in the late evening of August 23, and the Polish 
foreign minister accepted a formula that General Doumenc was to use in 
speaking to the head of the Soviet delegation in Moscow. He could state: 
We have acquired the certainty that, in case of common action against a German 
aggression, collaboration between Poland and the USSR, in technical conditions 
to be determined, is not excluded (or is possible). 
130. For Daladier's claim of what he allegedly said to the Polish ambassador and 
the latter's rebuttal, see Diplomat in Paris, 252-253, Polish text in Juliusz 
Lukasiewicz, Dyplomata w Paryzu 1936-1939, 298-299. 
131. For Beck's Instruction, August 23,1939, see Akty dyplomatyczne, 75, re-
printed in Wladyslaw T. Kowalski, Polska w polityce mi<?dzynarodowej (1939-
1945). Zbior dokumentow, 1939 (Warsaw, 1989), no.163, 466. 
132. For Kennard's report of August 24, 1939 on Polish calm, see British Docu-
ments on Foreign Affairs, part II, series F, vol. 58, Poland, 1939 (Lanham, MD,1990), 
doc. 303, 307. 
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The French and British General Staffs therefore consider that all the hypoth-
eses for collaboration should be studied immediately. 
The text of the British message to Moscow, as agreed with the Poles, 
was more specific and closer to Polish thinking. It read: 
We have learned for certain that in the event of common action against German 
aggression, collaboration under technical conditions to be settled subsequently 
between Poland and the USSR, is not to be excluded.133 
However, there was no communication between the Anglo-French military 
mission and Voroshilov, who did not answer their joint letter to him until 
August 25 when he met separately with the British and French delegation 
leaders. When Doumenc reiterated his message to Voroshilov, he was told 
that the talks between the military delegations could not continue because 
"political conditions had changed." [The Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance 
Treaty was signed in London that afternoon]. When British Admiral Drax 
asked whether, in view of the change in the international situation, the Soviet 
government still desired to continue the talks, Voroshilov said he had been 
unable to reply to the joint letter of the French and British delegations— 
because he had been on a duck hunt! He then said that, to his regret, the change in 
the international situation made any further conversations useless.134 
As is known, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed on August 
23, while the secret protocol was worked out and signed at the Kremlin on 
the night of August 23-24. No Russian record of these negotiations has 
been published, but it is clear the Germans quickly gave up any claims they 
may have had to East Galicia. Furthermore, according to German sources 
Stalin demanded the inclusion of the Latvian ports of Libau (Liepaja) and 
133. For the French version of the formula agreed in the late evening of August 
23 between Beck and Noel, see the latter's telegram of August 23, DDF 2nd ser. 
XVIII, no. 275, and Musse report of August 24, ibid., no. 396, p. 480 (trans. A.M.C). 
Halifax informed Kennard on August 22, that Britain gave general support to France 
regarding the passage of Soviet troops through Poland, but only if the latter was at 
war with Germany, DBFP 3rd ser. VII, no. 150. For the text of the Polish message, as 
reported by the British ambassador, see Kennard to Halifax, August 23, 1939, 3. 30 
p.m., ibid., no. 176. The Polish version, as communicated by Beck to Lukasiewicz, 
did not mention an eventual agreement between Poland and the USSR; see Diplo-
mat in Paris, p. 257. 
134. For the meeting between Voroshilov and key members of the Anglo-French 
Mission, August 25, 1 p.m., see DDF; ibid., no. 457 and DBFP, ibid., no. 277 
(including Voroshilov on duck hunt), and Appendix II, pp. 613-614. Voroshilov 
also saw the British and French ambassadors, but separately so they could not 
communicate with each other, see point 7 in report by General T.G. Heywood, 
DBFP, 3rd ser. VI, 607. 
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Windau (Ventspils) in the Soviet sphere of influence, and Ribbentrop re-
ceived Hitler's agreement to this by telephone. On August 28, the Pisa River 
was added, at Molotov's request, to the northern part of the demarcation 
line in Poland.135 Indeed, this line, which ran through the middle of War-
saw, was shown as the demarcation line between the Soviet and German 
armies on the map published in Pravda on September 23. This map was 
published in several Soviet newspapers over the next few days. 
In the early hours of September 17, just after Stalin informed the Ger-
man ambassador that Soviet troops were about to enter Poland, Potemkin 
read an official note, signed by Molotov, to Polish Ambassador Grzybowski, 
who was summoned to Potemkin's office at 2 a.m. The note—which the 
ambassador refused to accept, but was delivered to the Polish embassy 
during his interview with Potemkin—read as follows: 
The Polish-German war has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. 
In ten days of hostilities, Poland has lost all its industrial regions and cultural 
centers. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish govern-
ment has collapsed and shows no signs of life. Therefore, the treaties concluded 
between the USSR and Poland have ceased to operate. Abandoned to its fate and 
left without leadership, Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and 
unexpected contingency, which may constitute a threat to the USSR. Because of 
this, the Soviet Government, which had been neutral hitherto, can no longer 
maintain a neutral attitude toward these facts. 
Nor can the Soviet Government remain indifferent when its blood brothers, 
the Ukrainians and Belorussians living on Polish territory, having been aban-
doned to their fate, are left without protection. 
In view of this state of affairs, the Soviet Government has instructed the high 
command of the Red Army to order troops across the frontier and to take under 
their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and 
Western White Russia. 
At the same time, the Soviet Government intends to take every step to deliver 
the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by 
their unwise leaders, and to give them an opportunity to live a peaceful life.136 
135. On the negotiation of the secret protocol at the Kremlin during the night of 
August 23-24, see Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 381-399; for German documents, see 
DGFP D VII, nos.205, 206, 210. Herwarth writes that he was sitting at the tele-
phone in the German embassy, passing Soviet requests to Hitler, as transmitted by 
Ribbentrop. He was surprised that Hitler approved each request immediately, see 
Against Two Evils, 165. For the addition of the Pisa River to the line of August 23, 
in the agreement signed by Molotov and Schulenburg on August 28, see GK 2, 
no.614, DVP 1939 I, no. 507. 
136. Potemkin note to Grzybowski, September 17, 1939, PWB no. 175, DPSR 
I, no.43, Degras, SDFP III, 374; Russian text: DiM VII, no. 105, Dokumenty 
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Molotov repeated these statements in his radio speech of the same day. 
To his German partners he explained that these declarations were neces-
sary for both foreign and domestic opinion.137 Indeed, Soviet opinion was 
shocked by the pact in August and once the Red Army moved in in Septem-
ber, some citizens were critical of the USSR's apparent collusion with the 
Germans in the destruction of Poland.138 
As for the date of Soviet aggression against Poland, the cease-fire signed 
by the Soviet and Japanese commanders in Nomonhan/Ghalkin Gol on 
September 16, 1939, does not seem to have been decisive for Stalin's agree-
ment that evening to German pleas for Soviet military action and the order 
that the Red Army move into eastern Poland the next day. In fact, the 
Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts had been mobilized on September 7 and 
only awaited marching orders. These were dated originally September 14, 
but the date of readiness, end September 16, was inserted later. It was also 
on this date that the Germans informed Stalin of the allegedly impending 
fall of Warsaw, and this news, together with reports that the Polish govern-
ment had crossed the border into Romania, may have been decisive for the 
Soviet leader, for if the Polish state no longer existed, this could at least 
technically absolve the USSR of attacking it. However, contrary to the claim 
regarding the fall of Warsaw, which was based on German disinformation, 
and proclaimed by Molotov that day on the radio—and repeated by German 
Vneshnei Politiki, vol. XXII, 1939, Kniga II (Moscow, 1992) no.597 (henceforth: 
DVP 1939 II]; for Potemkin record of the conversation, see: ibid., no. 596; for 
Grzybowski's account, see his "Final Report," PWB no.184, DPSR I, no.69. The 
same note was sent to foreign ambassadors in Moscow, see Steinhardt to Secretary 
of State, September 17, 1939, FRUS 1939 I, 428-429. 
137. In a previous version of this statement, the Soviet government was to say 
that it was coming to help their Ukrainian and Belorussian brothers threatened by 
the German Wehrmacht. Molotov explained to the Germans that this was to justify 
the Soviet intervention in the eyes of the masses, so it would not appear as the 
aggressor, but Ribbentrop voiced strong objections, see DGFP D, VIII (London, 
Washington, 1954), nos. 46, 70, 78. For Molotov's radio speech of September 17, 
1939, see Degras, SDFP, III, 374-376. 
138. NKVD informants in Leningrad reported shock and confusion among the 
people at the nonaggression pact, seen as a treaty with "the fascists." When the Red 
Army entered Poland, there was talk about "secret treaties" and Soviet-German 
collusion in the destruction of Poland; see Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's 
Russia. Terror; propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1914 (Cambridge and New York, 
1997), 98-99. See also the memoirs of an erstwhile communist, then a teenager in 
the USSR, later a professor at Yale University, Wolfgang Leonhard, Betrayal. The 
Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 (New York, 1989), ch. 2., "The Pact and the People in 
the Soviet Union," 45-72. 
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historian Fleischhauer fifty years later139—the capital was still defending it-
self. As for the Polish government, it was still on Polish soil. On September 
17, Beck telegraphed the Polish embassies in Paris and London as follows: 
Ambassador Grzybowski has refused to accept M. Molotov's note and has pre-
sented a protest against the aggression. I have approved his attitude, instructing 
him to ask for his passports and to withdraw from Moscow. The Polish Govern-
ment, which is functioning on Polish territory and is in contact with the Diplo-
matic Corps, has made a protest against the Soviet insinuation. Our frontier 
troops have resisted the invasion. 
He also instructed the Polish embassies in London and Paris to protest the 
Soviet invasion.140 
That same day, however, on learning of the speedy Red Army advance 
into Poland, which threatened the security of the Polish government itself, 
the latter decided to cross into neighboring Romania. By this time, having 
retreated east and southeast ahead of the German armies, they were lo-
cated, together with the diplomatic corps—which included U.S. Ambassa-
dor Anthony J. Drexel Biddle—and high command, on the Polish-Roma-
nian border. Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz issued an order to Polish troops 
not to fight the Red Army unless attacked or threatened with disarma-
ment. President Moscicki issued an address to the nation, condemning the 
German and Soviet aggression against Poland and explaining the govern-
ment was going abroad to secure the constitutional continuity of Polish 
sovereignty.141 The government and high command crossed into Romania 
139. For Soviet-German talks on September 16-17, see: DGFP D VIII, nos. 78, 
80. For Fleischhauer on Stalin sending the Red Army into eastern Poland only after 
the fall of Warsaw, see Der Pakt, 385. For the marching orders to the Belorussian 
and Ukrainian Fronts, originally dated September 14, then changed to September 
16, see Russian Katyn documents: Katyn. Plenniki nieob'iavlennoi Voiny, edited by 
Nataliia S. Lebedeva, Wojciech Materski et al. (Moscow, 1997), doc. nos. 3, 4; 
Polish text, Katyn. Dokumenty Zbrodni, 1, Jency nie wypowiedzianej zbrodni 
(Warsaw, 1995), doc. no.3 and Supplement 1. 
140. For Beck telegram to Polish embassies, September 17, also notes presented 
by Polish ambassadors in London and Paris protesting the invasion, see PWB, nos. 
176-178; for Grzybowski telegram to Foreign Ministry and Polish government pro-
test, see DPSR I, nos. 44, 45. 
141. For Smigly-Rydz order to Polish troops of September 17, see ibid., doc. no. 
6. For a photo copy of President Moscicki's address to the Polish nation, including 
handwritten corrections, see Dariusz Baliszewski and Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, 
eds., Prawdziwa historia Polakow. Ilustrowane ivypisy zrodlowe 1939-1945, vol. 
I, 1939-1942 (Warsaw, 1999), doc. no.80, 73. For Ambassador Drexel Biddle's 
report on the war and retreat to Romania, see "The Polish-German Conflict and 
The Embassy's Activities," Poland and the Coming of the Second World War. The 
Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle Jr. United States Ambassador to Poland, 
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on the night of September 17-18, with the intention of proceeding to France 
to continue the fight there and with a French invitation to do so. However, 
they were interned in Romania though they were formally still recognized 
by the Polish diplomatic representatives abroad and by Poland's allies as 
the Polish government until a new one was established in Paris on Septem-
ber 30.142 Warsaw defended itself until there was no food or water, and 
capitulated after a three-week siege on September 27, while General 
Franciszek Kleeberg's troops, the last Polish force fighting the Germans, 
laid down its arms at Kock on October 5.143 There were also some pitched 
battles between Polish and Soviet troops, and the town of Grodno defended 
itself for three days.144 
One day after the surrender of Warsaw, a German-Soviet "Boundary and 
Friendship Treaty" was signed in Moscow. It established a new frontier be-
tween the two countries in Poland, running in the north well to the east of the 
August 23 line. It gave more Polish territory to Germany (Lublin and the 
eastern part of Warsaw province) in exchange for German recognition of all 
of Lithuania—except for the southern part of the country including the Memel 
[Klaipeda] territory—as belonging to the Soviet sphere of interest, for which 
Stalin undertook to pay an additional $7 million in gold. Also, the Soviet 
Union gave the Wilno [Vilnius] region to Lithuania. One of the secret proto-
cols signed on September 28 provided for cooperation against any "Polish 
agitation which affects the territories of the other party,"145 that is, against 
any Polish attempts to restore a Polish state. The new German-Soviet frontier 
1937-1939, Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward D. Wynot, Jr., Theodore P. Kovalev, 
eds. (Columbus, OH, 1976), 94-165. 
142. On the Polish government's retreat from Warsaw eastward, then south-east 
to the Polish-Romanian border, and its internment in Romania, see Anna M. 
Cienciala, "Internowanie rz^du R.P. w Rumunii we wrzesniu 1939 r." Niepodlegiosc, 
vol. XII [po wznowieniu] (New York and London, 1989), 18-65. 
143. See Steven Zaloga 8c Victor Madej, The Polish Campaign 1939 (New York, 
1985, reprint 1991), 103-152. 
144. On the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland, ibid., 152-146. For a compre-
hensive collection of mostly Russian documents, translated into Polish, on the op-
erations of the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts in Poland, September 1939, 
see Czeslaw Grzelak, Stanislaw Jaczynski, Eugeniusz Koztowski, eds., Agresja 
sowiecka na Polskew swietle dokumentow. 17 wrzesnia 1939 (Warsaw, 1994,1995, 
1996), vols. 1-3. For a brief Russian account, see Mikhail Meltiukhov, Sovetsko-
Pol'skie Voiny. Voenno-politicheskoe protivostoiianie 1918-1939 gg (Moscow, 
2001), 303-350. The author's interpretation of interwar Polish foreign policy gen-
erally follows the old Soviet line. 
145. For the English language texts of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friend-
ship Treaty and secret protocols of September 28, 1939 see DGFP D VIII (London 
and Washington, 1954), nos. 157-160, DPSR I, nos. 52-55; Russian texts, DVP 
1939 II, nos. 640-643. 
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in Poland became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line, similar in the 
center and south both to the Curzon Line—proposed by British Foreign Sec-
retary Lord Curzon as an armistice line between the Soviet and Polish armies 
in July 1920—and to the Polish-Soviet frontier established in 1944-45. 
It is clear from a study of available Russian and German documents that 
Polish foreign policy did not play any part in Stalin's decision to align with 
Hitler. Even at the time, a high Soviet official admitted as much. Deputy 
Foreign Commissar Solomon S. Lozovskii told a Norwegian diplomat on 
August 23, that Poland's independent attitude had nothing to do with the 
conclusion of the German-Soviet pact, because political relations followed 
naturally from the economic agreement. He also touted the nonaggression 
pact as a peaceful measure, pointing out that previous Soviet nonaggres-
sion agreements always contained a clause that if one of the parties became 
an aggressor, this did not involve the other.146 This indicates that he was 
either ignorant of the details of the pact, which is unlikely, or deliberately 
misled the Norwegian diplomat. It is true, of course, that the Soviet atti-
tude toward Poland was always one of deep distrust. Her government was 
portrayed as pro-German and fascist. It was expected to give in to German 
demands, and even to join the Germans in an attack on the USSR. Still, 
before Britain granted a guarantee to Poland, Stalin seems to have toyed 
briefly with the idea of a Popular Front government in Warsaw, presum-
ably to be organized and perhaps led by Polish communists. But he had 
dissolved the Polish Communist Party in 1938 on charges of infiltration by 
Polish police, so he allowed the establishment of an "Initiative Group" in 
Paris in January 1939. These were selected Polish communists whom he 
apparently viewed as the embryo of a new Polish Communist Party. They 
published three issues of a bulletin up to and including April 1939, calling 
for a Polish coalition government to resist Germany. However, after the 
British guarantee, they called for its overthrow. Stalin shelved them in April, 
when he apparently decided they were no longer needed.147 Perhaps he 
perceived a German attack on Poland as more likely because of Polish 
acceptance of the British guarantee, and decided at this time to try for an 
agreement with Hitler to partition Poland. 
Whatever the case may be, Soviet policy toward Poland in spring and 
summer 1939 was characterized by friendly declarations as well as talk of 
Soviet help and benevolent neutrality. At the same time, however, great 
distrust is documented in the correspondence between Litvinov, then 
146. Record of Lozovskii conversation with Norwegian charge d'affaires, M. 
Bolstad, August 23, 1939, DVP 1939 I, no. 486. 
147. On the Paris Initiative Group, see Anna M. Cienciala, "The Activities of 
Polish Communists as a Source for Stalin's Policy Toward Poland in World War II," 
International History Review, vol. VII, no. 1 (1986): 129-145. 
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Molotov, with the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris, as well as by 
Soviet demands regarding the prospective political and military alliance 
with France and Britain. No official Soviet offer of cooperation was ever 
made to Poland, nor was there any official proposal for the passage of 
Soviet troops, though a low-level Soviet sounding was recorded in Wilno 
in spring 1939.148 In fact, Lithuania was not included in the Soviet list of 
states to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the Western powers, per-
haps because it did not border on the USSR. Also, Litvinov may have as-
sumed—or pretended to assume—that Poland would, in her own interest, 
come to the defense of Lithuania in case of German aggression. No official 
Soviet proposal was ever made to the Polish government that Polish offic-
ers participate in the Moscow negotiations. Indeed, it is possible that if the 
Polish government had agreed to the Soviet demand for troop passage, 
Stalin could have portrayed this at the appropriate time as sanctioning the 
Soviet occupation and then annexation of eastern Poland. The latter took 
place officially in early November 1939, when the Supreme Soviet acceded 
to the "requests" of the Soviets [assemblies] of western Belorussia and 
western Ukraine [East Galicia]—elected under Soviet rules and in an atmo-
sphere of terror—for union with the Soviet Belorussian and Ukrainian Re-
publics. According to wartime Polish estimates, about one million Polish 
citizens were deported from these territories into the depths of the USSR, 
of whom about 50 percent were ethnic Poles and 30 percent were Jews, 
with Ukrainians and Belorussians making up the rest. (Soviet figures, com-
piled at the time by the NKVD and released after 1991, put the number of 
deported Polish citizens at about 325,000, which seems too low) . Further-
more, about four hundred thousand Poles are estimated to have been killed 
by Soviet authorities in former eastern Poland between September 17,1939, 
and June 21, 1941. Finally, according to Soviet sources, of the some two 
hundred thousand Polish prisoners of war taken in September 1939,21,857 
officers and some civilians were held in special camps as well as prisons in 
Belorussia and Ukraine. They were murdered by special NKVD troops on 
orders signed by the Soviet Politburo on March 5, 1940.149 That is how 
148. See note 57 above. 
149. On Soviet-style elections in eastern Poland, October 1939, and Soviet rule 
there, see Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland's 
Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, N.J., 1988); also Keith Sword, 
ed., The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939-41 (New York, 
1991), and his, Deportation and Exile. Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-48 
(Basingstoke, England and New York, 1994). The number of deported Polish citi-
zens was estimated by the Polish government-in-exile at about 1,200,000, but NKVD 
figures released after 1991, put them at about 325,000, which seems too low; see 
Marek Tuszynski, "Soviet War Crimes against Poland During the Second World War 
and Its Aftermath. A Review of the Factual Record and Outstanding Questions," 
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Stalin brought a "peaceful life" to the Polish population of western Ukraine 
and Belorussia. At the same time, the "liberation" of the Ukrainians and 
Belorussians meant terror, arrests, and deportations for "enemies of the 
Soviet people," with collectivization of the land and nationalization of all 
means of production imposed on the population. 
So when did Stalin decide to align the USSR with Nazi Germany? On the 
basis of all the documentation available up to now, it is clear that the 
"Vozhd" was very interested in an agreement with Hitler, if not as far back 
a s 1934—as Krivitsky claims—then certainly in 1935-36, as evidenced by 
the proposals made by Litvinov to Schulenburg in May 1935, and even 
more so by Kandelaki to Schacht at the turn of 1936-37. If Stalin had not 
decided to seek cooperation with Germany earlier, he might have done so 
after the British guarantee to Poland on March 31, 1939, which he appar-
ently suspected of being directed against the USSR. Or he might have done 
so with the dismissal of Litvinov on May 3 that year, as surmised by Jonathan 
Haslam and Lev. I. Ginzburg, and affirmed years later by Andrei Gromyko. 
If this was so, the primary goal of Soviet diplomacy, at least from this time 
onward, was an agreement with Germany. In any case, Molotov told 
Schulenburg on May 20 that a political basis had to be found for the eco-
nomic agreement between the two countries. After a hiatus in the Molotov-
Schulenburg talks—though talks continued in Berlin—the Germans became 
anxious to make a deal. On August 11, 1939, the Soviet charge in Berlin, 
Georgii Astakhov, listed the territorial concessions the Germans were will-
ing to make and Molotov found them of great interest, but said it was now 
up to the Germans. Perhaps the final decision to start concrete negotiations 
was made that day, as Yakovlev claimed in December 1989, saying it was 
due to news of Hitler's impending attack on Poland any time after August 
25. However, there is no documentary evidence that Hitler made this deci-
sion before he was sure that he could strike a deal with Stalin, and this 
occurred on August 21. In any case, the Germans were told on August 15 
that they could send a negotiator to Moscow. On August 17, Molotov 
(note 149 continued) Polish Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (1999): 183-216. For a brief study 
of Soviet oppression of Poles and Polish citizens, citing NKVD documents, see Stanistaw 
Ciesielski, Wojciech Materski and Andrzej Paczkowski, eds., Represje sowieckie wobec 
Polakow i obywateli polskich (Warsaw, 2000). For Russian documents on the arrest, 
imprisonment, and mass murder of Polish prisoners of war in the western USSR in 
spring 1940, see Nataliia Lebedeva, Wojciech Materski et al., eds. Katyn. Plenniki 
neob'iavlennoi voiny, and, Katyn. Dokumenty zbrodni. Tom I. ]ency niewy-
powiedzianej wojny (see note 140 above); Materski, Lebedeva, et al., eds., Katyfz_ 
Dokumenty Zbrodni; Tom II. Zagtda (Warsaw, 1998), and Lebedeva, Materski et: 
al., eds., Katyn. Mart 1940—sentiabr 2000 g. Rasstrel. Sud'by zhivykh. Ekho Katynz. 
Dokumenty (Moscow, 2001). The publication of an English language volume by Yale 
University Press, edited by the author of this article, is expected in 2003. 
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handed a Soviet aide-memoire to Schulenburg, proposing a nonaggression 
pact, and on August 19 he gave the German ambassador the Soviet draft of 
this pact. Yakovlev stated this was done on that day because Stalin allegedly 
heard from "documented sources" that the Western powers and Poland would 
not change their attitude. Fleischhauer writes that Stalin made his decision on 
August 21, when it was clear the Western powers had not persuaded the Poles 
to grant the key Soviet demand for passage of troops, also because of the 
Soviet-Japanese fighting in the Far East. However, Yakovlev said the decision 
to negotiate with the Germans had been made on August 11. If August 21 
was the date of the final decision to make a deal with Berlin, Stalin was likely 
to have made it because he could not afford to refuse Hitler's demand that 
Ribbentrop arrive in Moscow by August 23. 
Summation 
While the lack of Russian documents on the decision-making process at 
this time does not allow fixing the exact date of Stalin's decision, it is clear 
that Astakhov's talks with German officials in Berlin in the period from 
mid-April to August 12 paved the way for the Nazi-Soviet agreement. 
Gorlov's thesis, supported by Roberts, that the absence of any instructions 
from Molotov to Astakhov during this time proves the latter was acting on 
his own initiative is clearly untenable. Not only did German officials, in-
cluding Ribbentrop, treat Astakhov as a bona fide representative of the 
Soviet government, but it is also clear that he was in close touch with 
Molotov all the time. Indeed, even Astakhov's published correspondence 
with Moscow shows that he was not acting on his own. Thus, it is quite 
possible that Stalin and Molotov decided on an agreement with Germany 
at least as early as Litvinov's dismissal in early May, if not earlier, and then 
played a consummate diplomatic game until they were sure that Hitler 
would grant all their demands. This assumption is supported by Astakhov's 
Berlin conversations, as well as by the "leaks" provided to the German 
embassy in London from the "reliable source" who was most likely the 
Soviet agent in the Foreign Office Communications Department, Francis 
Herbert King. It is striking that very few such hints and leaks of German-
Soviet negotiations were made to the Western powers, and those came from 
the Germans who informed the French. Also, Molotov's tone in his meet-
ings with the British and French diplomats in Moscow was almost always 
rough, and even rude, while Western policy was strongly criticized in the 
Soviet press as insincere at best and exploitive at worst. This was in con-
trast to the generally polite tone adopted by the Soviet press toward Ger-
many and by Molotov toward Schulenburg. 
What is particularly noticeable is the parallelism between the German-
Soviet talks and the Franco-British-Soviet negotiations between mid-April 
and the end of July. This became even more striking in August. Thus, 
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Astakhov told the Germans on August 12—the day that Franco-British-
Soviet negotiations opened in Moscow—that the Soviet government was 
ready to negotiate and would accept a German negotiator in the Soviet 
capital. Stalin's readiness to sign a nonaggression pact was expressed by 
Molotov to Schulenburg on August 17, the day that military negotiations 
with the French and British were suspended after Stalin learned of a mes-
sage from Hitler to be delivered by Schulenburg. This was before intensive 
Anglo-French efforts took place in Warsaw to persuade the Poles to agree 
to the passage of Soviet troops. Molotov handed the Soviet draft of a non-
aggression pact to Schulenburg in the late afternoon of August 19, before 
the French government, and presumably Doumenc in Moscow, received 
the news of the Polish refusal that day. It is possible that Stalin judged the 
time was right to negotiate an agreement with Germany sometime in Au-
gust 1939, but if so, this was the culmination of a long, preparatory pe-
riod. At the same time, it is most unlikely that Stalin only made up his mind 
on August 21, allegedly because he learned that the French and British 
delegations failed to receive a positive reply from Poland regarding the 
passage of Soviet troops. In fact, Stalin seems to have expected a negative 
outcome to these military negotiations. If he did, he may have agreed to 
them in order to pressure Hitler into an agreement with the USSR—and 
perhaps, at the same time, receive a Western sanction for entering eastern 
Poland. As for the Japanese-Soviet fighting in the Far East, it did not amount 
to a full-scale war. Furthermore, a highly placed Soviet intelligence agent in 
Tokyo (Richard Sorge) reported in June that Japan was not planning to 
attack the USSR, so it is unlikely that this fighting played a significant role 
in Stalin's decision. 
Did Stalin fear a German attack on the USSR? Perhaps, but German 
documents do not indicate that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union 
through Poland in 1939, and Soviet intelligence should have reported this 
to Stalin. D. C. Watt may be right in his judgment that Stalin expected 
Hitler to attack France and Britain, not the USSR. Whatever the case may 
be, one may ask whether Hitler would have attacked Poland if the USSR 
had an alliance with France and Britain? Setting this question aside, it is 
clear that the lack of a clause abrogating the German-Soviet nonaggression 
pact in case one of the two parties engaged in an aggressive war against a 
third country—a clause present in other nonaggression pacts signed by the 
USSR before August 1939150—was certainly a strong encouragement for 
Hitler to attack Poland. Bearing all this in mind, can Stalin's policy be 
150. For example, art. 2 of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact of July 25 , 
1932, stated: "If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against 
a third State, the other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the 
present Treaty without previous denunciation.," DPSR, I, no. 6. 
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described simply as appeasement of Germany, and can he be viewed as a 
wise statesman for concluding the nonaggression pact with Hitler?151 
The lack of authoritative Soviet documentation allows the debate on dat-
ing Stalin's key policy decision to continue, and the same holds true of the 
interpretation of Stalin's motives for concluding the pact with Hitler. As far 
as short-term goals are concerned, one may, for example, ask whether Stalin 
thought he could sign a military alliance with the Western powers if he 
obtained their agreement to enter eastern Poland while bound by a nonag-
gression pact to Nazi Germany? Daladier, for one, was certainly willing to 
let Soviet troops enter eastern Poland, and presumably stay there, as wit-
ness his cable to Doumenc of August 21. The British agreed to this on 
August 24. This may have encouraged the Soviet leader to speculate that 
he could have his cake and eat it too, that is, he could have both an alliance 
with the Western powers and a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. 
This hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that, between August 23 
and 25, both Molotov and the Soviet press proclaimed there was no con-
tradiction between a military alliance with the Western powers and a non-
aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet ambassador in Poland also talked 
as if the situation had not changed. Indeed, as late as September 2, when 
Poland was already under German attack, he suggested the Poles should 
ask the USSR for supplies, mentioning Voroshilov's positive statement on 
this as published in the Soviet press on August 27.152 Was this simply cam-
ouflage aimed to strengthen Polish morale and so make the Poles fight the 
Germans as long as possible, or was it something else? Did the Soviet talk 
on August 23 -25 that both the pact and the alliance were not inherently 
151. "Das staatsmannische Interesse Stalins bei Abschluss dieses Paktes bestand 
in einer Politik der Beschwichtigung, der Pakt selbst war vorrangig, ein Instrument 
der sowjetischen beschwichtigungspolitik." Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 434. 
152. Beck informed the Polish embassy in London on September 2, that the 
Soviet ambassador had asked why Poland was not negotiating with the Soviet gov-
ernment regarding supplies, since the Voroshilov interview had opened up this pos-
sibility, PWB, no.171, DPSR, I, no.36. Indeed, on August 27, Izvestiia had reported 
Voroshilov's statement that aid in raw materials and war materials was a commer-
cial, not a military question, so no military convention was needed to supply Po-
land with them, see PWB, no 170, also Degras, SDFP III, 362, Russian text after 
Izvestiia. DiM, VII, no. 104. However, on September 8, Molotov informed the Pol-
ish ambassador that British and French intervention, of which Voroshilov was un-
aware when granting the [press] interview, had created an entirely new situation, so 
the USSR was prepared to supply Poland only with the raw materials provided for 
in the quotas for the current year, PWB no. 172, DPSR, I, no. 39; this document 
and Molotov's statement of September 8 to Grzybowski were not published in DVP 
1939 II. Of course, France and Britain were not at war with Germany until Septem-
ber 3, while Voroshilov's statement was published on August 27. 
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contradictory reflect Stalin's policy? It is possible that he may have allowed 
talk on the compatibility of an alliance with the Western powers and a 
nonaggression pact with Germany to secure Western agreement to his de-
mand regarding Red Army passage through Poland, or to exert pressure 
on Hitler to make more concessions to the USSR, or both. Of course, with-
out access to relevant Soviet documents, these questions will remain unan-
swered. 
There are also questions concerning Stalin's long-term aims in conclud-
ing the pact with Hitler. As mentioned earlier, some Western, a few Rus-
sian, and most Polish historians believe that Stalin deliberately ensured 
Hitler's attack on Poland, thus risking the outbreak of a European war in 
which the USSR would gain some territory, stay on the sidelines, and then 
take advantage of the European powers' exhaustion to expand both Soviet 
power and communism. This view seemed to find confirmation in a Ger-
man newspaper report of July 1996 on a documentary "find" by a Russian 
scholar. This was the text of a speech that Stalin allegedly made to the 
Politburo on August 19, 1939. As it turned out, the speech had been pub-
lished as long as ago as 1939, and Stalin denied it at the time. Some histo-
rians believe it to be a forgery, while others think it is genuine. Neither 
opinion can be proved correct without other documents to confirm it, but 
the date of August 19 was cited by Yakovlev for Stalin's final decision, and 
the document does reflect Soviet thinking as recorded elsewhere. For these 
reasons the text is given below: 
Peace or war? This question has entered into its critical phase. Its solution de-
pends entirely on the position taken by the Soviet Union. We are absolutely 
convinced that is we conclude an alliance treaty with France and Great Britain, 
Germany will see itself obliged to draw back from Poland and to seek a modus 
vivendi with the western powers. In this way, war could be avoided and then, 
later development of this state of affairs will take on a character dangerous to us. 
On the other hand, if we accept the proposal of Germany, that you know, to 
conclude with her a nonaggression pact, Germany will certainly attack Poland 
and the intervention of England and France will be inevitable. 
In these circumstances, we will have a very good chance to stay out of the 
conflict, and we will be able to wait our turn with advantage to us. This is 
precisely what our interest demands. 
Thus, our choice is clear: we should accept the German proposal and send 
the Anglo-French missions back to their countries with a courteous refusal. 
It is not difficult to foresee the advantage that we will draw from this way of 
proceeding. It is evident to us that Poland will be destroyed even before England 
and France are able to come to her aid. In this case, Germany cedes to us a part 
of Poland right up to the outskirts of Warsaw—together with Ukrainian Galicia. 
Germany leaves us complete freedom of action in the three Baltic states. She 
does not oppose the return of Bessarabia to Russia. She is ready to cede us 
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary as our sphere of influence. 
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There remains the question of Yugoslavia, the solution of which depends on 
the position taken by Italy. If Italy remains at Germany's side, she will demand 
that Yugoslavia be included in her sphere of influence, and it is also through 
Yugoslavia that she will obtain access to the Adriatic. But if Italy does not march 
with Germany, the latter will have access to the Adriatic at Italian expense, and 
in that case Yugoslavia will pass into our sphere of influence. 
That is, if Germany is victorious in the war. 
However, we should foresee the possibilities which will result from the defeat 
as well as from the victory of Germany. Let us examine the case of a German 
defeat. England and France will then have enough power to occupy Berlin and 
destroy Germany, and we will not be able to give effective help to the latter. 
Therefore, our goal is that Germany be able to carry on the war as long as 
possible, so that England and France are tired and exhausted to such a point that 
they are no longer able to knock out Germany. 
Consequently our position is that while remaining neutral, we help Germany 
economically, furnishing her with raw materials and food products. But it is 
obvious that our aid should not exceed a certain limit so as not to compromise 
our economic situation and not weaken the power of our army. 
At the same time, we should, in a general way, conduct an active communist 
propaganda, especially in the Anglo-French bloc, and especially in France. We 
should expect that, in this country, our party will be obliged, in time of war, to 
abandon legal measures and move to clandestine activity. We know that this 
activity requires a lot of money, but we should consent to these sacrifices with-
out hesitation. If this preparatory work is duly carried out, German security will 
be assured. The latter can contribute to the sovietisation of France. 
Now, let us examine the second hypothesis, that of German victory. Some 
[people] are of the opinion that this possibility represents the greatest danger to 
us. There is some truth in this assertion, but it would be erroneous to think that 
this danger is as near and as great as some imagine. 
If Germany wins, she will come out of the war too tired to make war on us 
for the following decade. Her main concerns will be to keep watch over defeated 
England and France to prevent them from recovering. 
On the other hand, a victorious Germany will have vast colonies at her dis-
posal. Their exploitation and adaptation to German methods will absorb Ger-
many to an equal extent for several decades. It is evident that Germany will be to 
busy elsewhere to turn against us. 
Comrades, concluded Stalin, I have expounded my considerations to you. I 
repeat that is in your* interest that war breaks out between the Reich and Anglo-
French bloc. It is essential for us that this war lasts as long as possible, so that the 
two sides are exhausted. It is for these reasons that we should accept the pact 
proposed by Germany and work so that the war, once declared, is prolonged to 
the maximum. At the same time, we should intensify economic work"* in the 
belligerent countries, so that we are well prepared for the moment when the war 
ends. 
As it turned out, the German newspaper report was based on a docu-
ment found a few years earlier by the Russian historian Tatiana Bushuyeva, 
who discovered it among documents seized from the Nazis and then stored 
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in the former Soviet war booty archive. She published it Russian transla-
tion in the Russian journal Novy Mir in October 1994. Bushueva believed 
that since the text was in French, it was probably written by a French-
speaking Comintern member present at the meeting.153 There is no confir-
mation of the text from Russian sources, and many historians believe it is a 
forgery.154 However, on September 7, Georgii M. Dimitrov, then head of 
the Comintern, noted Stalin as saying: 
We have nothing against their fighting and weakening each other. It 
would not be bad if German hands shook up the wealthier capitalist coun-
tries (especially England). Hitler, though he does not understand or desire 
it, is shaking up and undermining the capitalist system. 
On the Soviet Union's role in the war he said: "We can maneuver, sup-
port one side against the other; so that they fight each other all the bet-
ter. 39155 It would be strange, indeed, if Stalin did not have such thoughts 
before the conclusion of the pact with Hitler. Furthermore, there are Czech 
and Polish reports on statements made by high Soviet officials in 1940-41 
153. *"votre" [your interest] should probably be "notre." [our interest]. ** It is 
not clear what is meant by "economic work"; perhaps it was to organize worker 
unrest so as to impede war production. The English translation by the author of this 
article is from the original French text as printed in Eberhard Jackel, "Uber eine 
angebliche Rede Stalins vom 19 August 1939," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 
no. 4 (Munich, 1958), 581-582. For the German article of 1996, see Carl Gustav 
Strohm, Moscow, "Stalins Strategic fur Krieg und Frieden. Geheime Dokumente 
beweisen: Sowjetischer Diktator hat Hitlers Angriff auf Polen einkalkuliert," Die 
Welt, July 16, 1996; Russian translation from French by T. Bushueva in section 
"Knizhnoe Obozrenie," Novy Mir; 10 (1994): 232-233.. 
154. According to Eberhard Jackel, the text of the alleged Stalin speech, first 
summarized in a report by the French news agency Havas, was provided by an 
unnamed source to Henry Ruffin, the Havas correspondent in Geneva. Jackel noted 
that the "speech" was published in Geneva in the Revue du Droit International 
no.3 for July-September 1939, and that Stalin's denial appeared in Pravda, 30 No-
vember 1939. The denial was also published in the German press, while the text 
was reprinted in the Geneva journal in 1941 and in the Vichy France Revue 
Universelle in 1944. Jackel concludes that Stalin's motives, as portrayed in the al-
leged speech, were "historically incorrect," and that it was a piece of "prophetic 
fiction" written by a specialist on Bolshevism, see: Jackel, "Uber eine angebliche 
rede Stalins," 589. 
155. Emphasis added, A M..C. See F. I. Firsov, in Komintern: opyt, traditsii, 
uroki, Moscow, 1989, 21; cit. in Nataliia S. Lebedeva, M.M. Narinskii, eds., 
Komintern i Vtoraia Mirovaia Voina, chast 1 do 22 iuniia 1941 g., Moscow, 1994, 
10-11. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Georgii Dimitrov, 1933-1949, New Haven & 
London, 2003, pp. 115-116. 
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about Soviet plans for the Red Army to march into an exhausted Europe, 
which would then become communist.156 
It is, of course, possible to explain Stalin's decision to align the USSR 
with Germany because he expected the latter to invade Poland without any 
significant military reaction by France and Britain, and because he needed 
time to rearm. On this hypothesis, it would be obviously in the Soviet inter-
est to prevent the Germans from taking all of Poland and perhaps Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia as well, while making an ally of Finland. However, it 
seems rather restrictive to view Stalin's policy only in terms of traditional 
"realpolitik," based on the need to assure Soviet security while totally ig-
noring the role of communist ideology. Instead, it seems more appropriate 
to see Stalin's policy in 1939 as a combination of "realpolitik" and the old 
goal of world revolution—in this case, the establishment of Soviet-domi-
nated communist governments in Europe after an exhausting war. 
In conclusion, it seems most likely Stalin decided sometime in spring 1939 
to align with Hitler. He must have calculated that he could risk having the 
German army and air force much nearer to Moscow through a partition of 
Poland, because he expected Hitler to become bogged down in a long war 
with France and Britain. Therefore, he conducted negotiations with the 
Western powers in order to pressure Hitler into an agreement with the 
USSR. Such a policy would form part of the long-term Soviet goal of gain-
ing lasting security for the USSR, which was always identified with the 
spread of communism across the world, but first of all in Europe. Like 
Lenin in 1917-19, Stalin seems to have expected such a state of affairs only 
in the wake of an exhausting war. Again, like Lenin, he seems to have 
viewed Germany as the key European country in an expanded communist 
156. Two Czech reports written in 1940-41 mention statements by Soviet offi-
cials about plans to communize Europe, and one even forecast an autonomous 
Czech republic as part of the USSR; see reports to President Edvard BeneS of No-
vember 6, 1940 and August 10, 1941, Jan Nemecek et al, eds., _eskoslovensko-
sovetske vztahy v diplomatickych jednanich 1939-1945. Dokumenty, dil 1 (brezen 
1939—cerven 1943) (Prague, 1998), nos. 98, 163. Statements by high NKVD offi-
cials on the Red Army marching to the English Channel and a postwar communist 
Europe were recorded by a Polish cavalry captain, a surviving prisoner of war, 
interviewed for military service by the head of the NKVD, Lavrenty P. Beria and his 
deputy, Feodor A. Merkulov in fall 1940, see Narcyz Lopianowski, Rozmowy z 
NKWD, 1940-1941 (Warsaw, 1990), 32, 85 ff. Lopianowski joined a group of 
Polish officers willing to cooperate with the Soviet government, led by General 
Zygmunt Berling, but did so in order to report on the group to his own command-
ing general, see ibid., 93. 
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bloc, which included Poland as the land bridge between Germany and the 
USSR. Finally, all the available documentation indicates that Poland did 
not play any role in Stalin's decision to align with Hitler in 1939, except as 
a convenient scapegoat for breaking off the negotiations for a Soviet alli-
ance with France and Britain. Stalin's view of Poland is probably best re-
flected in a statement noted by Dimitrov during the latter's meeting with 
the "Vozhd" on September 7, 1939. Stalin characterized it as "fascist state" 
which oppressed Ukrainians and Belorussians, and said: 
The destruction of this state in present circumstances would mean one bour-
geois, fascist, state less! Would it be a bad thing if, as a result of the defeat of 
Poland, we expanded the socialist system to new territories and populations?157 
It is more than likely that these were also Stalin's thoughts about Poland 
for a long time before he concluded his fateful agreement with Hitler in 
August 1939. 
157. See Lebedeva and Narinskii, Komintern, cit. note 155 above; trans. A.M.C. 
